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ABSTRACT 
THE HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND FOREIGN LABOR 
IN THE UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS: 
A POLICY ANALYSIS 
E. Aracelis Francis 
This study examines the foreign-worker crisis in the United 
States Virgin Islands during the twenty-year period from its 
inception to 1976. The role of social workers in policy formulation 
is discussed in terms of the development and role of the Virgin 
Islands Department of Social Welfare, specifically this agency's 
response to the needs of the foreign workers and to the community 
in general. 
The author hypothesizes that the lack of appropriate and 
adequate responses sprang from (1) the federal government                      
more to business interests than to the social needs of the foreign 
workers and their families; (2) the federal and local governments 
viewing the foreign workers as temporary and failing to envisage the 
emergence of critical social problems; (3) the federal government's 
disregard for whether or not the local government could deal with the 
socioeconomic consequences of migratory workers; (4) the local govern-
ment's bypassing the needs of the foreign workers in order to 
preserve scarce services for the native-born and voting population; 
and (5) the local government's failure to develop adequate policies 
and programs to deal with the consequences of the foreign-workers 
2 
program being directly related to the local government's inability 
to influence federal policies. 
Hypotheses one through four are supported by the study data, 
but the fifth was not supported. 
The author points to the Virgin Islands' territorial status, 
. 
and the consequent prejudicial relationship vis-a-vis Washington as 
a dominating factor in both federal and local policy formulation and 
execution. United States citizenship in the Virgin Islands does not 
                    the same benefits as citizenship on the United States main-
land. In particular, Virgin Islanders do not vote for the President 
and the Vice President nor do they receive Supplemental. Security 
Income (SSI). Only recently in fact have Virgin Islands secured 
representation       the federal Congress--a non-voting delegate. The 
author traces the local government-federal government relationship 
from its earliest roots through 1976. Particularly important is the 
haphazard manner in which funds are provided for Congressionally 
mandated programs in the Virgin Islands. 
. Policy implications and recommendations are based on the 
distinction between the cultural and socioeconomic characteristics 
of the Virgin Islands and         United States mainland and on the 
planning necessary when large numbers of migrants are introduced into 
a society. 
The author contends that (1) the migrant workers should become 
healthy, productive, and contributing. members of the Virgin Islands 
society, the basic goal of such a policy being successful integration 
into the community; (2) the local government must actively plan for 
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the health, education, and w.elfare of the migrant labor force. In 
the final analysis, the local government is held responsible for the 
migrant work force; (3) local social service programs must fit local 
mores and cultural values; (4) the federal government must provide 
training and resources to effectively and efficiently carry new pro-
grams out. The Virgin Islands' ambiguous status has made this a 
major problem in providing adequate social welfare services. 
In order to implement policy successfully, clarification of the 
relationship between the Virgin Islands government and the United 
States government is necessary. Also necessary is evaluation of the 
cultural and socioeconomic differences of an island community with 
limited resources and different needs than the United States 
continent. 
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During the two decades from 1956 to 1976, the United States 
Virgin Islands experienced unprecedented economic development and 
population growth. (Appendix A shows the islands rapid economic 
development as illustrated by its population growth statistics.) 
For example, in this period, the Virgin Islands government's 
budget was increased thirty-two times from $4,095,60l.0q in 1955 
to $128,680,635.00 in 1976. 1 Per-capita income increased 680 per-
cent from approximately $675.00 in 1955 to $4,596.00 in 1976. 
Business licenses sextupled from 1,527 in 1955 to 8,278 in 1976 
(down from a high of 10,981 in 1973). Building and construction 
permits showed a similar growth from 367 in 1955 to 888 in 1976 
(from a high of 1,880 in 1970). 
Most important for the purposes of this study is the dramatic 
increase in total population: estimated at 29,000 in 1955, 32,099 
in 1960, 49,747 in 1965, 75,151 in 1970, and 95,650 in 1976. 
lVirgin Islands Government Budget for Fiscal Year 1960. Sub-
mitted by Governor John D. Merwin in April 1959 (St. Thomas, Virgin 
Islands: Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 94. 
This growth has brought profound changes to the previously 
underdeveloped and isolated Virgin Island communities of St. ThoDlas, 
St.               and St. John. l The close interpersonal relationships 
encouraged by a small population and the community cohesion that 
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once characterized these                 no longer exists. Today, the United 
States Virgin Islands are marked by increased community tensions, 
alienation of               deteriorating interpersonal relationships, and 
increased crime. In short,           are afflicted with all the. ills of 
a modern industrial society in the last quarter of the twentieth 
century. 
In comparison witp             communities, however, the United 
States Virgin                   with a population estimated at still under 
100,000 in 1976, is relatively small. One might well assume, 
therefore, that the problems facing the Virgin Islands could be 
easily understood, analyzed. and resolved. Unfortunately, this is 
not the case. Lewis aptly describes the problem as a rapidly 
increasing population accompanied by very little planned effort to 
increase welfare facilities and services to meet the explosion. 2 
The central question, then, is why was there not planned effort to 
provide the services needed by the ever-increasing population? The 
present study attempts to find answers to this question in the course 
of tracing the history of foreign labor in the American Virgin Islands 
lA1though sixty-eight islands officially comprise the United 
States. Virgins, these three islands are by far the largest and most 
important. 
2Gordon K. Lewis, The Virgin Islands: A Caribbean Lil1iput 
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1972), p. 225. 
and its impact on ,the social welfare system during the twenty years 
from 1956 to 1976. We shall, of course, discuss the policies of 
the Virgin Islands government, and thus the policies and programs 
of its social welfare bureaucracy during this critical juncture. 
Background of the Problem 
Discussions of the foreign labor problem in the United States 
Virgin Islands during the period of our study must invariably center 
on the 1956 decision to permit the entry of large numbers of foreign 
workers from the British, French. and Dutch West Indies1:'in order to 
stimulate the Islands' economic development by providing an expanded 
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labor pool in the private sector. There were approximately 630 foreign 
workers admitted to the Virgin Islands in 1957; by 1960, the number 
had increased to 3,688. In 1965, 10,715 workers were admitted and 
by 1971 this number had increased again to 12,500. The 1976 figure 
declined to 7,250 due to the Islands' economic recession and the 
fact that many foreign workers had been granted permanent-resident 
status, entitling them to apply for American citizenship.2 
The 1956 decision was motivated by the fact that in the 1950s, 
Virgin Islanders were primarily concerned with the economic deve1op-
ment of the Islands and the potential for improving the standard of 
lSee for example, Ralph Blumenthal, "Invited Aliens Find 
Welcome Squeezed Dry in Job-Tight Virgin Islands", The San Juan Star, 
May 16, 1976; Ralph Blumenthal, "Imported Workers on Virgin Islands 
Pose Immigration Problems", The New York Times, Saturday, May 15, 
1976, p. 13 and           Department of Commerce, Economic Development 
Policy Guidelines (Draft), Prepared by the Economic Policy Council, 
January 1978. 
2See Table 1 for the numbers of foreign workers in the U.S. 
Virgin Islands during the fiscal years 1957 to 1976. 
TABLE 1 
FOREIGN WORKERS IN THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS 
FROM FISCAL YEARS 1857 TO 1976 
Fiscal Year Tota1* Fiscal Year 
1957 1,256 1967 
1958 1.500 1968 
1959 3,008 1969 
1960 3,688 1970 
1961 4,971 1971 
1961 6,297 1972 
1963 7,427 1973 
1964 8,742 1974 
1965 10,715 1975 












      figures available as foreign labor certification program was 
being transferred from the Virgin Islands Employment Security· 
Agency to the U.S. Department of Labor. 
*Tota1s from 1960 to 1970 are adjusted totals as foreign workers 
were certified every six months so total figures had to be 
readjusted to reflect this. 
Sources: 1957. 1958, 1959 and 1964 Virgin Islands Employment 
Service Annual Reports, St. Thomas, Virgin Islands: Government 
Printing Office, 1957, 1958, 1959 and 1964; 1968, 1972 and 1973 
Virgin Islands Employment Security Agency Annual Reports, St. 
Thomas Virgin Islands: Government Printing Office, 1968, 1972 
and 1973; 1965, 1967 and 1969 Annual Report of the Governor of 
the Virgin Islands to the Secretary of Interior, Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965, 1967 and 1969; 1971 figures 
from U.S. Department of Labor, Manpower Administration, Alien 
Certification Office, St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands, Annual 
Report, Fiscal Year 1973 (Mimeographed) p. 2 and figures for- 1974, 
1975 and 1976 were secured from Mr. Plunkett, Director of the 
Alien Certification Office, Manpower Administration, U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor, St.                 Virgin Islands on November 22, 1978. 
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living through increased government revenues, the development of 
public services, and the creation of additional jobs. The negative 
consequences of the large-scale migration of foreign workers were 
conveniently overlooked. Their status as temporary workers encouraged 
a prevailing attitude that the society did not need to plan for this 
group because they would return to their native islands once they 
were no longer                 It soon became obvious, however, that the 
'b f'll d b th f' k . ft' b I JO s     eye               wor ers were       act permanen JO s, 
that they were not returning to their native islands, and were 
establishing families in the American Virgin Islands. Despite the 
situation of foreign workers, no plans were made by the government 
to assist foreign workers in meeting minimum needs for housing, 
health care, or protection of their job rights. Their permanent status 
was officially ignored. 
Consequently, foreign workers were forced to fend for them-
selves: as low-wage employees, they were unable to pay the high 
rentals demanded in the private housing market; as non-citizens, 
they were denied access to the public-housing program. On the other 
hand. Virgin Islanders who were experiencing the same cost problems 
in the private housing market were assisted by the department of 
social welfare's Emergency Housing Program. Excluded from both 
IThe U.S. Immigration and Nationalization Service had argued 
that the jobs that were available in the U.S. Virgin Islands were 
in fact permenent jobs and had used this as their rationale for 
denying entry to foreign workers under the temporary workers 
section of the Immigration and Nationality Act, prior to 1956. See 
U.S. Congress,               Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and 
International Law, Nonimmigrant Alien Labor Program on the Virgin 
Islands of the United States, 94th Congress. 1st Sess., 1975, pp. 
7-8. 
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public housing and emergency housing, foreign workers were thus 
relegated to the Islands' slum housing--where they were forced to 
live in deplorable conditions. 
Similar treatment was accorded them in other areas. For 
example,             paid the full cost of health care--if they were granted 
access to health-care services. (When serious illness struck the 
foreign worker often had to return to his native island.) Since 
their employment was contingent on their employer's whim, they were 
hardly in a position to assert themselves and demand rights such as 
a minimum wage, maximum work week. and holiday and vacation pay that 
citizen employees were guaranteed. The-i.r families were denied entry 
into the American Virgin Islands, unless their spouses were also able 
to present proof of employment as a condition of' entry. Their non-
citizen children were denied access to the public-school system. 
Thus, if they were able to bring their children to the Virgin Islands, 
foreign workers were forced to pay for private-school tuition from 
their low wages. These substandard conditions endured by foreign 
workers affected them and their families in many ways.l Continued 
indifference to their plight generated social tensions and group 
hostilities which prevented the integration of the foreign workers 
into the Virgin Islands community. Official neglect of the foreign 
lThe two major studies on foreign workers conducted by the 
Social, Educational Research and Development, Inc. (SERD) and 
entitled "Aliens in the U.S. Virgin Islands: Temporary Workers in 
a Permanent Economy" and "A Profile and Plans for the Temporary Alien 
Worker Problem in the U.s. Virgin Islands" document the mUltiple 
problems which they faced. They were published in January 1968 for 
the College of the Virgin Islands and on August 25, 1969 for the 
Office of Economic Opportunity respectively. 
workers helped to provide a unifying chord and within a few years 
these same workers asserted their rights and demanded a recognized 
place in Island society. Attempts to address these demands by both 
the local and federal governments often resulted in a haphazard and 
inconsistent application of policies which, as we shall discover in 
later chapters of this study, exacerbated existing problems rather 
than resolved them. l 
Policy Analysis 
Gil defines policies as guiding principles or courses of 
action adopted and pursued by societies and their governments, as 
well as by various groups or units within societies. Specific 
policies are intended to govern specified domains of a society 
or its subunits. Any policy may affect domains other than the 
one with which it is primarily concerned. Gil also suggests that 
the fragmented, parochial, and incremental approaches to social 
policy are the result of pressures from various self-serving groups 
in the "social marketplace" to change conditions which tl1ey consider 
2 undesirable in terms of their perceived interests. 
A comprehensive review of the history of the foreign-labor 
program and the delivery of social welfare services in the American 
Virgin Islands shows that a coherent policy was made impossible by 
the perceived interests of various groups in the society. This 
lGordon K. Lewis, OPe cit.; Valdemar A. Hill, Sr., Rise to 
Recognition (St. Thomas. Virgin Islands: By the Author), 1971, 
and Edward A. O'Neill. Rape of the American Virgins (New York: 
Praegcr Publishers, 1972). 
2David G. Gil, Unraveling Social Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Schenkman Publishing Company. 1973). pp. 12 and xiii. 
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factor, along with insufficient appreciation of the nature of the 
key processes through which social policy systems operate, prevent-
ed systematic analysis and synthesis of the policies relating to 
the temporary alien worker. 
In this study, Gil's framework for the systematic analysis 
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of existing or newly proposed social policies will be used to 
achieve the three objectives of social-policy analysis and snythesis. 
The objectives are: 
1. Gaining an understanding of the issues that constitute 
the focus of a specific social policy or social policy 
cluster which is being analyzed or developed. 
2. Discerning the chain of substantive effects resulting, 
or expected to result, from the implementation of a 
given social policy, including intended and unintended 
short- and long-range effects. 
3. Generating alternative policies aimed at the same or 
at different objectives concerning the focal issues. l 
Of particular importance to the present author is the fact 
that the main sections of Gil's framework are designed to elicit 
answers to five basic questions concerning a policy: 
1. Which of the many domains of concern to a society 
constitute the focus for this policy? 
lIbid., pp. 31-32. 
2. How would the policy affect this domain in substantive 
terms? 
3. How would society as a whole be affected by the sub-
stantive consequences of the policy? 
4. What effects may be expected from the interaction of the 
policy with various forces within and outside the society? 
5. What alternative policies could be designed to achieve 
the same or different policy objectives concerning the 
specified domain?l 
8 
Answers to these five basic questions, in terms of the policies 
of the Virgin Islands foreign-labor program and the delivery of 
social welfare ·services, should help to illuminate our discussion. 
Theoretical Considerations 
There is an extensive body of literature on immigration. How-
ever, little has been written about social welfare policy and its 
relationship to migration. Although the United States is often 
dp.scribed as a nation of immigrants, no dominant public policy has 
been developed to deal with the provision of services to the United 
States domestic migrant poor such as the Blacks, Puerto Ricans, or 
) migrant farm workers. 
Eaton writes that planning with respect to internal migration 
is a frontier of social work practice that has been but partially 
IIbid., p. 36. 
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explored. Migration presumably offers an opportunity for people to 
improve their lives, but when the migrants are poor, the lack of 
financial reserves heightens the problems inherent in mobility. 
This condition is compounded by the fact that poor people move in 
order to take low-paying entry-level jobs which few, if any, of the 
area's settled residents are willing to take. Too, when a large influx 
of migrants into a community occurs, overt expressions of prejudice 
are often stimulated among the area's settled popu1ation.1 In the 
American Virgin Islands. this phenomenon is reflected by the prejudice 
which natives manifest against migrant West Indians. This discrimi-
nation, based on superior numbers and politics, kept migrant West 
Indians out of government jobs and public schooling for many years.2 
Migration, however, is clearly a two-sided phenomen0!1: Figure 1 
taken from Eaton, is a graphic description of the therapeutic and 
stressful consequences of migration. 
Figure 1 charts the pressures that pushed the migrant West 
Indian to leave his native island and seek a living elsewhere. By 
moving to the United States Virgin Is1andsthe migrant was freed from 
the ascribed low status-in his own community, he was able to secure 
employment and new job skills, thus expanding his earnings potential. 
As Figure 1 shows, the foreign worker's move to the Virgin Islands 
was also very stressful. Assigned a low status in the Virgin Islands 
1Joseph W. Eaton (ed.). Migration and Social Welfare (New York: 
National Association of Social Workers, Inc., 1971), pp. v, x, xiii 
and xiv. 
2Mario C. Moorhead, Mammon vs. History (American Paradise or 
Virgin Islands Home) (Frederiksted. St. Croix: Square Deal Printer, 







PARADIGM OF SOCIAL WELFARE ASPECTS OF 
MIGRATION AND RESIDENTIAL MOVEMENT 
Therapeutic Consequences 
Freedom from ascribed low 
status. 
Opportunity to achieve a 
new status. 
Optimum economic use of 
one's labor. 
Freedom to follow new 
avenues of endeavor. 
Continuity of ascribed 
status with support from 
a familiar environment. 
Good knowledge of local 
conditions. 
Continuity of primary 
group relationships and 
friendship ties with 
parents, relatives, and 
neighbors of long stand-
ing. 
Stressful Consequences 
High risk of loneliness 
and anomie. 
Need to adjust to strange 
environmen t. 
Help may be available in 
an emergency or must be 
purchased commercially. 
Limited opportunities to 
achieve new status. 
Limited economic use of 
one's labor. 
Low rate of upward mobility. 
High degree of social con-
trol in primary groups 
with strong ties--parents, 
relatives, and neighbors 
of long standing. 
community, forced to adjust to different economic standards, lack-
ing familiarity with the local standards and mores, the foreign 
worker was an outsider suffering from an acute sense of loneliness. 
These stressful consequences were mitigated by the restricted 
opportunities available to the foreign, worker if he remained in the 
West Indies. The undeveloped state of the largely agricultural 
Caribbean economy, and the high rate of unemployment, made the 
United State's Virgin Islands an attractive alternative for an un-
skilled worker. l 
As may be observed in Figure 2, attempts can be made to 
. . confront the problems generated by migrants. Communities can make 
choices to use local funds either to help migrants adjust or to 
help their own people. These choices have obvious consequences 
in terms of the eventual integration of the migrants into the 
community. Figure 2, again from Eaton, illustrates policy 
alternatives. 
As we have shown, the welfare policy alternatives chosen in 
the United States Virgin Islands were mainly hostile. Prior to 
the late 1960s, little official concern was evinced for the foreign 
workers' problems. Simultaneously, there was virtually no inter-
ference with the practice of bringing large numbers of foreign 
workers to the Virgin Islands. The hostility encompassed economic, 





discussion of population policy in the Caribeen see 
Politics and Population in the Caribbean (Rio Piedras, 










































to help people make 
new social contacts. 
Open-door policy for 
newcomers by clubs .. 
churches. and other 
social programs 
Absence of special measures or of concern·for the problems of migrants 
in the area of destination; absence of efforts to inferfere with migration 














tions on welfare 
eligibili ty. 
Arrest or harrassment 
of people in need of 
help. 
Deportation from 
area of destination 
if help is needed. 
Second-class services 
in clinics and 
schools used by new-
comers. 





on voting. public 
services. and 
other rights. 









Social exclusiQn of 
newcomers. 
Viewing migrants only 
as labor. not as 
people and neighbors. 
Closed-door policies 
in clubs and other 
social facilities. 
Restrictive convenants 
in residential areas. 
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foreign workers often received wages below the legal minimum 
because they were unaware of their rights and no government agency 
effectively regulated the Islands' minimum-wage laws. They were 
also excluded from certain fringe benefits such as social security, 
were ineligible for public assistance, excluded from public housing 
and public schooling, and were often deported if intensive medical 
care was needed. Additionally, they were denied the right to vote 
and discriminated against by the police. In brief, foreign workers 
were viewed by the community as temporary laborers with negligible 
rights rather than fellow citizen neighbors. 
In recommending the establishment of a comprehensive migration 
policy by the federal government, Reid indicates that advocates of 
such a policy base their case on two assumptions: first, that un-
controlled internal migration contributes to a number of serious 
social problems; second, that                           federal intervention in 
migration can alleviate these problems. 1 The Virgin Islands 
experience is a dramatic example of the need for well-planned 
intervention. The absence of a strong federal policy led to serious 
unanticipated consequences for the Virgin Islands. 
Although the Virgin Islands remains a territory of the United 
States, it is comparable to a developing country and as such is 
some ways unique in its relationship with the United States main-
land. The pertinent literature implies that a place like the Virgin 
lWi1liam J. Reid, "Federal Migration Policy: Present Reality 
and Future Alternatives," in Migration and Social Welfare, ed. by 
Joseph W. Eaton (New York: National Association of Social Workers, 
1971), p. 158. 
14 
Islands can expect to experience difficulty in addressing its prob-
lems:;· Waterston, for example, makes the point that even in those 
developing countries where planning has been attempted, many 
problems arise with the implementation of the p1ans. 1 The Virgin 
Islands did not plan for its growing popu1ation--no overa11,':guide-
lines existed with which to assess                                       and economic 
problems. 
However. as a developing area the Virgin Islands had different. 
problems in many instances from the United States mainland. Caiden 
and Wi1davsky point out that the requisites of comprehensive economic 
planning do not exist in poor                       In addition to being poor 
and lacking money, developing countries also lack capable manpower, 
useful data, and government capacity to effectively mobilize 
existing resources. 2 Without an abundance of men, money, and 
relevant institutions, areas like the Virgin Islands, eved with 
access to United States mainland resources, are unable to fulfill 
identified needs of the community. 
A migration policy that fails to reflect the.community's total 
needs will adversely affect the functioning both of the community at 
large and the community's basic unit--the family. We shall attempt to 
show in this study that the implementation of a hostile welfare policy 
1A1bert Waterston, Development Planning: Lessons of 
Experience (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), 
pp. vii-viii. 
'2Naomi Caiden and Aaron Wildavsky, Planning and Budgeting 
in Poor Countries (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974), p. vii. 
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had severe socioeconomic and political consequences for the entire 
Virgin Islands community and was not limited to merely the alienation 
of the large foreign-labor population. 
Value of Study 
Throughout the history of the Virgin Islands foreign labor 
program, the local and federal governments have oversimplified their 
responses to this complex issue. As a native Virgin Islander, the 
author sought to understand why the foreign-worker dilemma had been 
allowed to reach crisis proportions. As a social worker, the author 
was concerned with the multiple needs of migrants and the appropriate 
role that social workers should play in formulating policies to 
provide social-welfare services. 
Recognizing that the foreign-labor problem had had a profound 
effect on every aspect of life in the United States Virgin Islands, 
the author elected to focus research on the delivery of social-welfare 
services to the foreign-labor population within the context of an 
historical study and social-policy analysis of the foreign-labor 
program and the Virgin Islands Department of Social Welfare. A 
number of primary hypotheses were generated during the research phase 
of the present study: 
1. The federal and the local government viewed the alien 
workers as temporary and failed to envisage the emergence of social 
problems. 
2. The federal government responded more to business interests 
than to the social needs of "temporary" alien workers and their 
families. 
3. The federal government paid no attention to whether or 
not the local government could deal with the socioeconomic conse-
quences of migratory workers. 
4. The local government disregarded the needs of the 
"temporary" alien worker because it wanted to preserve scarce 
services for the native-born and voting population. 
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5. The local government's failure to develop adequate policies 
and programs to deal with the consequences of the "temporary" alien-
worker program was directly related to the inability of the local 
government to influence federal policies. 
An important issue to be scrutinized in this study is the 
complex consequences a·ccruing to a government subunit that follows 
national policy. Despite the large and widely separated geographical 
areas encompassed by the United States and the regional variations, 
broad national policies are developed. Since a broad national 
policy by definition cannot consider local peculariarities, the 
intended benefits are often subverted in the local units and/or 
additional problems created. 
In relation to the above, the Virgin Islands is culturally 
and socially unique, and its territorial status and powerlessness 
in influencing national policy illustrate the difference in power 
between a government subunit and a national· unit. Hopefully, there-
fore, the present study should also provide a perspective on the 
following: 
the effects of a national pf1licy on the unique subunits 
within the nation; and 
the ability or inability of local units to meet the un-
anticipated consequences of national policy. 
Methodology 
The author of the                               a native Virgin Islander, 
began her research on this project in 1972. Over the course of 
twenty-four months of intensive research, the author learned many 
new things about the United States Virgin Islands, not the least 
of which was that the Islands have a distinct, strong personality 
of their own, even more so than may be at first apparent to an 
observer who considered herself to be very familiar with them. 
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A valuable point of departure in any discussion of the Islands 
is that they were, and are, a developing area. Thus, while           . 
were limited by and benefitted from policies formulated in mainland 
Washington, the Virgin Islands retained their own flavorful 
character--a character molded to a significant degree by,the history 
of the Caribean, of which they were an integral part, and almost 
accidentally by their relationship to the United States. As we 
shall see in later chapters, the Virgin Islands traditionally have 
been viewed as an afterthought on the part of federal legislators 
and policy planners, rather than as a critical policy concern. 
The author's familiarity with the Islands and the people who 
live on them guided her during the research period and undoubtedly 
assuaged, but did not remove, some of the barriers attending 
specialized research in a developing area. The primary sources 
of information in scrutinizing the history of foreign labor and 
its impact on the social welfare system during the twenty years 
from 1956 to 1976 were the various documents of the era. These 
included government reports and minutes of government meetings, 
census records, police files, newspaper a.nd magazine articles, 
various statistical files, and available scholarly research 
pertaining to the subject. l Access to the Department of Social 
Welfare's files proved instrumental in reading information that 
was not included in the Department's annual reports. 
A secondary source of information was informal interviews. 
The central barrier to assembling and interpreting infor-
mation was that recordkeeping in the United States Virgin Islands 
reflected the Islands' status as a developing area. Specifically, 
records were often incomplete, sometimes missing or misplaced, 
and not infrequently contradictory or patently erroneous. Too, 
records or memoranda often proved not to be housed where yet 
other records said they should be. If by definition scholarly 
research demands patience, then scholarly research in this case 
demanded a 1aborous. pouring over and sorting out of a mass of 
poorly organized information. 
On a smaller· scale, the same held true of informant 
interviews: an interview scheduled for one day might in reality 
finally take place days or even weeks later. 
1See the Bibliography for a complete listing of the sources 
used in this study. 
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In refining the research data, the researcher was aided 
greatly by the work of Katz. who suggests that the dilemmas posed by 
the conflict between the anthropological and the quantitative 
approaches in social research can be readily resolved by utilizing 
the anthropological approach as the initial stage in a field study. 
The phase which he calls the "scouting expedition" or "anthropological 
short-cut" lists ten practical procedures. Katz suggests that this 
phase can be utili'zed to secure the full advantages of seeing the 
situation as a whole and grasping the fundamental relationships:l 
1. Contacts should not be limited to a narrow segment of 
informants as people are limited in their                               their 
daily social roles. This researcher talked informally to top 
administrators, program directors, middle managers, supervisors, 
social workers, and clerical staff of the Department of Social 
Welfare and a group of present or former staff members in the 
Department of Labor, Virgin Islands Employment Service, the 
Housing Authority, Education, and Health. These contacts repre-
sented a broad cross-section of opinion and information. 
2. The informants have a wide             of contacts. A native 
librarian was eSpecially helpful in suggesting sources of infor-
mation, securing information that was not readily available, and 
gaining access to people who would have the needed information. 
lDaniel Katz,' "Field Studies," in Leon Festinger and Daniel 
Katz, ed., Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), pp. 68-74. 
20 
3. Locate" and consult w.ith informal leaders as well as c 4 4 , 
people in positions of formal leadership. Formal and informal 
leaders of groups such as the foreign-workers' organizations, and 
, anti-foreign-workers organizations, and other civic and concerned 
community groups were identified and consulted informally on an 
ongoing basis. 
4. Check discrepancies in accounts of various informants; 
This was especially critical in this study and the researcher used 
a variety of documents and sources to check discrepancies in written 
reports, informal"discussions, or in information commonly accepted 
by the community. 
5. Assess information from respondents in relation to their 
social role         position, their group membership, and their per-
sonal activities. Wherever possible, information such as residence, 
political party, nativity, social class, race, religion, and social 
affiliations were secured about governors, commissioners, federal 
officials or congressmen and others who were in influential positions. 
6. Considerable time should be spent in participant obser-
vations. The researcher was brought up in the Virgin Islands. This 
provided a perspective that would otherwise have been impossible. 
7. Personalized and private beliefs should be sought as well 
as the socially accepted climate of opinion. The researcher taught 
thirty government employees who were primarily from the Department 
of Social Welfare. Both the foreign-labor program and the Depart-
ment of Social Welfare were discussed; workers freely shared their 
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feelings and opinions about both programs. This experience provided 
insight into their personal beliefs. Additionally, radio talk shows 
were also an invaluable source of information for personalized and 
private beliefs due to the strongly opposing positions on the 
appropriate role of the foreign workers in the Virgin Islands community. 
8. Full records should be kept" py field workers. The researcher 
devised a series of headings (which are listed in Appendix B). The 
research data         then organized according to these headings in a 
five-by-eight-inch card system and in a letter-size loose-leaf folder 
system that ultimately numbered fourteen large loose-leaf books. 
Information that could be placed on five-by-eight-inch cards went 
into that system and longer material went into the loose-leaf folders. 
Other materials such as notes from annual reports or congressional 
hearings were filed together. When writing on a particular topic, 
all the material from that section was reviewed. This system 
enabled the researcher to easily retrieve needed information. 
9. Initial impressions and global judgments should not 
necessarily be discarded. As a native Virgin Islander, the 
researcher naturally started out with certain impressions and 
assumptions about the foreign-labor program and the Department of 
Social Welfare. Some of these impressions were confirmed while 
others were not. 
10. Available records and                     sources should be studied 
carefully and the operational procedures for deriving such records 
examined. The portion of this study that deals with changes in 
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the social services was the major area where operational procedures 
had to be examined. Since it was unlikely that reporting procedures 
would remain the same indefinitely, it was crucial to make sure, for 
example, that differences reflected differences in services and not 
changes in accounting procedures. Thus, particular emphasis was 
placed on changes in the operational procedures that could make the 
data non-comparable from one period of time to another. For example, 
Table I noted that administration of the foreign-labor program was 
shifted from the Virgin Islands Employment Security Agency to the 
United States Department of Labor. In the reporting system of the 
first agency, certifications were counted while the second system 
counted people. Since each worker had to be certified every six 
months, the Virgin Islands Employment Security Agency system could 
be made roughly comparable by adjusting the number of certifications, 
thus producing an estimate of the number of foreign workers. 
Adherence to Katz's ten steps together with the broad range 
of sources used hopefully helped to unify the data in an accurate 
and fair manner. 
Overview of the Chapters 
Now that we have introduced the subject of the study, dis-
cussed some of the literature relating to it, and hopefully given 
the reader an understanding of the methodology used, we shall 
describe, in brief, the following chapters. 
The impact of foreign labor on th.e Virgin Islands cannot be 
adequately appreciated unless the reader is familiar with the 
historia1, political, and socioeconomic context of the Islands. 
Chapter II, "Political History," traces the historical and 
political growth of the Virgin Islands while focusing on the 
relationship between the United States government and the Virgin 
Islands government. 
Chapter III, "Socioeconomics and the initiation of the Foreign 
Labor Program," describes the Islands' socioeconomic conditions at 
the time of their purchase by the United States, the successes and 
failures of the naval administration, the New Deal, World War II, 
and the political changes resulting from universal sufferage. 
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Chapter III analyzes the interplay between the difficulties involved 
in creating a viable economy and the Islanders' expectations of 
improvement in the standard of living. It also explores the relation-
ship between these forces and the desires of the business entre-
preneurs who developed the Islands' economy in the 1950s and secured 
the initiation of the foreign-labor program. 
Chapter IV "Consequences of the Foreign Labor Program," 
provides details of the program and its rapid growth. Also discussed 
is the response of this growth by various interests including the 
Virgin Islands. 1.egis1ature. which developed protective legislation 
for resident workers; the College of the Virgin Islands, which con-
vened a conference to discuss the impact; the response of various 
government agencies to the foreign worker and his family; and the 
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federal government, which initially ignored the foreign-labor pro-
gram but eventually reasserted control. Chapter IV closes with an 
examination of the major executive, legislative, and judicial 
decisions that led in the 1970s to the integration of the foreign 
workers into Virgin Islands society. Chapter IV also reveals the 
                of various branches of the Virgin Islands and United States 
governments to effectively plan for the consequences of foreign-
labor migration. 
Chapters V through VII examine the development of the Virgin 
Islands Department of Social Welfare. Chapter V, "The Development 
of Social Welfare Services," deals with the history of the Depart-
ment beginning with the extension to the Islands of the major relief 
:'1 
programs of the New Deal and ends in the late 1950s. By that time 
the Department of Social Welfare attempted to duplicate the services 
of United States mainland agencies, even though it did not have the 
resources to do this effectively_ Thus, Chapter V analyzes the 
demands placed on the agency by federal regulations, the restrictive 
financial provisions and other constraints under which the Depart-
ment had to operate. and the effect these had on the delivery of 
social welfare services to Virgin Islands' residents. 
Chapters VI and VII describe the delivery of social welfare 
services to the foreign-labor population from 1960 to 1976. Chapter 
VI, "Aging. Special Programs. and Public Assistance," focuses on the 
services of the Division of Aging and Special Programs and the 
Division of Public Assistance services that should have met the 
needs of the foreign laborers. Chapter VI demonstrates that the 
discriminatory federal financial treatment of the Virgin Islands 
required ever-increasing local expenditures for these programs. 
This treatment, in turn, reduced the ability of the Department to 
meet the minimum needs of low-income Virgin Islands residents, 
especially the foreign laborers. 
Chapter VII, "Child Welfare," focuses on the growth of the 
various programs provided by the Division of Child Welfare such as 
services to children in their own homes, institutional care, 
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foster care, adoptions, and day care. Chapter VII emphasizes that 
the division was overwhelmed by the increased demands created by 
limited funds. severe staff shortages and expanding service mandates • 
. . Chapter VIII, "Conclusion" reexamines the information in the 
preceding chapters in terms of which of the five hypotheses pre-
sented previously were supported by the data. A discussion of the 
possible policy implications follows. then recommendations are 
made on the structural arrangements that should be considered when 
large numbers of migrants are introduced into a society. Chapter 
VIII concludes by pointing out that implementations of these policy 
recommendations will require a reassessment of (1) the position or 
relationship of the Virgin Islands government vis-a-vis the United 
States government, and (2) the cultural, socioeconomic, and develop-
ment differences and constraints of an island conununity with limited 
resources and needs differing from the United States mainland. 
Now, we proceed to Chapter II. "Political History." 
CHAPTER II 
POLITICAL HISTORY 
Chapter II will focus on the historical-political forces that 
have shaped the Virgin Islands government, particularly since it be-
came a United States territory in 1917. The establishment and develop-
ment of the foreign-labor program and socia]. ...                 services in the 
United State Virgin Islands can only be understood if viewed within 
the context of these historical-political forces. These forces pro-
vide a perspective on the peculiar nature of the Virgin Islands-
United States relationships. 
We shall begin Chapter II with a brief presentation of several 
basic historical and geographical facts followed by a discussion of 
Danish control of the Islands. Next, we shall examine the United 
States purchase of the Islands from Denmark and then focus on the 
control aspects of United States sovereignty including the extension 
to the Islands of federal laws, the status of American citizenship for 
the Islands, interpretations of the Islands' constitutional position, 
and the post-naval administration period marked by the Congressional 
"organic" acts of 1936 and 1954 and the elective governor's mandate 
of 1968. 
The reader should note that in Chapter II, as throughout this 




Historical and Geographical Framework 
Under the terms of the August 4, 1916 treaty in which the United 
States agreed to purchase the Virgin Islands for twenty-five million 
dollars in gold coins, the United States government received the three 
major islands of St. Thomas, St. John, and St. Croix and forty other 
islets and cays of volcanic origin. Geographically, the islands are a 
part of the Antilles which form the dividing line between the Caribbean 
1 Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. This location, whi-ch is in the path of 
the trade winds, made the Virgin Islands an important port of call 
during the days of sailing ships. It was also an important link in 
the triangular trade between the United States, Africa, and the 
2 Caribbean during the l600s and l700s. 
Prior to the advent of modern communications and jet transporta-
tion, the isolation of the Virgin Islands was a significant factor in 
the development of relationships, especially misunderstandings, between 
the Islands' government and the United States government. The Virgin 
Islands lie 1,400 miles southeast of New York, 990 miles south and east 
of Miami, Florida, 1,646 air miles from Washington, D. C., and 40 miles 
. 3 east of Puerto Rico. 
lConvention Between the United States and Denmark, Etc., Treaty 
Series, No. 629; CONVENTION between the United States and Denmark, 39 
Stat. 1706 (Cession of the Danish West Indies), and J. Antonio Jarvis, 
Brief History of the Virgin Islands (St. Thomas: The Art Shop, 1938), p.9. 
2John P. Knox, A Historical Account of St. Thomas, W.I. (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1852), p'p. 96-103, and DaIWin D. Creque, 
The U.S. Virgins and the Eastern Caribbean (Philadelphia: Whitmore 
Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 37-40 •. 
3United States Department of Interior, Our Caribbean Gems ••• The 
U.S. Virgin Islands (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1969), p. 9. Information on air miles from Washington, D.C. to the 
Virgin Islands was secured from the American Airlines office in St. 
Thomas in a telephone conversation during October 1978. 
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The Danish Colonization 
The "Virgin Islands became important in the l600s when the 
European nations sought to expand their industrial and commercial 
enterprises into the West Indies. In 1670, King Christian V of 
Denmark concluded a treaty with Britain which assured British acqui-
escence to Danish occupation of St. Thomas. King Christian V then 
chartered the Danish West India Company which, among other things, was 
authorized to participate in trade and plantation agriculture and to 
occupy and take possession of St. Thomas and other nearby uninhabited 
islands that were suitable for plantations. 
By 1672, first successful colonization of St. Thomas was in 
progress although the Danish West India Company experienced difficulty 
as did other European nations in recruiting colonists. However, unin-
vited colonists who had booked passage to St. Thomas, or even jumped 
ship, to escape the Third Dutch Wars brought with them their agricultural 
1 lore, which was of great value to the young colony. 
The                 laborers in St. Thomas died faster than they could be 
replaced. Thus, a prime ingredient of success in the St. Thomas 
colonization was slaves to work the sugar cane--a remedy borrowed from 
the British and French colonies in the West Indies. The first ship-
load of Africans destined expressively for St. Thomas arrived in 1673. 
In 1718, St. John was settled and the English and Spanish 
settlers were asked to swear fealty to the settlement's commander. In 
1733, a slave rebellion wrecked on St. John's economy, leaving the 
1 Is aac Doo khan,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
States (Epping, Essex, England: Bowker Publishing Company, 1974), 
pp. 37-40, 51 and 70. 
island uninhabited, and the Danish West India Company's financial 
1 difficulties dictated further expansion. The company coveted the 
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French island of St •. Croix to the south, negotiated for its purchase, 
and took possession that same year. A year later, in 1734, a Danish 
settlement was established in St. Croix and the British planters al-
ready established on the island were permitted to remain if they took 
the Oath of Allegiance to the King of Denmark. 2 The settlement of the 
three islands by colonists of various nationalities meant that the ties 
to Denmark were at best. tenuous. 
Perhaps the lack of strong bonds between the colonists and 
Denmark was the root cause leading to the company's downfall, for it 
continued to incur financial obligations without showing a profit. 
Finally, in 1754, the Danish West India Company was dissolved with 
Crown approval. 
The Danish Crown then became responsible for the Islands' manage-
ment appointing local administrators to carry out its will. Ultimate 
decision-making authority rested, of course, in Copenhagen. Although 
the slow communications between the Islands and Copenhagen vexed the 
colonists, there wasn't very much they could do about it for almost 
another century when, in 1848 and 1849, the slaves in the Danish West 
3 Indies were emancipated and constitutional changes occurred in Denmark. 
lIbid., pp. 41, 43, 121, and 124-125; and Luther Harris Evans, 
The                         from Naval Base to New Deal (Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press                         1945), pp. 15 and 17-18. 
2 Florence Lewisohn, St. Croix Under Seven Flags (Hollywood, 
Florida: The Dukane Press, 1970), pp. 81-84. 
3 Dookhan,       cit., pp. 64-66 and 200-202. 
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The Colonial Laws of 1852, 1863, and 1906 established a more represen-
1 tative government in the Danish West Indies. 
The Colonial Law of 1852 established a single Colonial Council; 
the text of the law included extens·ion of a limited franchise to the 
2 Islands. The limited franchise meant that only affluent members of 
3 the society participated in the "representative" government. However, 
. 
inter-Island rivalry and differing needs resulted in the Council often 
being unable to meet as the St. Thomas members would not travel to 
St. Croix for meetings. 4 The Colonial Council made recommendations 
about laws to the Crown which then issued Ordinances extending Danish 
laws to the Territory or established specific legislation. 
1 .. See Moorhead, .2.£..             pp. 63-71, for an analysis of the 
effects of these Danish constitutional changes on the different 
economic systems in St. Thomas and St. Croix. Dookhan,.2.£.' cit., 
pp. 203-204 and 205-207. 
2For the English translation of the Colonial Law, 1852, see 
James A. Bough and Roy C. Macridis (ed.), Virgin Islands: America's 
Caribbean Outpost (Wakefield, Massachusetts: Walter F. Williams 
Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 11-14. 
3 Dookhan, .2.£.. cit., pp. 205-207. 
4Dookhan, .2.£.. cit., pp. 208-209. The conflict regarding separate 
Councils continues and there are periodic demands that a separate 
Legislature would more appropriately meet the Islands' needs. In 1936 
when the U. S. Congress passed an Organic Act for the Virgin Islands, 
the separate Municipal Councils were retained. In 1954 the Revised 
OrganiC Act established a unicameral Legislature         the Virgin 
Islands. During the 1953 hea.rings on the Revised OrganiC Act, the 
St. Croix Chamber of Commerce opposed the Single Legislature but gave 
no reasons for their opposition. Congressman Butler felt this was a 
retrogressive stand by the St. Croix business community and surmised 
that the businessmen feared political domination by the more populous 
and aggressive island of St. Thomas.· All the other speakers at the 
hearing supported a single legislature. (Source: U. S. Congress, 
Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Virgin Islands 
Report, 83d Congress, 2d sess., 1954, pp. 14 and 34.) D. C. Canegata 
details the difference between the two islands and laments the lack of 
knowledge of lo.cal constitutional history that resulted in the absence 
of any reference to the 1852 Colonial Law during the 1953 hearings by 
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The Colonial Law of 1863 granted the Danish West Indies a more 
detailed and specific constitution. The struggle for separate dis-
tricts was won: each participated in lawmaking and the administration 
of their respective municipalities. The law also required that prior 
to passage of any Island-related act of the Danish Parliament, the 
expression of the Councils had to be received. Yet another critical 
feature was the inclusion of a Bill of Rights reflective of the consti-
1 tutional guarantees then enjoyed by Danish citizens. 
The Colonial Law of 1906 was the last major act of the Danish 
Parliament dealing with the Danish West Indies government. Following 
the unsuccessful attempts by the United States government to purchase 
the Islands in 1902, a Royal Commission was appointed to investigate 
and report on measures to improve Island conditions. A series of recom-
mendations were made; some, such as a single Colonial Council, were 
rejected by the separate Colonial Councils. The 1906 Colonial Act was 
Senator Butler. See D. C. Canegata, St. Croix at the Twentieth Cen-
tury--A Chapter in Its History (New York: Carlton Press, Inc., 1968), 
pp. 118-120. The First and Second Constitutional Conventions in the 
Virgin Islands retained the Single Legislature as established. in the 
1954 Revised Organic Act. (Source: Virgin Islands Constitutional 
Convention Report-Draft of Organic Act for the Territory of the Virgin 
Islands of the United States. Adopted by Constitutional Convention of 
the Virgin Islands on February 26, 1965 and 1971-72                              
Convention, Constitution of the Territory of the United States Virgin 
Islands, Second Constitutional Convention of the Virgin Islands, 
August 1.0, 1972 approved.) The discussions of the delegates to the 
Third Constitutional Convention clearly demonstrated that this issue 
was still a major concern. On April 20, 1978, the Third Constitutional 
Convention of the Virgin Islands adopted a constitution which provides 
for District Assemblies in St. Croix, St. Thomas, and St. John under 
Article VII on Local Government. Local government was created to bring 
about an improvement in the delivery of local services as well as 
bringing government closer to the people it serves. (Source: Sp·ecial 
Edition on Virgin Islands Constitution dated May 9, 1978. The inclusion 
of a section on district assemblies reflects the continuing concern 
about separate councils.) 
1 Ibid., pp. 209-211, and Moorhead, £E. cit., pp. 67-68. 
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basically a reenactment of the 1863 Colonial Act except for three 
provisions. The most significant of these extended the franchise by 
lowering the financial qualifications and introducing the secret 
1 ballot. This reflected the Islands' constitutional arrangement when 
the Danish West Indies were purchased by the United States government 
in 1917. 
In summary, then, by 1917 the Danish West Indies had been 
transformed from isolated, uninhabited islands to important trading 
and sugar-cane plantation economies. The administration of the Islands 
by the Danish West India Company eventually led to conflicts between 
it and the very influential European merchants and planters who com-
posed the majority of the Islands'. white population and who had con-
tributed significantly to the Islands' economic development. This lack 
of cooperation with the company contributed to its ultimate dissolu-
tion. The Danish Crown then assumed the responsibility for the 
Islands' governance. After constitutional change in the Danish govern-
ment, the colonists continued to press for more political power, 
resulting in the three major Colonial Laws of 1852, 1863, and 1906. 
Local representation was secured for the affluent landowner and mer-
chant, even though the majority black population remained disenfran-
chised and the governor's authority remained supreme. 
The Purchase of the Danish West Indies 
In 1917, the United States government purchased the Virgin 
Islands from Denmark for twenty-five million dollars,                     the 
lDookhan,       cit., pp. 213-214, and Bough, "General Introduc-
tion to the Constitutional Evolution of the Virgin Islands," pp. 119-
120. 
negotiations and discussions between the two governments which had 
1 started as early as 1856. 
Denmark's need to sell the Islands emerged as a result of: 
1. the declining economy of the Virgin Islands which had 
made them a political liability; 
2. an increase in expenditures due to the necessity of meeting 
the education and welfare needs of the ex-slaves. The local 
government was unable to pay for these expenses. The Danish 
government could not assist the Islands due to its critical 
financial position caused by the 1864 War with Prussia and 
the need to finance its industrial development; 
3. the declining revenue from the Islands which led to 
recurring deficits and growing indebtedness; 
4. The Islands' decline as a market for Danish produce or a 
source of raw materials and its consequent loss of imr 
portance to the Danish government; and 
5. the small minority of Danish citizens in the Islands. This 
meant, as noted previously, an absence of close                            
ties between the Danish West Indies and Denmark. 
The United States government's interest in purchasing the 
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Islands was in its harbors and naval stations which could be important 
for trade and for military purposes. Additionally, the United States 
had had a long association with the Danish West Indies in commerce 
and trade, extending as far back as the early eighteenth century. By 
the end of the nineteenth century, trade with the United States ac-
counted for approximately one-third of the Islands' imports. During 
the American Civil War, a suitable port in the Danish West Indies had 
been essential. The construction of the Panama Canal made the 
lFor a detailed description of the negotiations leading to the 
purchase of the Danish West Indies, see Charles Callan Tansill, 
The Purchase of the Danish West Indies (New York: Greenwood Press' 
Publishers, reprint edition, 1968). 
2 Dookhan, A History,       cit., pp. 241-247. 
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acquisition of the Islands even more attractive, for ownership would 
enable the United States both to defend the approaches to the Panama 
Canal and prevent the Islands from falling under the hegemony of hostile 
1 nations such as Germany. 
Three separate attempts were made by the United States to pur-
chase the Danish West Indies. The first was the Treaty of 1867 which 
was concluded after a long series of negotiations. The discussions 
regarding the purchase had been initiated by Secretary of State 
William H. d d . . 2 Sewar , an ar ent expans10n1st. The treaty provided for 
the acquisition of St. Thomas and St. John for 7.5 million dollars with 
the understanding that the "Islands' inhabitants would express t.heir 
agreement through a plebiscite. 3 St. Croix was excluded, because the 
1733 Treaty for the Danish purchase of St. Croix from France had 
included a provision that Denmark would not sell St. Croix to any 
foreign nation without French consent. The two Islands' voters over-
whelmingly approved the purchase and the Danish Parliament ratified 
4 the treaty which was signed by the King on January 31, 1868. However, 
the United States Senate delayed approval; after many extensions the 
foreign relations committee recommended Senate disapproval on March 22, 
1870. Reasons for the ratification's failure included public 
lIbid., pp. 247-249. 
2 For a description of the initial overtures regarding the pur-
chase of the Danish West Indies, see Tansill, ££. cit., pp. 5-13. 
3Convention Between His Majesty the King of Denmark, and the 
United States of America, Concerning the Cession of the Islands of 
St. Thomas and St. John in West Indies. 
4Tansill,       cit., pp. 49-50 and 96-98. 
indifference, reaction against Seward's expansionist policies, the 
country's emphasis on social and economic reconstruction, and the 
Ii f · 1 . 1 po cy 0 1S0 at10n. 
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Although some approaches were made in the l890s, another treaty 
was not concluded until January 24, 1902. Five million dollars were to 
be paid for the three islands and a plebiscite was not required. 2 
Majority opinion in the Islands was against the sale because of the 
earlier rejection, but United States' conservative opinion now favored 
the purchase as a source for harbors and coaling depots. The treaty 
was easily ratified by the Senate and signed by the President on 
3 March 1, 1902. 
The treaty was not received favorably in Denmark. The Lower 
House of the Danish Parliament approved the treaty in view of the 
Islands' failing economy, indebtedness, and Denmark's inability to 
maintain them, but th.e Upper House opposed the sale. 4 
The United States, however, considered the sale essential because 
1 Dookhan,       cit., pp. 253-254. 
2Convention Between the United States and Denmark for the Ces-
sion of the Danish West Indies, Signed at Washington, January 24, 1902. 
Ratification advised by the Senate February 17, 1902. Ratified by 
the President, March 1, 1902. 
3 Dookhan,       cit., pp.                   See D. C. Canegata,       cit., 
pp. 13-42 for a discussion of the controversy regarding·the sale of 
the Danish West Indies and the second treaty. D. C. Canegata also 
reports that the 1896 Republican platform supported the purchase of the 
Danish Islands,       cit., pp. 13 and 153-156. 
4Dookhan,       cit., pp. 257-258, Canegata, op. cit., pp. 31-42, 
and Tansill,       cit., pp. 349-365 discuss the reasons for the treaty's 
failure in the Danish Parliament and the controversy regarding the 
sale. The latter two authors give a vivid description of the situation 
at that time. 
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of the fear of German intentions. Therefore, the United States govern-
ment added concessions to the treaty packages including commercial 
privileges. 
On August 4, 1916, the treaty was signed by Secretary of State 
Robert Lansing and Constantin Brun, the Danish minister in Washington, 
D.C. Under its terms, private property rights were to continue unim-
paired, while the United States Congress reserved the power to determine 
the civil rights and political status of Virgin Islands inhabitants. 
Danish citizens in the Islands were allowed to remain or leave, but 
1 in either case would retain all rights of property. 
The United States Senate ratified the treaty on September 7, 
1916. Twenty-one Islands' planters sent cables supporting the sale 
and" both Colonial Councils unanimously passed resolutions supporting 
2 it. Differences in Denmark were overcome by a national referendum 
3 that supported the sale. The Danish Parliament followed the people's 
wishes. On December 22, 1916, King Christian X signed the treaty; 
4 on January 16, 1917, President Wilson signed it. 
On March 31, 1917, formal transfer ceremonies were held in 
St. Thomas and St. Croix. The Danish flag was lowered and the United 
1Dookhan,       cit., pp. 259-260, Evans,       cit., pp. 41 and 45, 
and also see Convention Between the United States and Denmark for the 
Cession of the Danish West Indies, signed at New York, August 4, 1916; 
ratification advised by the Senate, September 7, 1916; ratified by 
the President, January 16, 1917, ratified by Denmark, December 22, 1916; 
ratifications exchanged at Washington, January 17, 1917; proclaimed, 
January 25, 1917, Treaty Series No. 629. " 
2 Dookhan, ,£E.. cit., p. 260. 
3Evans, ££. cit., p. 44, and Tansill,       cit., p. 514. 
4Tansi11,       cit., p. 515. 
States flag raised. The transfer produced emotions. For example, 
Dr. Hamilton Jackson, the labor union leader, told the inhabitants, 
1 "We know who we got, but we don't know who we are going to get." 
The expectations raised by the transfer in ownership are per-
haps best summarized by a native author: 
The Islands had suffered economic disaster through the war and 
were on         verge of complete collapse by the time of the 
signing of the treaty in August. With the transfer came the 
end of over two hundred fifty years of Danish rule. African 
Negroes had been the mainstay of the European plantation owners 
and the great merchants of the Islands, as in the other 
coloriies of the West Indies. Together with their masters, 
these Negroes had built fortunes .and lost them. The exploited 
Negroes had nothing except faith in the United States and hope 
that the new nation would give them the opportunity it promised 
to all men under the American Flag. 2 
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In other words, the Islands' black majority expected that United 
States ownership meant a better life for themselves. 
American Sovereignty 
The record shows that the major concern of the United States 
government in purchasing the Virgin Islands was not the extension of 
the principles of American democracy to the newly acquired territory, 
but rather the protection of its                         boundaries from attack by 
hostile countries. 3 This fact is the foundation supporting the frame-
work in which to review the Islands' political and constitutional 
evolution. That is, specifically, the black Virgin Islanders' struggle 
lJean Larsen, "The Cruzan Kiva" column, West End News, August 27, 
1967. 
2Valdemar A. Hill, Sr., A Golden Jubilee (Virgin Islanders on 
the Go Under the American Flag (New York: Carlton Press, 1967), p. 31. 
3 Dookhan, A History,       cit., p. 262. 
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to achieve the expectations created by the advent of American 
sovereignty in 1917. 
The struggle for representative government, the extension of the 
principles of American"" democracy, the dilenunas that have confronted 
the United States government and its island possessions in their com-
plex relationship--all are clearly illustrated by scrutiny of the five 
major landmarks in Virgin Islands constitutional history since the 
1917 transfer: 
1. The March 3, 1917 Act of Congress. 
2. The Organic Act of June 22, 1936. 
3. The Revised Organic Act of July 22, 1954. 
4. The Elected Governor Act of 1968. 
5. The 1972 Act providing a Delegate to the House of 
Representatives. 
Let us begin by studying the act of 1917. 
The 1917 Act of Congress 
The act of Congress of March 3, 1917 made provisions for the 
1 governance of the United States Virgin Islands. It gave the Presi-
dent of the United States" the power to appoint an officer of the army 
or navy as governor. It is of critical importance to note that the 
Danish Colonial Law of 1906 was continued as the Islands' constitu-
tional system of government. Thus, the then-current laws regulating 
elections, electoral franchise, and any other laws not in conflict 
1 Act of Congress, March 3, 1917, Statutes at Large, XXXIX, 
Ch. 171, 1132 (1917). 
39 
with the changed sovereignty remained in effect. l 
The retention of the Danish electoral franchise meant that the 
major.ity black population was excluded from the electoral process. 
Since the combined Colonial Councils represented no more than 3 per-
cent of the Islands total population,2 this meant that over 90 percent 
of the residents could not vote. In 1917, in fact, only 700 out of. 
the Islands' population of about 26,000, of which only 2,000 were white, 
were eligible. to participate in the electoral process. The 700 voters 
. were composed of Creoles, Danes, non-Danish, Europeans, and mulattoes. 
The members of this elite class made their livings as plantation 
owners, merchants, real estate owners, and other businessmen. 3 The 
powers of the Colonial Councils included participation in the budgetary 
and auditing processes and they had responsibility for municipal admin-
istration. However, they were strictly limited in their authority 
4 and were easily overruled by the vast powers of the governor. 
Since the Islands had been purchased for their strategic position 
in naval warfare, the President nominated, and the Congress approved, 
the United States Navy to oversee the new territory.5 
1 
Evans,       cit., pp. 52-53. 
2L . . 47 ewl.S,       Cl.t., p. • 
3Ibid ., p. 26, Hill, Sr., Rise to Recognition,       cit., p. 77, and 
Isaac Dookhan, "The Search for Identity--The Political Aspirations and 
Frustrations of Virgin Islanders Under the United States Naval Admin-
istration 1917-1927" (paper presented at the Tenth Conference of 
Caribbean Historians, St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, March 26-April 1, 
1978), pp. 3-4. 
4Evans,       cit., pp. 86-87; Bough, "General Introduction," 
p. 120, and Lewis, loco cit. 
5L . . 46 ewl.S,       Cl.t., p. . 
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On April 6, 1917, the United States government formally entered 
the First World War and was preoccupied with it until 1918. 1 Ulti-
mately, it took nineteen years before a permanent government was 
2 established in the United States Virgin Islands. This delay conferred 
upon Virgin Islanders an odd combination of American sovereignty and 
Danish institutions. 3 
Major Unresolved Issues. Thus, four major issues were left un-
resolved. 
First was the question of civil government, that included separa-
tion of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Universal 
suffrage and the participation of all Island residents in the govern-
ment's decision-making process through elected representatives were 
4 also deemed essential. Second, American citizenship for all Island 
inhabitants was desired. In the early 1920s the State Department, in 
response to a joint Congressional committee request, indicated that 
United States Virgin Islands inhabitants had American "nationality" 
and were entitled to government protection, but that they did not have 
civil and political status equal to United States citizens. Under 
the 1916 treaty, the Congress was given the right to determine the 
"civil rights and political status" of the inhabitants. Thus, Virgin 
Islanders who graduated from American universities could not practice 
1 Dookhan, A History,       cit., p. 265. 
2 Dookhan, "The Search for Identity," £E.. cit., pp. 1-2. 
3L . . 45 ewl.S, .Q£.. Cl.t., p. • 
4 Evans, 2£. cit., pp. 59 and 218-247, and Hill, A Golden 
Jubilee, pp. 67-74. Both authors discuss the controversy regarding 
the quest for a civil government. 
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their skills in         of the states because they were not citizens. l The 
third issue was constitutional status. This involved the definition of 
the relationship between the United States and the Virgin Islands and 
the inhabitants' inherent rights. Although the 1916 Treaty did not 
address the issue of status, however, the United States Supreme Court 
2 in the 1901 Insular cases had made a distinction between unincorpor-
ated and incorporated territories. Briefly, the Court insisted on 
"an express declaration" of the intent to extend the United States 
Constitution to an unincorporated territory, but this had not been done 
with the Virgin Islands. 3 
The fourth problem concerned the applicability of federal laws to 
the Virgin Islands. The Act of March 3, 1917 did not expressly extend 
United States statutes to the Virgin Islands. General United States 
laws did not apply unless something in their language might be inter-
4 preted to extend them. However, it was obvious that the Virgin 
Islands required extension of certain federal laws. 
1 Lewis,       cit., p. 44, and Evans,       cit., pp. 61-63. 
2 In 1901 in a series of decisions popularly known as the Insular 
Cases, the U. S. Supreme Court endorsed the right of Congress to legis-
late for Puerto Rico in the manner that had been accomplished. There 
were three cases affecting Puerto Rico, but Downes v. Bidwell, 182 
U.S. 244 (1901) is used most frequently in discussing the V.I. Other 
U.S. Supreme Court cases that have been related to the situation in 
the Virgin Islands are Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 24 S. Ct. 
808 (1904), Balzac v. People of Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) and 
Rasmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905). 
3Evans, .2,£.. cit., p. 50. 
4 . 
              p. 56. 
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Organized Opposition 
After World War I, Congressional concern arose about the "tem-
porary government" of the Virgin Islands. However, differences of 
opinion existed in the Islands about the need for a more permanent 
form of government. The traditional ruling class, for example, empha-
sized economic development as its major priority. The naval adminis-
tration, which followed a policy of Americanization, and the ruling 
class were both unwilling to share their political power with any other 
1 class of Virgin Islanders. 
On the other hand, the majority black Virgin Islanders worked 
through their labor unions to institute civil government as well as 
other desirable reforms. The St. Thomas and St. Croix Labor Unions 
were established in 19l7.and the American Virgin Islands Federation 
of Labor in 1919. The latter also had branches in St. Thomas and 
St. Croix and had been affiliated with the American Federation of 
Labor since 1920. The unions published newspapers that consistently 
took strong anti-government positions by attacking the naval administra-
tion, by supporting a civil government, and by educating their readers 
in the American way of life. Although some of the union leaders even-
tually became members of the Colonial Councils, their articulate and 
outspoken expressions on behalf of the majority black population 
branded them as militant radicals, Reds, and Bolsheviks. 2 
The naval administration responded by warning and intimidating 
the newspaper editors, which resulted in the muzzling of the press 
lDookhan, "The Search for Identity," .2.P.. cit., p. 1. 
2 . 
              pp. 11-15, and Evans,       cit., p. 223. 
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through the courts. For example, the editor of the St. Croix Herald 
was imprisoned for six days for contempt of court. Alien associates 
and supporters of these editors were deported as undesirables; re-
prisals were taken against government employees who dared to criticize 
the naval administration or associate with known opponents of the 
1 government. 
Another instrumental factor in political reform was the quasi-
political parties--the Party for Progressive Political Action, the 
Republican Club, and the People's Party. Additionally, two other 
groups--the Civil Rights Committee and the Active Citizens' Committee 
in St. Croix--were also helpful. These groups distributed propaganda 
leaflets and established platforms which advocated a new economic sys-
tem, the removal of the existing form of government, and universal 
suffrage. They also aroused and sustained interest in political reform 
by conducting public lectures and discussions. 2 The activities of these 
groups broadened the base of support for political reform. Thus, not 
merely the labor unions campaigned for political reform, but a wide 
cross section of the black majority, including some of the enfran-
chised blacks. 3 
Support for political reform in the United States was essential 
for success. Spokesmen for the black majority made frequent trips to 
speak before Congressional committees, civic organizations, and to 
lDookhan, "The Search for Identity," £E.. cit., pp. 23-25, and 
Lewis,       cit., pp. 52-53. For another example of harassment of 
newspaper editors, see Hill, Rise to Recognition, ££. cit., pp. 83-85. 
2 Dookhan, "The Search for Identity," £E.. cit., pp. 12 and 14. 
3 Evans, £E.. cit., p. 219, and Hill, Rise to Recognition,      
cit., pp. 80-81. 
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plead their case before the President of the United States. The influ--
ential American Civil Liberties Union and various mainland Virgin 
Islands organizations, such as the Associated Virgin Islands Societies 
I of New York, also helped to foster support. 
The naval administration, in the face of increased opposition 
from the majority black population and their local and mainland sup-
porters, advised the United States Congress that the only responsible 
opinion in the Virgin Islands was that of the Colonial Councils and the 
traditional ruling class. The local groups and their supporters, 
pushing for political reform, were an irresponsible group of rabble-
2 rousers. While a considerable body of sympathy was aroused on the 
mainland for the plight of the Islands' black majority, Congres-
sional action proved forthcoming only after prolonged agitation by 
3 the proponents of reform. 
The extension of federal laws to the Virgin Islands was first 
raised in relation to the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment, also 
known as the Volstead Act or the National Prohibition Act. Following 
a request by the governor of the Virgin Islands, the United States 
Congress extended the National Prohibition Act to the Virgin Islands 
on November 23, 1921. However, when the Eighteenth Amendment was re-
pealed in the United States Congress, in accordance with the Supreme 
lDookhan, "The Search for Identity,".2E.' cit., pp. 15-20; Lewis, 
.2E.. cit., p. 49, and Evans, £E. cit., p. 222. 
2Dookhan, "The Search for Identity," £E.. cit., pp. 21-22, and 
Evans, £E. cit., p. 278. 
3Hi11 , Rise to Recognition, Ope cit., Dookhan, 
A History,       cit., and Lewis,                   support the position that 
self-government in the Virgin Islands has only occurred after an exten-
sive and extended struggle on each issue. 
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Court's decision on unincorporated territories, a special act 'was neces-
sary to rescind the law in the Virgin Islands. l 
Inevitab.ly, Danish law proved inadequate in negotiating the 
complex relationship that grew between the mainland and the Islands. 
Some of the more important legislation extended to the Islands during 
the naval administration included the following: 
1. Congress by an October 28, 1919 act directed the Postmaster 
General to establish an office in Charlotte Amalie. As communication 
between the United States and the Virgin Islands increased, a need 
arose to improve mail transport. The logical outcome was to extend the 
2 United States Postal System to the Virgin Islands. 
2.·The United States Immigration Act of 1924 was extended to the 
Islands on June 1, 1925. The extension of the immdgration laws was 
construed by the Department of State as enabling all aliens born in 
the Virgin Islands to enter the United States under the non-quota 
classification and facilitated the out-migration of Virgin Islanders 
to the mainland. The extension resulted in a petition by twenty-three 
Crucian planters to Governor Trench, requesting that the law be waived 
due to the shortage 0.£ local labor, for the entry of British West 
Indians doing seasonal agricultural work. Local labor leaders viewed 
the planters' request as a deliberate attempt to suppress wage rates 
d h 1 d · 3 an ve ement y oppose 1t. 
1 Evans,               pp. 56-57. 
2Ibid • , p. 65. 
3Ibid . , p. 66, and Dookhan, liThe Search for Identity,"       cit., 
pp. 9-10. 
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In the ensuing conflict, the naval administration opposed the 
entry of foreign labor and favored the entry of a limited number of 
Puerto Ricans. Before the end of the naval administration, this pro-
" "" d 1 gram was                   . However, the lines between planters and labor 
unions were now clearly drawn on the foreign-labor issue. The tide of 
British West Indian emigration to the Virgin Islands was stemmed. The 
emigration had resulted in a net gain in population, rather than a 
net loss, despite the heavy outmigration of Virgin Islanders to the 
United States and other foreign countries in order to improve their 
" d"" 2                 con                
The extension of federal immigration policies to the Virgin 
Islands brought to an end the easygoing Danish immigration policies 
which had resulted in a           cosmopolitan community. The close ties 
between the Virgin Islands and the rest of the West Indies were 
weakened; consequently, Virgin Islanders experienced a loss of identi-
fication with the rest of the Caribbean. 3 
3. The Census Acts of 1929 and May 17, 1932 provided for the 
extension of the fifteenth national census and all subsequent censuses 
to the Virgin Islands. At the request of the governor, the Commerce 
Department had arranged for a census in 19174 that enabled the United 
1 Evans,       cit., p. 75. 
2Dookhan, "The Search for                           cit., pp. 9-10. This 
paper also illustrates through source documents that there was more 
immigration (total of 9218) from the United States and all other 
countries into the u.S. Virgin Islands during 1920-23 than emigration 
(total of 7998) from the U.S. Virgin Islands. 
3L " " 104             .2.E..       t ., p. . 
4 Evans, 2.E.. ci t., p. 66. 
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States to get an accurate count of the Islands' inhabitants, which 
assisted the navy in planning health and. education programs. The inc1u·-
sion of the Virgin Islands in the census act, of course, provided 
comprehensive statistical information about the inhabitants. 
4. The United States Admiralty Laws were extended to the Virgin 
Islands by an act of May 20, 1932. Under March 3, 1917 act establishing 
the temporary government for the Virgin Islands; the Danish 
                  laws remained in effect. It soon became obvious that the 
laws would have to be changed due to the inherent conflict in governing 
an American possession with Danish laws. Both the governor and the 
Colonial Councils united in requesting the change to the Admiralty 
laws of the United States.1 
5. The emergency relief acts of 1932-1935 were extended to the 
Virgin Islands. The Virgin Islands by the late 1920s were experi-
encing a serious economic depression that preceded the Great Depres-
sion in the United States. The naval administration had been unable 
to stimulate the Islands' economy and the socioeconomic situation in 
the Islands had deteriorated. Extensive poverty and hardship prevailed 
throughout the Islands. After a 1929-1930 study of the conditions 
in the Islands by the chief of the· federal Bureau of Efficiency, 
several recommendations were made. 
One of these recommendations concerned the establishment of a 
large-scale rehabilitation program to counter the depressed economic 
conditions. This program was initiated in 1930. Consequently, the 
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Roosevelt New Deal programs were also extended to the Virgin Islands. 
The Virgin Islands was included within the scope of the Federal 
Emergency Relief Act of 1933 which provided cash grants to the needy 
and the unemployed. Under section 301 of the Emergency Relief and 
Construction Act of 1932, the Virgin Islands was provided Presidential 
1 allotments to construct roads. Thus, jobs were provided to the 
unemployed in addition to the construction of a much-needed road sys-
tem. The public-works section of the National Industrial Recovery 
Act (Title II) and Works Progress Administration grants, under the 
Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935, were also extended to the 
Islands. Overall, the Islands' economy was improved and important 
public-works projects were initiated. 2 
In summary, the United States government adopted a patchwork 
response to the many problems that faced the Islands. Consequently, 
the extension of United States laws was haphazard. Some laws were ex-. tended at the initiative of Congress; others because of pleas from 
the naval governors or request from the.Colonial Councils. The New 
York groups representing Virgin Islands' interests and the on-island 
representatives of the disenfranchised black majority also influenced 
the extension of federal laws to the Virgin Islands. Virtually every 
issue was fought over bitterly. 
American Citizenship 
Many local gro.ups demonstrated support for granting full citizen-
ship to the inhabitants of the United States Virgin Islands including 
lIbid., pp. 67 and 281-283. 
2Ibid ., pp. 67 and 300-301. 
49 
the New York Virgin Islanders' organizations and the Colonial Councils. 
A federal commission of Negroes, appointed in 1924 by the Secretary 
of Labor to study Island conditions, strongly recommended the granting 
of full American citizenship. A total of eight bills on constitutional 
reform were introduced in the United States Congress from 1924 to 1926. 
All included provisions for the extension of United States citizenship.l 
On February 25, 1927, United States citizenship was granted to 
most Virgin Islanders. The inhabitants who were resident in the Virgin 
Islands on January 17, 1917 and February 25, 1927 received citizenship. 
Although it was assumed that this legislation covered all Virgin 
Islanders, certain groups of Virgin Islanders were in fact excluded. 
Specifically, Virgin Islanders not on the Islands on those dates did 
not receive American citizenship. The problem was that many Virgin 
Islanders had migrated to the United States or other foreign countries 
and were not in the Virgin Islands on those two dates. Eventually, 
additional enabling legislation was passed on June 28, 1932. 2 
The delay in extending full United States citizehship to the 
Virgin Islanders reflects ambivalence and uncertainty about the proper 
status of the residents vis-a-vis the United States mainland. Lewis 
points out that exclusion seems to have been used against communities 
such as the Virgin Islands where the majority of the citizens were of 
N . . 3 egro o rl. gl.n . 
United States citizenship still did not mean the same rights and 
lIbid., pp. 223-247, and Dookhan, "The Search for Identity," 
      cit., pp. 26-33. 
2 Evans, ££. cit., pp. 63-64. 
3Lewis,       cit., pp. 44-45. 
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privileges for Virgin Islanders as for other Americans living in the 
continental United States. Marshall argues that citizenship confers 
rights in at least three different areas: civil rights, political 
rights, and social rights. l It is of paramount importance to note that 
the 1927 extension of United States citizenship to Virgin Isianqers 
did not confer these rights to the inhabitants unless they left the 
Virgin Islands. In other words, as long as they remained in the 
United States Virgin Islands, none of these rights were available. 
For example, the only civil rights available to Virgin Islanders 
were those included in the 1906 Danish Colonial Law, thus the United 
States Bill of Rights, which guaranteed other American citizens certain 
freedoms, was not applicable in the Virgin Islands. The covert censor-
ship of the press during the naval administration was an example of 
the restricted rights of Virgin Islanders. Political rights were 
only available to a small percentage of the population, since the 
franchise was limited by sex, property value, or annual income. Even 
those Virgin Islanders who were enfranchised could only vote for 
representatives of the legislative branch of government and this body, 
as noted previously, exercised limited powers. Social rights were 
limited to those social benefits already available in the Virgin Islands. 
The extension of United States citizenship was of most benefit 
to those Virgin Islanders living on the United States mainland. 2 The 
IT. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University, Pre'ss, 1950). 
2Lewis,       cit., p. 66, writes that it was estimated that by 1930 
New York Harlem's ghetto was estimated to contain 20,000 Virgin Island-
ers. Dookhan, "The Search for Identity," £E.. cit., p. 9, presents 
data secured from NARS RG55/2, File 10802. Miscellaneous data obtained 
for the federal commission shows that between 1920 and 1923, 2,592 
Virgin Islanders migrated to the United States. 
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economic deprivation in the Islands had resulted in heavy migration to 
the United States and American citizenship accelerated this movement. 
Thus, Virgin Islanders who were mainland residents were entitled to 
all the rights and privileges of American citizenship. 
Constitutional Status 
As the preceding discussion has shown, the anticipated inclusion 
in all of the. benefits of American democracy were not forthcoming. 
Dookhan states that the important question which the United States had 
to resolve was whether it should continue the autocratic government 
then practiced in the Virgin Islands. He concludes that autocracy· 
was selected as the Virgin Islands was conceived of as a naval base 
and the people considered inexperienced in operating a democratic sys-
tem. l Perkins and Lewis see the failure to address the Islands' con-
stitutional status in a planned, meaningful way as due to the fact 
that the United States, unlike France and Great Britain, lacked the 
administrative machinery of colonialism needed to govern colonial 
dependencies. 
Article IV, Section 3 of the United States Constitution gives 
the United States Congress power to dispose of and make rules and regu-
lations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the 
United States. 2 The United States Congress exercised this responsi-
bility in its act of March 3, 1917 which provided a temporary government 
1 Dookhan, A History,       cit., p. 266. 
2 Lewis,       cit., p. 42, and Whitney T. Perkins, Denial of Em-
pire--the United States and Its Dependencies (Netherlands: 
A.W. Sythoff-Leyden, 1962), p. 13. 
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for the Virgin Islands by vesting in a governor, appointed by the 
President with the advice and consent of the Senate, all military, 
" 1 
civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern the Virgin Islands. 
The act was silent on constitutional status and the" Virgin Islands 
government remained subject to the whims, interests, and priorities 
of the United States Congress. 
In Dorr v. United States, Justice Brown enunciated a distinction 
between the "fundamental" guarantees of the Constitution which must 
prevail everywhere and the "non-fundamental" guarantees that Congress 
2 did not have to extend to the territories unless it wished to. In the 
Virgin Islands these so-called non-fundamental rights have at various 
times included trial by jury, indictment by a grand jury, and separa-
tion of powers between the judicial and executive and the civilian and 
military branches of government, as well as a Bill of Rights. 3 
Two months after the Islands' transfer, the United States Attorney 
General ruled that a law prohibiting naval officers from holding cer-
tain government positions, such as judgeships in territories, was 
inapplicable to the Virgin Islands. The Virgin Islands were "neither 
organized nor incorporated territory of the United States"; an act 
extending "all laws of the United States which are not inapplicable" 
to "organized" territories did not suffice to extend such laws to "U'l-
organized" territories like the Virgin Islands. 4 
1 Bough, "General Introduction,".Q£.. cit., p. 120. 
2 . Dorr v.               States, 195 U.S. 138, 24 Sup. Ct. 808 (1904)" 
3Lewis,       cit., pp. 43-44. 
4 Evans, .Q£.. cit., p. 50. 
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Of critical significance, too, was the fact that Virgin Islanders 
had no Congressional representatives. Lewis describes this as giving 
giving Virgin Islanders second-class citizen-
ship and a government ruled by Congress rather than by constitutional 
1 guarantees. 
Civil Government 
On February 27, 1931, President Hoover signed an Executive 'Order, 
without prior consultation with the local legislature, placing the 
administration of the Virgin Islands' government under the Secretary 
of Interior, removing the naval                                                     appointi:ng a 
° °1° 2                   governor. Although there had been a great deal of political 
agitation for civil government, there were overriding reasons for this 
change. 
A subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, after 
a 1929 visit to the Islands, requested the Bureau of Efficiency to 
make a thorough survey of the political, economic, and social conditions 
3 of the Islands. The Islands' declining economy had required heavy 
deficit spending, for the naval administration had not been able to 
stimulate economic development. It was hoped that economic development 
would reduce federal appropriations. 4 Herbert D. Brown, chief of the 
Bureau of Efficiency, visited the Islands during the winter of 1929-1930 
1 
Lewis,       cit., p. 18. 
2Ibid., p. 68. 
3Evans, °t 159       E2:..-., p. • 
4 Dookhan, A History,       cit., pp. 270-271. 
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and held hearings that resulted in two major recommendations: (1) a 
change to a permanent civil government; (2) a large-scale rehabilita-
tion program to counter the acute economic conditions. l Both the 
House subcommittee and the President approved of the rehabilitation 
program. Brown was placed in charge of the rehabilitation program with 
authority to distribute the accompanying federal funds which amounted 
2 to a grant of $141,000. 
Right after Brown's appointment Governor Waldo Evans questioned 
Brown's control of the federal funds. 3 In the midst of this contro-
versy, the President ended the naval administration, bringing to a suc-
cessful conclusion the long struggle by the representatives of the 
4 Islands' black majority for its replacement. However, the agitation 
continued for a permanent government for the Virgin Islands. 5 The 
first civilian governor, unlike his naval predecessors, outplayed his 
opposition by publicizing his case and lobbying the United States 
Congress and the federal administration. 6 Local feelings against his 
7 administration intensified with some groups, such as the Colonial 
Councils,even favoring the restoration of the naval administration. 8 
lHill, Golden Jubilee, ££. cit., p. 49, and U.S. Congress, House 
Committee on Insular Affairs, A Report on the                     Social and 
Economic Conditions in the U.S. Virgin Islands, 1917-1930, by Herbert D. 
Brown (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1930), pp. 45, 68. 
2Ibid., pp. 49-50, and Evans,                     pp. 160-163 and 281-282. 
3Ibid., p. 163, and Hill, Golden Jubilee,       cit., p. 50. 
4Evans,       cit., pp. 162 and 280. 
5Dookhan, A H" t "t 278       ory, £E.         p. " 
6Ibid., and Evans, £E. cit., p. 308. 
7Evans, £E. cit., pp. 299-300. 
8Dookhan, A History,       cit., p. 278, and Lewis, ££. cit., p. 72. 
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When the New Deal came to the Virgin Islands, high expectations 
were raised of developing economic                                     Unfortunately, 
these expectations remained unfulfilled; thus, political unrest con-
tinued and mass unemployment remained the order of the day. The New 
Deal and its impact on the Virgin Islands will be discussed more fully 
in the following chapter. 
The 1936 Organic Act 
On MOnday, June 22, 1936, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed 
the Virgin Islands Organic Act, which established a form of government 
on familiar American lines while retaining much of the existing 
1 political arrangements that were compatible with American principles. 
Self-determination in the form of.civil government had" finally been 
approved by the United States Congress. The bill extended the franchise 
regardless of race, creed, or color to those twenty-one years old or 
more who could read and write the English language. 2 This provision 
revolutionized the political process in the Virgin Islands by extending 
the franchise to the majority black population, who for the first time 
could elect representatives concerned about their interests. The 
control of the Islands' legislative power by the merchants, real-estate 
owners and the Crucian planters was ended. With one act, the Islands 
were revolutionized politically and socially.3 
The 1936 Organic Act allowed each municipality to retain its 
lJ . arvl.S,       cit. , p. 230. 
2 cit. , 107-108, and Dookhan, A History,       cit., Creque,       pp. 
p. 280. 
3Creque,       cit. , p. 108. 
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Council. The governor was empowered to convene the two Councils, 
acting as the Virgin Islands Legislative Assembly, to consider legisla-
tion applicable to the entire Virgin Islands. 
Executive power remained vested in the governor who was ap-
pointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
The governor was empowered to exercise a legislative veto which could 
be overridden by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly, but final 
decision was reserved for the United States President. The governor 
reported to the Secretary of the Interior. l 
Additionally, the courts now were subject to the United States 
2 Constitution and the guarantees embodied in the Bill of Rights. 
Obviously, the 1936 Organic Act also represented a great step 
forward in separating the executive,                         and judicial branches 
However, the Organic Act did not completely fulfill the Virgin 
Islanders' expectations for self-government. For example, the Virgin 
Islands' governor remained a Presidential appointee answerable to the 
President through the Secretary of the Interior. The local legis-
lature could pass local legislation, but their override of the 
3 governor's veto was subject to Presidential approval. Eventually, 
these gaps in self-government led to agitation of the type that had 
preceded the passage of the 1936 Organic Act. Bough illustrated this 
dilemma when he pointed out that the interpretation of rights as set 
1 Dookhan, A History, ££. cit., pp. 279-280. 
2 . Bough, "General Introduction," ££.             p. 122. 
3 U.S. Congress, Senate, An Act to Provide a Civil Government 
for the Virgin Islands of the United States (Pub. L. 74-749: 74th 
Congress, 1936), S. 4524. 
57 
forth in the 1936 Organic Act expanded or contracted in direct propor-
tion to the liberalism or conservatism of the current                   and 
Secretary of the Interior or both. The problem existed until 1954 when 
the. first Organic Act was substantially modified. l 
Universal suffrage extended new powers to the legislature which 
enacted a series of progressive measures such as the Homestead Act and 
the Home Loan Fund. 2 
The Islands' political leaders were determined that Virgin 
Islanders would need to elect their own governor, be granted a Resident 
Commissioner to serve as the Islanos' representative to the United 
States Congress and have a single treasury department. Additiona.lly, 
they campaigned for unification of the St. Thomas and the St. Croix 
districts as a stimulus to the Islands' socioeconomic development. 3 
Specifically, the leaders established an Organic Act Committee in the 
Virgin Islands Legislative Assembly in 1945, brought about Island-wide 
referendums on these issues in 1948 and 1952, and pressured the United 
States Congress with petitions, resolutions, and delegations to 
Washington, D.C. These efforts, among other things, produced visits 
in 1947-1948 and in 1953 by Senator Hugh Butler, chairman of the 
4 Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. 
The committee recommended the following: 
1 Bough, "General Introduction,".£E.. cit., p. 123. 
2 Creque,       cit., pp. 109-111. 
3Lewis,       cit., p. 104. 
4 Creque,       cit., pp. 131-133, and 141-145, and Hill, Golden 
Jubilee, £2.. cit., pp. 146-147. 
1. a unicameral legislature and a strong administrative 
organization; 
2. a single treasury; 
3. the establishment of a new revenue structure to 
exploit all sources of governmental revenue; 
4. the return of the Internal Revenue Tax on rum, but 
with some restrictuions on the use of the money. 
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The committee did not recommend an elected governor and a resi-
dent commissioner to the United States Congress. l Senator Butler's 
conservatism was to play a major role in shaping the final provisions 
of the 1954 Revised Organic Act. 2 
By 1953, widespread Hupport existed for a revised Organic Act, 
and the Department of the Interior, the Virgin Islands Legislative 
Assembly, and the St. Thomas Chamber of Commerce favored a unicameral 
legislature, a resident commissioner to the United States Congress, and 
the return of the Internal Revenue taxes on Virgin islands' products 
shipped to the United States. 3 They differed on the elective governor 
and language provisions,4 on immigration, and in some other minor 
areas. 
1 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior "and Insular Affairs, 
Virgin Islands Report, pp. 22-24. 
2L · . 345 eW1S, .£.e..         p. • 
3 Creque, .£.e.. cit., pp. 147-149. 
4The 1936 Organic Act had stipulated the ability to read and 
write English as a requirement for voting. By 1953, there was con-
siderable sentiment for deleting this requirement. Others, however, 
favored its retention. According to the 1950 Census, approximately 
10 percent of the Islands' population were non-English-speaking, 
mostly of Puerto Rican origin. In effect, this meant that Puerto 
Ricans whose legal residence was in the Virgin Islands were prohibited 
from voting. The 1954 revision of the act rescinded this requirement. 
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The November 1953 Congressional hearings in the Virgin Islands 
enabled Senator Butler to survey representatives of all economic, 
political, and social groups. Groups such as the Legislative Assembly, 
the St. Thomas Labor Union, and the Unity Party favored an elective 
governor, a resident commissioner to the United States Congress, a 
unicameral legislature, and the return of the Internal Revenue taxes. 
The Republican Club, the Virgin Islands Hotel Association, the 
St. Croix Chamber of Commerce, and several prominent white citizens 
who were former mainland residents opposed the elective-governor 
provision; the populace, they felt, had not proven themselves fit for 
this measure of self-government. Some observers favored a resident 
commissioner and the return of the Internal Revenue taxes, but others 
contended that the community should be more interested in self-support 
than in spending money. 
Except for the St. Croix Chamber of Commerce, general agreement 
existed on the establishment of a unicameral legislature. Both the 
St. Croix and St. Thomas Chambers of Commerce and the Virgin Islands 
Hotel Association recommended the relaxation of the immigration laws. 
On the other hand, the labor unions strongly opposed easing immigra-
tion restrictions. They saw this move as a businessman's ploy to keep 
1 wages artificially depressed. 
1Hill, Golden Jubilee,       cit., pp. 146-153, and U.S. Congress, 
Senate, Virgin Islands Report. During the hearings before Senator 
Butler's Committee, the St. Thomas Labor Union had pointed out that 
there were hundreds of women willing to work as domestics but were un-
willing to work for the mere pittance of $25.00 or $35.00 a month 
(U.S. Congress, Senate, Virgin Islands· Report), p. 38. In the 1953 
Annual Report of the Governor of the Virgin Islands to the Secretary of 
Interior (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office" 1953), p. 21, 
it was reported that minimum hourly wage rates are now uniform for the 
Virgin Islands and are as follows: utility workers, $.30; unskilled 
60 
labor, $.40; sales or service workers, $.35; skilled labor, $.65; semi-
skilled labor, $.50. A committee was established in early 1953 to 
study the cost of living and make a survey to note the changes since the 
last wage increase in St. Thomas in 1949 and the change in St. Croix 
since 1951, Daily News (St. Thomas, Virgin Islands), January 16, 1953. 
The committee recommended that the present statutory method of fixing 
wages by labor categories by superseded by fixing wages on an individual 
industry basis. The change was recommended as the labor categories 
were seen as too inclusive and led to the evasion of the Wage and Hour 
Ordinance and created many difficulties for the Wage Commissioners who 
made the decisions about which category a \07orker should fall into, 
Daily News (St. Thomas, Virgin Islands), May 23 and 29 and June 1, 
1953. Employees of privately operated businesses engaged in interstate 
commerce were "governed by the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act. The 
original Fair Labor Standards Act, which became effective on October 4, 
1938 contained no special provisions for the V. I. so the same rate 
applied. The Wage and Hour Division could not enforce the statutory 
minimum wage due to the severe economic problems, the considerable 
unemployment, and the low standards of living". In June 1940, the U.S. 
Congress enacted an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act which 
authorized lower rates to be established in the Virgin Islands upon the 
recommendation of the special industry committee appointed by the 
Administrator. The Special Industry Committee was authorized to recom-
mend rates up to 40 cents an hour. Wages approved by Industry Committee 
#2 and effective August 29, 1949 and November 26, 1951 ranged from a 
low of 15 cents per hour to a high of 50 cents an hour. By 1949, the 
minimum wage in the United States had reached 75 cents per hour. See 
Valdemar A. Hill, Jr., "Minimum Wages in the United States Virgin 
Islands, 1938-1968" (Master's thesis, Inter-American University, 1968), 
pp. 7-8, and U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour and Public 
Contracts Division, Data Pertinent to the Review of Minimum Wage 
Rates Under the Fair Labor Standards Act for Employment in Industries 
in the Virgin Islands, October 1968, pp. A-3 - A-4. The 1953 Virgin 
Islands Employment Service Annual Report (St. Thomas: Government 
Printing Office, 1953), p. 9, reported that average wages were: domestic 
workers, $.18-$.20 per hour; hotel and restaurant workers, $.30-$.35 
per hour; construction workers, $.80-$1.00 per hour; laborers, $.50 
per hour. 
The report also stated that more than 400 orders for farm la-
borers that c'ould not be filled locally were received. Farm work was 
described as unattractive because wages were low, hours irregular, and 
farms isolated. Due to the low wages, $.40 per hour, only foreign labor 
from nearby British and French islands could be attracted. James 
Warren Green, "Social Networks in St. Croix, United States Virgin 
Islands" (Ph.D. disse"rtation, University of Washington, 1972), p. 80, 
reports that in the mid 1930s farm laborers in St. Croix received $.55 
per day due to the union's efforts. This was nearly twice the wage 
then available in the British Virgin Islands. It can be assumed that 
this disparity in wages still existed in the               thus the Virgin 
Islands was an attractive                       area. 
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The Revised Organic Act of July 22, 1954 
Senator Butler's influence helped insure passage of a new Organic 
Act and on July 22, 1954, President Eisenhower signed into law the 
Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands. The act provided for a 
single legislature, a single treasury, and the return of the Internal 
Revenue taxes--with a provision that a government comptroller appointed 
by the Secretary of the Interior would audit, provide financial over-
sight for, and have the final decision on questions on all Virgin 
1 Islands revenues and receipts. 
Although the Revised Organic Act provided for a much-needed reor-
ganization of the 1936 Organic Act, it could hardly be termed a further 
advance in the quest for self-government. Lewis describes the re-
visions as a counterrevolution, leaving unchanged the governor's power 
of veto and the President's power of final veto over local legislation. 
It actually reduced the previously accredited perogatives of the 
elected legislature and increased those of the Islands' executive 
branch. 2 For example, the legislators' authority to determine their 
own salaries was eliminated and a set per-annum rate established. 
Legislative sessions could be held only for a fixed number of days 
and only the governor could convene special sessions. 
The use of Internal Revenue funds was limited and although appro-
priations could be made by the legislature, approval by the Secretary 
of the Interior was required. 3 Bough writes that Senator Butler, in 
lRevised Organic Act of 1954 (July 22, 1954, Ch. 558, 68 Stat. 
497). 
2 . 
                    cit., p. 105. 
3Act of Congress (June 22, 1936, Ch. 699, 49 Stat. 1807), and 
Act of Congress (July 22, 1954, Ch. 558, sec. 1, 68 Stat. 497). 
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his report to the Senate on the 1954 Revised Organic Act, stated cate-
gorically that the act was designed to provide a larger measure of self-
government. However, close study of the 1954 act in comparison with 
the 1936 act and the Puerto Rican constitution leaves much room for 
1 debate. The limitations on the use and amount of the Internal Revenue 
funds, the increased powers of the governor, and the enlarged super-
visory role of the Secretary of Interior reflected a decrease rather 
than an increase in local autonomy. 
Former Governor MOrris de Castro was to tell Congress later that 
the Revised Organic Act rested on the assumption that the ills of 
2 democracy could be cured by less democracy. Senator Butler, then, had 
moved to correct what he perceived as the evils of the Virgin Islands 
legislative system, but had in reality curbed the powers of the people's 
representatives. Neither an elected governor nor a resident commis-
sioner was mandated by the 1954 act. The basic flaw in this situation, 
according to Lewis, was the certain conflict between a weak legis la-
d " "bl "3 ture an an                       e                      
The 1954 Organic Act thus failed to address the Virgin Islanders' 
aspirations for more self-government, although admittedly it was the 
first time that Congress in the thirty-seven years since the Islands' 
purchase had bothered to define their status. Bough states that the 
unincorporated territorial status of the Virgin Islands satisfied Con-
gressional conservatives who opposed statehood for them. 4 There are 
lBough, "General                                   cit., p. 125. 
2Lewis,       cit., p. 106. 
3Ibid., pp. 105-106. 
4Bough, "General Introduction," .£E.. cit., p. 123. 
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in fact no clear guidelines about the rights and privileges of "un in-
corporated territories." 
The difficulties in implementing the Revised Organic Act, and the 
ensuing battles between the appointed governors and the elected legis-
lature, stirred even more agitation for an elected governor, a 
Washington representative to the United States Congress, and increased 
perogatives for the local legislature. The businessmen and the wealthy 
white continentals, of course, were quite satisfied with the status 
quo, but the liberal, labor-oriented Unity Party opposed it. 
Twelve years after passage of the 1954 Organic Act the Virgin 
Islands legislature managed to convene a constitutional convention (on 
April 2, 1964). The purpose of the convention was to draft yet another 
revised organic act, within the framework of the United States Constitu-
1 tion, for presentation to Congress. This elected body of thirty-
three dalegates held several public sessions during a three-month 
period, developing eight major proposals for enlarging self-government. 
By 1979, three of the eight recommendations had still not been imple-
men ted: the right to vote for the United States President and Vice 
President; a comptroller to be appointed by the governor with the 
advice and consent of the Virgin Islands legislature; and amendment of 
the Organic Act by the legislature through popular referendum or by a 
constitutional convention. 
The other five provisions were adopted through piecemeal legis la-
tion: (1) an elective governor and lieutenant governor serving terms 
lVirgin Islands Law, To Provide for a Convention, Election of 
Delegates and for the Submission of Proposals of the Convention to the 
Congress and President of United States, To Provide an Appropriation 
Therefor, Act 1174 (1964). 
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of four years; (2) abolition of the limitation on voting for legis-
lative members at large; (3) representation in the United States 
Congress through a resident commissioner or delegate to the House of 
Representatives; (4) abolition of the Presidential veto on local laws; 
and (5) authorizing the local legislature to fix the salaries of its 
. 1 members, effective upon election of a succeeding leg1slature. 
It is insightful to review the steps leading to the successful 
passage of the elective-governor legislation. In 1966, as a result of 
continuous pressure, an elective-governor bill was introduced in both 
houses of Congress, but opponents were able to postpone enactment 
until the Ninetieth Congress. The appointed Democratic governor 
wanted the provision enacted in 1967 to coincide with the fiftieth 
anniversary of the transfer of the Virgin Islands to the United States. 
However, the opposition, led by the editor of the leading newspaper 
and the Republican Club, proposed a 1970 date. They felt that the 
appointed Democratic governor would use his influence to manipulate 
the elective process and insure his continuation in office. The 
Republican Party reasoned that it would be impossible to achieve a 
2 genuine two-party system if an election was held prior to 1970. The 
United States Congress eventually agreed to .set the date for 1970, thus 
removing the major objection to the bill's implementation. 
·1 
Bough, "General Introduction," op. cit., pp. 125-126. 
2 U.S. Congress, Senate, Guam-Virgin Islands Elective Governors, 
Hearings Before the Territories and Insular Affairs Subcommittee and 
the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Congress, 1st 
Session, February 20, 1967 and April 26, 1967, pp. 52-53, and Hill, 
Rise to Recognition, pp. 149-150. 
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The 1968 Elective Governor's Act 
On August 23, 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the 
Elective Governor Bill into law. The act provided for the election of 
the governor and the lieutenant governor for a four-year term. If no 
candidate received a majority of the votes cast, a runoff election was 
1 mandated within fourteen days. Despite the right to elect their own 
governor, the people of the Virgin Islands were still under the super-
vision of the United States Secretary of the Interior, whose power to 
appoint a government comptroller for the Virgin Islands was retained. 2 
We may reasonably conclude that retention of this office virtually 
guarantees the adversary                           that has characterized this 
office. 3 
lVirgin Islands Elective Governor Act (73 Stat. 569). 
2Ibid., and Hill, Rise"to Recognition,       cit., p. 153. 
3 On August 4, 1977, I attended a governor's cabinet meeting 
where then-Governor Cyril E. King advised his cabinet that he was 
terminating certain U.S. government comptroller privileges such as the 
colocation of their offices in the Department of Finance. He also 
added that he was halting all existing audits and as of the date of 
the meeting, no audits would be done without advance notice and 
clearance from the governor, who would then send the department head 
a letter saying he had approved the audit. The responsibility for 
approval had formerly rested with the Commissioner of Finance. The 
governor had returned from meetings in Washington, D.C., and had been 
unable to resolve the policy differences between his position on the 
role of the U.S. government comptroller and that of the Department 
of the Interior. The governor was taking the above measures to pre-
vent the infringement of the rights of the local government. Another 
example of the troubled relationship between the Virgin Islands 
governor and the U.S. government comptroller is described in an 
article by John Riehm, "He Checks the Books but Comptroller's Efforts 
Not Always Lauded," The St. Croix Journal, Thursday, December 13, 
through Wednesday, December 19, 1973. The U.S. government comptroller, 
in a discussion with the newspaper writer, expressed surprise at the 
heat of the recent blast made by the then-Governor Melvin Evans at the 
U.S. government comptroller for his criticism of the Virgin Islands 
government's shortsighted planning on the widening of the Veteran's 
Drive, a public highway in St. Thomas. 
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On November 17, 1970, Virgin Islanders elected a governor for the 
first time, thus achieving a goal that had first been articulated in 
the 1920s when the leaders of the majority black Virgin Islanders 
1 attemp·ted to secure a representative government for their people. 
Virgin Islands' governors were now answerable to their elected represen-
tatives rather than to the President of the United States. 
The 1972 Non-Voting Delegate Bill 
The quest for a resident commissioner to represent Virgin Island-
ers in the United States Congress began shortly after the passage of 
the 1936 Organic Act. As early as 1945 the Virgin Islands Assembly 
h d .. d h C f T.T h . . 2 a                     t e ongress or a was                                              
Finally, on April 10, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon signed 
Public Law 92-271 to provide for a non-voting delegate to the House of 
Representatives from the Virgin Islands and Guam. 3 Governor Melvin 
Evans, the first elected governor of the Virgin Islands, hailed the 
bill's passage by the United States Senate as a "most momentous 
occasion" and expressed "joy and happiness" that this "long-sought-
after goal had finally become a reality.,A As the Virgin Islands 
Washington representative so ably argued during the hearings on the 
non-voting-delegate bill, the greater array of problems confronting 
lHill, Rise to Recognition, Ope cit., p. 155. 
2 Creque,       cit., pp. 122-123. 
3Delegates to Congress from Guam and Virgin Islands (86 Stat. 
119,1972); 48 U.S.C., sec. 1711-1715 (1972). 
4 Daily News (St. Thomas, Virgin Islands), March 29, 1972. 
the Islands, combined with the greater array of federal programs to 
combat them, meant that the Islands' needs were beyond the scope of 
casual attention by the Interior Committee. l 
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Under the provisions of the law, the non-voting delegate lacked 
the vote on the House floor, but enjoyed other House privileges such 
as a seat on the floor, a right to engage in debate, and. the right to 
i t d 1 · 1 . 2 n ro uce eg1s at10n. After the election of the first Virgin Islands 
non-voting delegate, the House rules were amended to allow him a 
. 3 comm1ttee vote. 
Although the Virgin Islands legislature had its first Washington 
representative in 1968, he functioned solely as a lobbyist for the 
Islands' interest. 4 As a representative he was not entitled to a 
Congressional office, membership on committees, lacked access to the 
House floor and had no voting power. 5 
The long struggle for a Washington representative is vividly 
described by Lewis, who sees the long history of the fight for adequate 
representation in Washington as reflection of the indifference, 
lHome Journal (St. Thomas, Virgin Islands), April 11, 1972, 
Daily News (St. Thomas, Virgin Islands), March 16, 1972. U.S. Congress, 
House, Committee on the Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on 
Territorial and Insular Affairs, Hearings on Non-voting delegates--
Guam and the Virgin Islands (9lst Cong., 2d sess., 1970), pp. 44-48. 
2Daily News (St. Thomas, Virgin Islands), Wednesday, March 29, 
1972. 
3 U.S. Congress, House, House Resolution 6, approved on January 3, 
1973. 
4 Virgin Islands Code, Office of the Elected Representative to 
Washington, D.C. from the Virgin Islands (1968, Title 18, c. 2). 
5Lewis,       cit., p. 348. 
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inaction, and outright hostility with which the United States Congress 
traditionally viewed demands by Virgin Islanders. A resident commis-
sioner for the Virgin Islands was supported by Virgin Islands' voters 
in two different referendums, and also by administration officials and 
Congressmen friendly" to the Virgin Islands. 
Attempts to secure representation through local legislation were 
vetoed by Governors Harwood in 1944 and Gordon in 1956. They reasoned, 
first, that the legislature's action did not inspire confidence in the 
Virgin Islanders' ability to assume the obligations of their govern-
ment, and, second, that legislating locally illegally attempted to 
bypass the Secretary of the Interior, who was the Presidential agent 
for the territories. 
Congressional objections had reflected these "attitudes. The first 
was related to cost and the second to the attitude that the Islanders 
had no right to complain because only the United States Congress had 
the authority to determine the Virgin Islands'                     status. l 
Summary 
Constitutional progress in the United States Virgin Islands was 
achieved only after an extensive and extended struggle. According to 
Lewis, "The central malaise of life" in the Virgin Islands "is their 
continuing status as an 'unincorporated territory'" of the United States. 
This unhappy condition stems directly from the lack of Constitutional 
guarantees to unincorporated territories. Lewis concludes, therefore, 
that Virgin Islanders necessarily exist within an atmosphere of profound 
lLewis, Ope cit., pp. 345-348. 
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1 
                        for what Congress gives, Congress can as easily take away. 
This uncertainty has affected the Islands' development, directty 
impacting on the foreign-labor program and the development of social 
services. The delay in implementing an American system of government 
and the piecemeal manner in which it occurred meant that the business-
men and the landowners maintained their hegemony in Virgin Islands 
affairs after the 1917 transfer. Thus the black majority's hopes for 
democratic government remained unfulfilled. Representatives of the 
black majority, like the labor unions, were viewed as rabble-rousers. 
The labor unions themselves were unable to secure better salaries and 
improved working conditions for their members. 
Due to the economic difficulties experienced in the Islands 
after its purchase by the United States government, the only alterna-
tive for the black majority was to migrate in search of economic 
betterment. This large outmigration both created a labor shortage and 
deprived the Islands of many talented younger people. 
When United States immigration laws finally were extended to 
the Virgin Islands in 1925 businessmen, particularly the owners of the 
sugar-cane plantations in St. Croix, campaigned for seasonal foreign 
labor, specifically West Indians. A vicious cycle was thus created: 
the black Virgin Islander was forced to. migrate in part because in-
migrants were willing to work for lower wages. Although the naval 
administration was successful in securing Puerto Rican migrants for the 
agricultural work on· St. Croix, the Puerto Rican laborers, American 
citizens, were free to accept other employment or return at will to 
1 . Lewis,       cit., pp. 344 and 358. 
70 
Puerto Rico. The businessmen continued to pre<,s for foreign workers 
whose freedom was considerably more restricted. The labor unions main-
tained that any labor shortage was due to low wages. 
Universal suffrage was finally secured in 1936 and the represen-
tatives of the black majority secured political power. However, their 
legislative power easily could be curtailed by the governor. Thus, 
local legislative initiatives could be severely curtailed. For 
example, attempts to secure representation in the United States Congress 
were vetoed and the legislators criticized for their immaturity. 
The relatively underdeveloped state of the Virgin Islands and 
the mUltiple needs for basic public services such as electricity, 
water, sewage systems, and so forth, and the impact that a large migra-
tion of foreign workers would have on the society, were ignored by the 
United States Congress, which implemented legislation allowing the 
entry of foreign labor. 
The lack of clarity about Virgin Islanders' citizenship status 
created a great deal of uncertainty. The Islanders' quest for self-
government could thus be prolonged. 
As we shall see in Chapters V, VI and VII, the haphazard treat-
ment suffered by Virgin Islanders was especially evident in the social 
welfare programs. Specifically, the Virgin·Islands was excluded from 
the 1935 Social Security Act. After many years of public testimony, 
frequent Island delegations to the United States Congress and federal 
agencies, and publicity about the Islands' deteriorating socioeconomic 
posture, some provisions of the Social Security Act were allowed. How-
ever, more onerous requirements were imposed including different 
dollar-for-dollar matching formulas and tighter financial ceilings. 
71 
The result has been an ineffective social service delivery system. 
Today, the trend continues. For example, the Virgin Islands was 
included in the Food Stamp program, but excluded from the Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) program. Under Title XX, the Virgin Islands 
receives funds if the fifty states and the District of Columbia don't 
use their total allotments. The Virgin Islands government is con-
stant1y on the defensive as it strives to provide programs comparable 
to those on the mainland. 
The magnitude of the total problem can be appreciated by the 
fact that extraordinary effort must be exercised in regard to all 
federal programs and the many special legislative acts that pertain 
1 exclusively to the Virgin Islands. Yet not until 1972 did the United 
States Congrass approve a non-voting delegate for the Virgin Islands. 
This delay is but one of many illustrations of the Congressional per-
spective on the Islands. Lewis quite accurately refers to the indif-
ference, inaction, and hostility with which Congress has viewed 
Vir.gin Islanders' demands. 2 Not surprisingly, this attitude has fos-
tered a position of inferiority on the part of the Islands' represen-
tatives vis-a-vis the Congress. 
All of these factors have multiplied the problems related to 
foreign labor and an effective social service delivery system. 
lDuring the closing hours of the 95th Congress, an amendment 
increasing the ceiling for the Public Assistance program in the terri-
tories was attached to the Tax legislation. See, U.S. Congress, Senate, 
The Revenue Act of 1978 (Pub. L. 95-600, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978). 
However, this increase was limited to the fiscal year 1979 only and 
the financially strapped territories are unable to effectively make 
use of these funds to assist clients since there are no guarantees 
that the funds will be extended. 
2Lewis, 2£. cit., p. 346. 
Now that we have discussed the political relationship between 
the Virgin Islands and the United States, we shall proceed to 
Chapter III, "Socioeconomics and the Foreign-Labor Program." 
72 
CHAPTER III 
SOCIOECONOMICS AND THE FOREIGN-LABOR PROGRAM 
Discussions of the multiple socioeconomic problems in the              
Islands during the 19}Os must inevitably include the foreign-workers 
program. This program, initiated in the late 1950s, was an exception 
to the temporary-workers' provisions of the 1952 Immigration and 
Nationality Act. Under this special program Virgin Islands' employers 
were permitted to use foreign workers from the British, French, and 
Dutch West Indies if the local labor market could not supply workers 
needed in the tourist industry, which generated the economic prosperity 
of the 1960s. l 
Many discussions on the problems generated by the temporary 
alien-workers' program are limited to the time the program was in 
existence. However, the pertinent historical circumstances are 
germane to any comprehensive examination, for they help in appreci-
ating the distinctive forces that shaped the socioeconomics of the 
United States Virgin Islands. Critical to an understanding of the 
Virgin Islands domestic labor force are the interrelationships among 
the rising aspirations of the unskilled and uneducated Virgin Islands 
lU.S. Congress, House, Non-immigrant Alien Labor Program on the 
Virgin Islands of the United States, pp. 59-61. 
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laborer, cyclical trends of prosperity and depression on the Islands, 
and the limited opportunities available to the native Virgin Islander 
for self-advancement. 
Chapter III, therefore, will focus on the socioeconomic history 
of the Islands since the 1917 purchase. 
We shall begin our discussion with a review of the socioeconomic 
conditions at the time of the transfer to the United States. Then we 
shall discuss the achievements and shortcomings of the naval adminis-
tration followed by an examination of the Roosevelt New Deal's impact 
on the new civil administration of Governor Pearson. His creation, 
The Virgin Islands Company, will then be scrutinized after which our 
discussion will turn to the 1936 OrganiC Act and the failures of the 
aging New Deal. The two major periods spanning the years from 1941 
to 1954 will be covered next. Universal sufferage and post-1954 
economic development--the Revised Organic Act and the initiation of 
the foreign-labor program--conclude Chapter III. 
Of course, the reader should bear in mind that all conclusions 
remain tentative. 
Socioeconomic Conditions at Transfer 
The Virgin Islands, at the time of their purchase by the United 
States, had lapsed economically into the status of dependencies 
requiring state subsidies to cope with the endemic problems of poverty 
unemployment. and                               The Danish government, however, had 
lLewis, Ope cit., p. 38. 
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spent a fraction of what was actually needed. Thus the United States 
bought a depressed colonial society with an economy whose traditional 
outlets for laborers had been estate agriculture based on cheap black 
labor on St. Croix, harbor commerce supported by clerks and stevedores 
on St. Thomas, and farming, fishing, and the production of bay oil on 
St. John. The economic system's inequalities were compounded by 
hereditary land monopolies: on St. Thomas, 60 percent of the total 
acreage was held by fifteen owners; on St. Croix, twenty families and 
one alien industrial group owned 80 percent of the land. l Thus, 
upward mobility of the majority black population was severely re-
stricted and only a few blacks were able to acquire financial and 
economic power. Small wonder, then, that most of the Islanders 
looked to their new government, the United States, to improve their 
2 economic status. 
In St. Croix, where agriculture was the major industry, the 
prominent products were sugar, rum, cotton, fru-i. ts and vegetables, 
hay, forage, and cattle. 3 Since the middle of the nineteenth century, 
the Crucian sugar-cane industry had declined due to its low yield 
per acre, high production costs and freight rates, and more efficient 
competitors. Despite the sugar industry's decline, it had long been 
lLewis, £P. cit., pp. 38 and 59. 
              H. Dickinson, "The Economic Crisis in the Virgin Islands," 
Current History, XXVII (December, 1927), p. 377. 
3Luther K. Zabriskie, The Virgin Islands of the United States 
of America (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1918), p. 178 and 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of the 
Virgin Islands of the United States, November 1, 1917 (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1919), p. 25. 
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1 the mainstay of the St. Croix economy. Wages of ten to twenty cents 
a day, plus housing and a plot of ground, the seasonal nature of 
sugar-cane cultivation and the limited employment opportunities had 
fostered the mass migration of Crucian labor to Puerto Rico, Cuba, 
Panama, and the United States. 2 Laborers from other West Indian 
islands were recruited to replace              
The St .·Croix Labor Union was fonned in 1916, but attempts to 
negotiate labor agreements brought little but repression from the 
island's power brokers. A strike in 1916, however, led to a wage 
increase amounting to thirty-five cents per nine-hour day.4 Except 
for very limited gains. the plight of the island's laborer remained 
virtually unaltered. The agricultural laborers lived a starvation 
existence in huts and outbuildings, and malnutrition was rampant. 
Under these conditions, labor's productivity was substandard. 
The 2 percent of the population of St. Croix who were land-
owners remained opposed to modernization.for the tax structure 
encouraged the holding of land for future speculation while successful 
sugar-cane cultivation was perceived as dependent on cheap agricultural 
lU.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour and Public Contracts 
Division, Economic Report on Industries Operating in the Virgin 
Islands, March 1949. p. 6. 
2Jarvis, op. cit., p. 102, Lewisohn, op. cit., p. 357 and 
Zabriskie, op. cit., p. 132. 
3Dickinson, "The Economic Crisis in the Virgin Islands," p. 379 
and Memorandum to Secretary of the Navy (Operations) from Governor Rear 
Admiral James Harrison Oliver on Subject: Virgin Islands of the United 
States: Preliminary Report, dated May 10, 1917, p. 8. 
4Hill, Rise to ...• p. 63 and Lewisoh, op. cit., pp. 357-358. 
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1 labor. These conditions helped maintain the status quo and cut into 
the union 1 s potential strength. 2 
St. Thomas's agricultural base had been overshadowed by the 
island's importance as a shipping and transshipping center for the 
other islands in the West Indies. It was also the communications 
center of the West Indies and for communications from Europe and the 
United States. Consequently, St. Thomas laborers were employed 
primarily in the coaling of ships and related harbor work. 3 When the 
harbor was busy. as it normally was. laborers earned one dollar or 
more per day. The exceptions, therefore, such as the 1916 hurricane 
and the subsequent hard times, fostered the unionization of the coal 
carriers and other laborers. It was believed also that they were 
inspired by the success of the St. Croix strike. The St. Thomas 
Labor Union struck against the West Indian Company in 1917 and obtained 
4 the increased wages demanded. 
lDickinson. "The Economic Crisis in the .Virgin Islands, p. 379 
and Committee on Insular Affairs, A Report on the Political, Social 
and Economic Conditions in the U.S. Virgin Islands., pp. 413-19. 
2Moorhead. op. cit., p. 71. in his discussion of the 1916 strike 
comments that a union of dependent people makes for very limited power. 
The union could strike but their members owned no land, thus they were 
dependent on the landowners for housing and subsistence. This limited 
their bargaining power. Dickinson supports Moorhead's position with 
his description of St. Croix as the last stand of the old feudal system 
of industry which depends on cheap and ignorant               autocratic and 
romantic minde.d overlords and land monopoly. He saw this in opposition 
to the practice of 20th century which is based on scarce, high paid and 
increasingly intelligent labor, efficient working executives risen from 
the ranks and distributed land. See Dickinson, op. cit., p. 378. 
3U. S • Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of the 
Virgin Islands of the United States, November 1, 1917, pp. 22 and 27. 
4Hill, Rise to ... , p. 65 and Zabriskie. op. cit., p. 138. 
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The economic activity of St. John was limited to the production 
of bay oil t used in the manufacture of bay rum, the raising of a 
limited number of cattle. and the cultivation of a small amount of 
fruit and vegetables. fishing, and the manufacture of bay rum. The 
population of 959 inhabitants earned their livelihood from the twenty-
1 six farms that represented four-fifths of the island's acreage. 
St. John's proximity to St. Thomas provided St. John's laborers with 
s()me mobility. 
The St. Thomas laborer earned three times as much as his Crucian 
counterpart and even though the Crucian laborer received housing and 
a plot of ground to grow provisions, he could not substantially 
improve his position. 2 His only viable alternative was emigration 
from St. Croix. The St. Thomas laborer, on the other hand t benefited 
directly in times of increased harbor activity. Additionally, his 
exposure to travelers from other parts of the world provided him with 
knowledge of off-island opportunities. His world view was, as a 
result t wider than his Crucian counterpart's. 
Despite the wage gap between St. Thomas and St. Croix, the 
socioeconomic conditions of the overall Virgin Islands laboring class 
were extremely poor. The disastrous hurricane of 1916 further 
aggravated this situation, prompting the Danish Parliament to dispatch 
lU.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of 
the Virgin Islands of the United States. November 1, 1917, pp. 25-26 
and U.S. Congress. Committee on Insular Affairs t A Report on the 
Political, Social and Economic Conditions in the U.S. Virgin Islands, 
p. 14. 
2There was little unoccupied land in the Virgin Islands on which 
laborers could settle without violating the law of possession so they 
were compelled to work on the plantations in order to earn their liveli-
hood. See, Dookhan, A History ... , p. 224. 
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yet another commission to study and report on the Is1ands--this time 
in case the treaty of cession of August 4, 1916 was unsuccessful. 
Their findings indicated that the decline of the Islands had continued. 
The competition from beet sugar and the low price of cane sugar in the 
world market had hurt St. Croix. The low wage levels and the building 
of the Panama Canal had resulted in the emigration of the better 
workmen whose places were filled by inferior laborers from Barbados 
and other is1ands. l St. Thomas had declined because of the changes 
in shipping due to new scientific developments and the dislocations 
of the World War. 
The various attempts by the Danish government to make the 
islands self-supporting had failed and numerous improvements were 
needed. Among these were a geological survey to determine if 
irrigation was feasible, the improvement of the water catchment 
system, the construction of a sewer system, the control of mosquitoes, 
and the modernization of the hospitals. Since the Danish                   could 
not . afford these improvements, the Islands' transfer to the United 
States was perceived as the most desirable a1ternative. 2 
lThe Crucian planters were deprived of an adequate supply of 
laborers as a result of the emancipation of the slaves in 1848. By 
1851, they had turned to immigration as a means of securing the needed 
labor. Considerable effort and government expense went into the re-
cruitment of supplementary labor and by 1860 a tax was imposed to pay 
for these costs. Laborers came from the British, French and Dutch West 
Indies, in addition of Madeira and indentured labor from India. Many 
of these immigrants were leaders during the labor revolts of 1878 and 
1916. On the other hand, the continuation of the unfavorable living 
conditions led to the large scale emigration of Virgin Islanders. Since 
1848, the population showed a consistent decline from 39,614 in 1850 to 
32,786 in 1890 and 27,086 in 1911. See Dookhan, Qp. cit., pp. 226-27 
and James Warren Green, "Social Networks in St. Croix United States 
Virgin Islands (Ph.D dissertation, University of Washington, 1972), 
pp. 79-80. 
2Evans, Ope cit., pp. 32-33. 
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As noted previously, the Virgin Islanders hoped their new 
association with the United States would cure their economic and 
social ills.l Contrastingly, the primary value of the Virgin Islands 
in the eyes of the United States related to government coaling depots 
and military bases. Additionally, a United States Department of 
Commerce investigating team had made a study in 1916 of the possi-
bilities of marketing more American products in the Virgin Islands 
and had predicted a bright economic future for the Islands--in direct 
opposition to the bleak picture painted by the Danish commission. 
It is important to note that the Commerce Department investigators 
had not attempted a detailed breakdown of the Islands' socioeconomics. 
Had they bothered to do so, they could hardly have evaded the true 
facts. 2 
The Naval Administration 
The conception of the Virgin Islands as militarily strategic 
led to the Navy Department's appointment to administer them. 3 The 
26,051 inhabitants could not be ignored,4 but the outlook for the Islands' 
economic recovery was poor. The negative factors included precarious 
lDookhan, 00. cit., p. 262. In Governor Oliver's May 17, 1917 
Preliminary Report on-the Virgin Islands, he states that the laboring 
classes were under the impression that the American occupation would 
increase wages and provide employment for all unskilled labor and that 
$10 million had been appropriated for this purpose. The landed 
aristocracy also believed that the United States would purchase large 
tracts of land at fancy prices. 
2Evans, op. cit., p. 34. 
3Dookhan, A History •.• , p. 266. 
4U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of 
the Virgin Islands of the United States, p. 36. 
climatic conditions, difficult terrain, minimal natural resources, 
dwindling shipping and sugar production, declining quantity and 
quality of population, a slavery inheritance that encouraged family 
instability, racial friction, and the concentration of land in the 
hands of a reactionary oligarchy.l Governor Oliver's first annual 
report stated that the problems of sanitation, hygiene, public 
morality, health care (particularly infant and death mortality 
rates), education, public roads and water supply were so severe and 
. far-reaching that only gradual improvements were practicable. 
Although he recognized that limited employment opportunities had 
forced native laborers to emigrate, his immediate plans did not 
foresee economic improvement. Instead, funds were requested for 
an immediate attack on projects related to water supply, sewage 
disposal, and health and sanitation. 2 
Emphasis on reforming the Islands' health, education, and 
public-works programs were to continue under subsequent Naval 
governors 3 and their achievements were remarkable. For example, 
the naval administration reorganized the hospitals in St. Thomas 
IGrede, "The New Deal in the Virgin Islands, 1931-1941", 
p. 52. 
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2Annual Report of the Governor of the Virgin Islands, Fiscal 
Year 1917. (Typewritten) The governor also states in this report 
that there was no immediate necessity for improving the St. Thomas 
harbor. This was seen as relatively less important than the problems 
of public health and sanitation. 
3Between 1917 and 1927 there were no less than six Governors. 
These frequent changes frustrated any hope of achieving continuity 
of policy. See Dookhan, A History ..• , p. 269. 
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and St. John, increased hospital personnel and equipment, established 
training programs for native nurses, improved infant and maternal 
welfare, formulated a sanitary code, and effectively controlled 
tropical diseases. The death rate dropped from 35.4 per thousand 
in 1917 to 19.5 per thousand in 1926. 1 Their greatest achievements, 
however, were in education. 
The educational system was secularized, school buildings were 
built or reconstructed. teacher training was initiated, existing 
junior and senior high schools were improved and new ones built, 
curriculums borrowed from other states were introduced, teachers 
were employed in increased numbers. and salaries were gradually 
raised. 2 Thus, the illiteracy rate dropped to a low of 16 percent 
at the end of the navy era, down from a high of 25 percent in 1917. 3 
Additionally, the naval administration introduced a safe 
water-supply system, a sewage disposal system. a partial saltwater 
flushing system, and a modern fire department. 4 
The navy was an abject failure in improving the Islands' 
economic structure, which continued to deteriorate despite a brief 
improvement in the sugar industry after World War 1. 5 Further 
1Dookhan, A History ... , p. 267 and Grede, "The New Deal in the 
Virgin Islands of the United States, 1931-1941," p. 57. 
2 Evans, Ope cit., pp. 272-273 and Dookhan, A History ••• , p. 268. 
3Lewisoln, op. cit., p. 367. 
4Evans, Ope cit., pp. 267-271 and Dookhan, A History ... , 
pp. 267-8. 
5Grede, "The New Deal in the Virgin Islands of the United 
States, 1931-1941," p. 58. 
aggravating the economic situation was a series of calamities that 
befell the Islands including the movement of the Hamburg-American 
Steamship Line to Curacao during World War I and the loss of 
employment for about one thousand people, and scientific advances 
which saw cable replace               communications and oil replace coal 
as fuel in transatlantic steamers. Too, prohibition was extended 
to the Virgin Islands from 1921 to 1934 and affected the sugar 
industry in St. Croix, the bay-rum industry in St. John, and the 
shipping activity in the St. Thomas harbor. The longest and most 
severe drought in the Islands' history lasted from 1921 to 1923. 
The disastrous effects of the 1928 hurricane in St. Croix affected 
every family and the labor market was further depressed by the low 
price of sugar due to the competition from the beet industry.1 
Despite these harsh setbacks, the naval administration was either 
unwilling or unable to act. Except for some assistance given 
Crucian plantation owners through drilling wells and facilitating 
the marketing of cattle in Puerto Rico, few attempts were made to 
stimulate agricultural development in St. Croix or increase trade 
activities in St. Thomas. 2 
In 1924 in response to a joint resolution of the Colonial 
Councils, the governor created a department of Commerce, Labor, 
and Agriculture. The resolution stated that the department's 
lU.S. Congress, House, Committee on Insular Affairs, A Re-
port on the Political, Social and Economic Conditions in the U.S. 
Virgin Islands, 1917-30, pp. 29-35. 
2Dookhan, A History ... , pp. 268-269. 
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purpose was the investigation of and advising on the "fundamental 
economic problems of the entire Virgin Islands and securing the 
most expert advice regarding modern methods of cultivating, pro-
cessing and marketing" the agricultural products of St. Croix and 
increasing the dependence of the people of St. Thomas on the soil. 
The navy chaplin who had responsibility for public welfare was placed 
in charge of this new department. His repeated requests that an 
agriculture expert be retained were ignored. l Thus the naval adminis-
tration effectively undercut the Colonial Council's desire to assist 
in the Islands' economic development. 
Grede hypothesizes that the naval administration's failure in 
this area may have been due to a lack of experience in colonial 
administration, the impossibility of solving the carryover economic 
problems of the Danes or the belief that this was not navy business. 
Indeed, the naval administration's involvement in the Islands' 
civilian,- non-bureaucratic life was so negligible as to be invisible. 2 
Unfortunately. this posture failed to meet the needs of both the 
Islands' economic classes: the large mass of landless, repressed 
black laborers and the small group of whites and propertied blacks. 3 
lEvans, op. cit., p. 274, Dookhan, A History of the ..• , p. 269. 
Lewis, Ope cit., p. 57. When Harry Taylor-tooklDver the work of this 
department, in 1931 in the Pearson regime, he discovered that the files 
covering the activities of these three departments consisted of the 
contents of less than one half of a standard file drawer. See Letter 
written by Harry Taylor in Virgin Islands View (November, 1965), p. 6. 
2Grede, "The New Deal in the Virgin Islands of the United States, 
   1931-1941, pp. 58 and 60. It is conservatively estimated that the navy 
spent over five million dollars for naval personnel and the maintenance 
of the naval station while disbursing a little under four million dollars 
for facilities and services to Islanders. 
3Ibid •• p. 49 and Lewisohn, OPe cit., p. 370. Lewisohn also 
                        91 percent of the Virgin Islands' population was black 
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Both groups entertained unrealistically           expectations about 
American ownership. Generally 9 these expectations fell into one 
of two categories: 
That the federal government would undertake a vast spending 
program for the economic rehabilitation of the colonial economy; 
that private capitalism would invest heavily in the Islands. 
Lewis comments that the tragedy of the navy experiment in 
colonial government was that the navy, through no fault of its own, 
possessed neither the machinery nor the political connections to 
be a political broker with Congress or a sales promoter with 
continental business. The officers had scant contact with business 
groups. Their isolation from Congressional politics prevented them 
from feeding at the trough of the federal pork barrel.1 
Consequently, changes in the Islands' economics were initiated 
not by the naval administration but by visiting Congressional 
delegations and representatives of the federal bureaucracy. In 1920, 
a joint Congressional commission visited the Islands. The commission 
recommended no significant changes in the form of government;2 thus, 
the quest by representatives of the black majority for fundamental 
change suffered a major setback. 
Despite this disappointment 9 three significant commissions 
studied the Islands during the next decade: 
and 90 percent of the blacks were in bad financial shape and fully 
dependent on available social welfare services while 10 percent of 
the affluent whites "and blacks existed on naval handouts in one way 
or another. 
lLewis, Ope cit., pp. 57-5& 
2 Evans 5 OPe cit., pp. 218-220. 
1) the 1924 federal commission appointed by the Secretary of 
Labor to investigate industrial and economic conditions; 
2) the 1928 educational survey authorized by the Secretary of 
the Navy;l 
3) the 1929-30 report on the political, social, and economic 
conditions by the chief of the Federal Bureau of Efficiency. 
First, we shall discuss the 1924 commission. 
The 1924 commission. The 1924 Negro Commission2 noted that 
large numbers of native workers complained about being undercut by 
aliens from nearby islands who worked for lower wages than the 
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pittance demanded and received by the domestic laborers. The commission 
therefore recommended immediate consideration of barring alien seasonal 
labor migration. 3 Despite this recommendation, rigid enforcement of 
the Immigration Act did not occur in the Virgin Islands until 1941, 
when the Immigration and Nationalization Service assumed complete 
jurisdiction.4 
lThese 1924 and 1928 commissions were also known as the Negro 
Commissions as they were composed of black mainland residents. The 
educational survey was conducted by Negro educators from Hampton and 
Tuskegee Institutes. 
2Jarvis, Ope cit., p. 138. Agricultural workers were then paid 
20e to 40¢ per day and workers involved in coaling vessels averaged 
60¢ per day, but work was usually available for only two days per 
week. See U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Secretary, Report 
of Federal Commission to the Virgin Islands, 1924 (typewritten), p. 1. 
3U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Secretary, Report of 
Federal Commission to the Virgin Islands, 1924, p. 3. The report 
indicated that the cost of living was very low, but to improve the 
opportunities for work "these people must migrate" to avoid sinking 
to an economic level abhorrent to American ideals. 
4U.S. Congress, House, Nonimmigrant Alien Labor Program on the 
Virgin Islands of the United States. pp. 3-4. 
The commission reported finding pervasive unemployment, in-
adequate wages, hunger, and poor housing;l indeed, six of its ten 
recommendations were directed toward economic rehabilitation. For 
example. the commission recommended that St. Thomas be restored as 
a port of call and that the Department of Commerce make a special 
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study of manufacturing and commercial possibilities so the Islanders 
would feel that the Islands were viewed as more than a mere defense 
outpost. 2 
Jarvis writes that Martin Trench, the governor who served 
from September 1925 to January 1927, was an enthusiastic and 
influential reformer, but died prematurely.3 Despite Jarvis's 
enthusiasm, however, it remains doubtful whether much could have 
been accomplished under Trench to improve the economy given the 
record of the fourteen-year naval administration. 
The 1928 Report. Although substantial credit was due the 
navy for its establishment and operation of an education system, 
by 1927 it was obvious that further improvements were desirable. 4 
lThe housing of workers was described as largely one room 
shacks with an occasional lean-to kitchen. See U.S. Department of 
Labor, Office of the Secretary, Report of Federal Commission to 
the Virgin                   1924, p. 1. 
2Ibid •• pp. 2-3. 
3Jarvis, op. cit., p. 140. 
4In 1928 it was reported that education which at first was 
liberally supported had been gradually dropped into a subordinate 
place. Education never came nearer than half of the expenditures 
for health and poor relief. See Report of the Educational Survey of 
the Virgin Islands, authorized by the Secretary of the Navy and con-
ducted under the auspices of Hampton and Tuskegee Institutes 
(Hampton, Virginia: The Press of the Hampton Normal and Agricultural 
Institute, 1929), p. 69. 
Consequently, Governor Evans, in 1927, requested the Secretary of 
the Navy to authorize an education survey, which was performed by 
Hampton and Tuskegee Institutes in 1928. 1 
The survey report concluded that the Department of Education 
had been conducted in a sincere and capable manner, but that the 
rebuilding of the deteriorated economic and social life of the 
people demanded more comprehensive development. This goal required 
a large per-capita expenditure on education including the partici-
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pat ion in the responsibility of the people for their education system, 
and the expansion and upgrading of industrial and agricultural 
education. Furthermore, the education system needed to be related 
more to local conditions, the gap between the home and the school 
bridged. A program of sabbatical leaves and scholarships was 
recommended as well as a salary schedule related to educational 
attainment. 2 
The commission's report transcended its educational frame-
work to paint a stark picture of economic deprivation and social 
dislocation,3 focusing on the condition of labor. Noting that 
although wages were twice as high ten years previously, the report 
pointed out that they were still low and that the Islands offered 
little choice for the laborer. Outlets for the ambitious Islander 
lJarvis, Ope cit., p. 242 and Pearl Varlack, "Teacher 
Education in the Unites States Virgin Islands: A Historical Profile," 
Micro-state Studies (St. Thomas: The Caribbean Research Institute, 
College of the Virgin Islands, 1977), p. 77. 
2Report of the Educational Survey of the Virgin Islands, pp. 
8-20, and Varlack, OPe cit., p. 77. 
3Lewis, Ope cit., p. 60. 
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were limited mostly to government clerical work and small trade, 
thus hastening mass migration to the United States. 
The industrial interests of the Islands,said the commission, 
forced the standards of labor down to the cheapest possible level. 
The more ambitious laborers were driven to the towns to compete for 
clerical jobs. for places in mercantile life, or to the United States;l 
those who remained           the old, the infirm, and the workers of lower 
caliber. 2 Except for massive reconstruction, which was highly un-
likely, improved education was the only way to reverse deterioration. 3 
lThe 1928 Commission reported that of the 125 high school 
graduates between 1920 and 1924, 60 went to the United States to study 
and find work, 30 were doing clerical work on the islands and it was 
felt that it would be too much to 'assume that more than a very few 
were entering actively into the industrial and productive life of 
the community. See the Report of the Educational Survey of the 
Virgin Islands, p. 62. Thus the educational system also helped to 
foster the outmigration due to the limited on island opportunities 
for advancement. 
2Ibid • Grede reports that migration to the mainland not only 
reduced the quantity but also the quality of Virgin Islanders re-
maining as it was the ablebodied young adults, the best workers and 
the more ambitious who left the Islands. The children were left 
behind with elderly relatives or no kin at all. Another serious effect 
of this migration was the further weakening of the already loose 
family organizations. The preponderance of young males who left for 
the United States,left behind women and children. The insecurity of 
females and family life resulting from the migration of young males 
was superimposed on a cultural pattern of loose family organization 
descendant from the days of slavery. Loose family ties made it easier 
for the young men to leave in the first place and, of course, their 
leaving further weakened family structure. This lack of family 
cohesiveness was both a cause and effect of migration. See Grede, 
OPe cit., pp. 37-38. In 1917, the Census showed 85.4 males to 100 
females and by 1930" females exceeded males by as much as 16 percent. 
See U.S. Department of Conunerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of the 
Virgin Islands of the United States, November 1, 1917, p. 49, and 
Grede, Ope cit., p. 37. 
                    of the Educational Survey of the Virgin Islands, OPe cit., 
p. 63. 
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The 1929 Report. In March 1929, a subcommittee of the House 
Committee on Appropriations visited the Virgin Islands to study the 
economic problems, particularly the issue of                 appropriations. 
The subcommittee subsequently recommended and secured Congressional 
and Executive approval for a thorough survey of political, economic, 
and social conditions. 
In the winter of 1929-1930 Herbert D. Brown, chief of the 
Bureau of Efficiency, and his staff conducted an extensive study 
in the Islands. A nine-hundred page analysis, detailing a proposed 
full-scale rehabilitation program, was produced. l 
Basically, Brown suggested three alternatives to the Congress: 
1. decrease the federal contribution, placing the Islands 
on a regrettably lower standard of government service; 
2. continue indefinitely the non-productive subsidies; 
3.                     for a time, the amount of federal contributions 
in order to establish productive enterprises capable of helping the 
Islanders to achieve self-sufficiency.2 
The United States Congress eventually accepted the Brown 
rehabilitation program, for the subcommittee was impressed with the 
notion that larger appropriations would enable the Islanders to help 
themselves. But the committee would not push the program through 
Congress and thus credit must be given to Brown for its success. 
lEvans, Ope cit., p. 159. 
2U.S. Congress, House, A Report on the Political, Social,and 
Economic Conditions in the U.S. Virgin Islands, 1917-30, pp. 44-45. 
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Brown developed the program as a whole and took the many steps 
necessary--including the lobbying of the Executive and Congressional 
branches. He then successfully fought for the funds to implement 
the program, which were approved on June 11, 1930. Before the end 
of June Brown and his staff had begun their work in rehabilitation, 
but his request for control over the rehabilitation funds raised 
the specter of a second administration in the Islands. 
Rumprs flew about that the Islands had two governors. Amidst 
this controversy, President Hoover, acting partially as a result of 
Brown's efforts on behalf of the report, withdrew the navy, announcing 
on January 30,1931 that he would transfer.jurisdiction to the 
Interior                         The Bureau of Efficiency was assigned to aid 
in the necessary reorganization, thus strengthening Brown's grip.l 
The investigation by the Bureau of Efficiency, unlike the 
other investigations that had preceded it, thus represented a poli-
tical and economic turning point in the life of the Virgin Islands. 
Politically, it resulted in the transfer of the Islands from the 
naval administration to the Department of Interior. Economically, 
it led to the launching of the rehabilitation program. 2 
Many authors have discussed the failures of the naval 
administration, but none dispute its achievements in health, education, 
and public works. 3 Brown, however, commented that despite the great 
lEvans, op.cit., pp. 101, 103, 160-163, and 282. 
2Ibid ., pp. 3-4. 
3See for example, Evans, Ope cit., Lewis, Ope cit., Grede,      
cit., Dookhan, A History, and U.S. Congress, House, A Report on the 
Political, Social and Economic Conditions in the U.S. Virgin Islands, 
1917-1930. 
education, health, and public-works improvements, the people were 
worse than before in some respects. True, education had been 
improved, but employment opportunities remained extremely limited 
and the economy depressed. He concluded by stating that the phrase 
"overeducated and underfed" might with some truth be applied to 
them. l 
Additional factors also led to the transfer. Naval dis-
armament forced reconsideration of the strategic value of the St. 
Thomas harbor; the threat of a hostile Germany was removed with the 
end of World War I; friendly powers controlled nearby West Indian 
harbors. As the United States economy declined, large expenditures 
on a naval base that provided employment for a small portion of the 
native population were increasingly difficult to justify. With the 
continuing deterioration of living conditions for most Islanders, 
a New Deal was indeed required. 2 
The New Deal 
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The New Deal in the Virgin Islands preceded President Roosevelt's 
New Deal by about two years. Despite President Hoover's skepticism 
about the possibility of making the Virgin Islands self-supporting 
he permitted his subordinates to test the program and supported them 
in their struggles with Congressional committees, leading to the 
lU.S. Congress, House, A Report on the Political, Social and 
Economic Conditions in the U.S. Virgin Islands, 1917-30, p. 35. 
2Grede, Ope cit., pp. 61-65. 
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appropriation of the first $141,000 in rehabilitation money.1 
The formal creation of a civilian administration was initiated 
2 by Presidential Executive Order signed on February 27, 1931. The 
Interior Department was "peculiarly adapted to the task" because of 
its experiences with other acquired and underdeveloped territories. 3 
The New Deal was to evolve through four phases during the 
decade from 1931 to 1941: 
1. the initial start-up phase under Brown and Governor 
Pearson; 
2. the chartering of the Virgin Islands Company, a public 
coproration that promoted business; 
3. the 1936 to 1939 period,when the New Deal achived its 
greatest successes including the 1936 Organic Act that established 
an American form of government; 
4. the subsequent failure of the New Deal efforts in the 
1939-1941 period. 
The New Deal Program and 
the Pearson Administration 
Brown and his staff were already implementing the rehabilitation 
program when the first civilian governor, Paul M. Pearson, was 
inagurated on March 18, 1931. 4 Eight days later, President Hoover 
lEvans, OPe cit., p. 281. 
2Executive Order No. 5566, February 27, 1931, Congo Rec. 74 
p. 6666. 
3Dookhan, A History. pp. 271-272. 
4Evans. Ope cit., p. 162 and Jarvis, Ope cit., pp. 159-160. 
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and Secretary of the Interior Wilbur visited St. Thomas briefly and 
both were discouraged by the seeming lack of prospects for the 
successful execution of the rehabilitation program. l In commenting 
to the press about his visit, President Hoover described the Islands 
as an "effective poorhouse" where the people could not be self-
supporting. Hoover hoped the transfer to a civilian administration 
would result in the development of some form of self-sustaining 
industry or agriculture. relieving the United States government of 
the need to support the population. 2 
The people of the Virgin Islands were stunned by the President's 
statements. Governor Pearson and his staff, on the other hand, 
interpreted the remark as a challenge and worked hard to disprove 
the President's diagnosis,3 The Pearson administration was committed 
to the rehabilitation program, strongly supporting the Bureau of 
Efficiency's recommendations and even expanding on them. The 
initial $141,000 Congressional                             was linked to immediate 
objectives: (1) homesteading; (2) remodeling the Grand Hotel in St. 
Thomas; (3) bay-oil development in St. John; (4) establishing an 
industrial and agrucultural school in St. Croix; (5) remodeling the 
poor farm; and (6) reforestation. 
Adding to the above recommendations, Governor Pearson favored 
the promotion of native handicrafts, some of the recommendations of 
lEvans, op. cit., p. 289. 
2Richard V. Oulahan, "Porto Rico Gaining, Virgin Isles a Loss, 
Hoover Concludes," New York Times, March 27, 1931, p. 1, col. 3. 
3 Eva.ns, op. cit., pp. 289-290. 
4 Evans, op. cit., pp. 286-289. 
the 1928 Negro Commission in modernizing the education system, 
recreation programs, trade development, reducing the number of 
officials in the insular government,and holding conferences to get 
people interested in solving their own problems. l 
Although it is certainly questionable whether all these goals 
could have been attained, Governor Pearson's attempts to achieve 
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them were undermined by his subsequent split with Brown. Evans writes 
that "there is indisputable evidence that Mr. Brown attempted to 
exercise an unjustified and unauthorized degree of control over 
Governor Pearson and his administration.,,2 Brown unsuccessfully 
attempted to have Governor Pearson replaced. Governor Pearson 
countered Brown's assertions of his incompetence by publicizing 
what           at times considered trivial accomplishments. 3 
Despite the Pearson-Brown controversy, the governor achieved 
some of his goals. The major activity of the rehabilitation pro-
gram during this period was the homestead project on St. Croix. 
As noted previously, in Chapter II, the concentration of land 
ownership in the hands of a few families, together with the depressed 
wages, made it impossible for most Virgin Islanders to purchase 
farmland. 4 A partial solution, used in other West Indian islands, 
in resolving social and economic ills was putting small farm hold-
ings               reach of the poor.! 
lEvans, Ope cit., pp. 286-289. 
2Ibid ., p. 291. 
3Ibid ., pp. 294 and 298, Jarvis, Ope cit., p. 161, and Doohkan, 
A History, p. 273. 
4Evans, OPe cit., p. 283. 
SCreque. Ope cit., p. 91. 
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The formula, of course. was to buy land with federal funds and 
then to subdivide into small farms. Initially, the homesteaders 
would be allowed to purchase five-to-ten-acre tracts on deferred 
payments at low interest rates. They could grow food for their own 
use and produce sugar cane as a money crop. 
The collapse of the sugar industry in the summer of 1930, and 
the bankruptcy of the company holding the best homesteading land, 
provided an excellent opportunity. However, the purchase was delayed 
by limited funds and legal encumbrances.                             purchase of 
this property was delayed until September 1934. 
In the meantime, however, other land was purchased in both 
St. Thomas and St. Croix and by February 1, 1933 most of the plots 
were in the hands of homesteaders. By July 1, 1934, it was found 
necessary to replace only 10 percent of the St. Croix homesteaders 
for unsatisfactory work while more than 90 percent made the first 
payment from crops grown on their farm plots. The St. Thomas land 
was not as satisfactory for homesteading, but plots of three to 
eight acres were laid out and a few were cultivated. A housing 
program was also linked to the homestead program and a number of 
concrete-block two- and three-room houses were constructed. 
Further development of this project became the responsibility of 
the Virgin Islands Company, which was chartered on April 9, 1934 
(see the following section).l 
Trade development had been one of the administration's goals 
and four bills passed by Congress should have helped in meeting 
lEvans, Ope cit., pp. 283-284 and 304-306 and Dookhan, A 
History, p. 272. 
this goal. We shall briefly describe the substance of the bills. 
1.The authority for the St. Thomas Harbor Board to sel1·bonds. 
This would enable the Harbor Board to build another floating dry 
dock. The floating dry dock which had provided income and employ-
ment for many years had sunk in 1924, but had not been replaced. 
The Secretary of the Interior was required to insure that the 
income from harbor business would retire the bonds, which were not 
guaranteed by the government. Unfortunately, the harbor's revenues 
were insufficient and the bonds could not be authorized. l 
2. The 1930 extension of various provisions of the Rivers 
and Harbors Act of March 3, 1899. The 1930 act included provision 
for projects such as removal of the wrecked dry dock from the St. 
Thomas harbor because the Virgin Islands were brought under federal 
statutes for the protection of navigable water. Unfortunately, 
the dry dock was not replaced so the potential economic development 
benefits of this act were not fully derived. 
3. The extension of the National Banking Act. This act 
established a United States National Bank in the Virgin Islands at 
the expiration of the National Bank of the Danish West Indies in 
June 1934. This change resulted in the United States dollar re-
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placing the Danish West Indian franc as the Islands' legal currency. 
The volume of work involved in converting money was thus e1iminated. 2 
lEvans, OPe cit., pp. 306-7, Jarvis, OPe cit., p. 163, and 
Lewis, Ope cit., p. 82. 
2Creque, Ope cit., p. 94, Evans, Ope cit., p. 296, and Jarvis, 
OPe cit., p. 165. 
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4. Authorizing the Colonial Councils to levy internal revenue 
taxes. This act was designed to add income to the municipal treasuries. 
Officials of the United States Customs and Postal System were directed 
to assist the municipal officials in the collection of these taxes. 
On December 18, 1933, the Colonial Council of St. Thomas and St. John 
implemented the provisions of this legislation by establishing an 
internal revenue tax which successfully met a court test of its 
legality. The St. Croix Colonial Council did not enact the measure. 
Despite this action on the part of the St. Thomas and St. John 
Colonial Council, revenues continued to decline and federal appropri-
ations were needed to cover the deficits. l 
Although the four measures above did not have an immediate 
impact on the Islands' economy, they did push the Islands further 
within the American system of government. 
As envisioned by Governor Pearson, trade development included 
the opening of new markets and the distribution and sale of what was 
produced in the Islands. Several experiments, such as the growing 
of fresh vegetables for the New York market, were tried. These 
attempts were not particularly successful. For example, heavy rains 
damaged the tomoto crop in 1934. Nevertheless, plans were made for 
increasing the total acerage the following year. The promotion of 
native handicrafts such as needle work, basketry, and cabinet-making 
was also undertaken. 2 A handicrafts cooperative was established in 
lcrequp., op. cit., p. 95, Evans, OPe cit .• p. 301, and Jarvis 
Ope cit., pp. 165, 170-171. 
2Evans, Ope cit., pp. 287 and 299. 
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St. Thomas and exhibits were held in mainland cities, but it was not 
a profitable undertaking and considerable disappointment was 
experienced during the first three years. Under FERA financing, the 
situation improved and the number of workers and the amount of sales 
both increased by 250 percent in 1934 over 1933. The production of 
bay-oil and bay-rum in St. John was investigated, but bay-rum pro-
duction remained the same and sugar production suffered a decrease 
during fiscal year 1934.1 
The promotion of tourism was yet another goal and the initial 
rehabilitation appropriation provided for the remodeling of a St. 
Thomas hotel. which would then be leased to a private party. Mr. 
Brown later decided that the first hotel was unsatisfactory and in 
1933 the Bluebeards Castle estate was purchased for the hotel pro-
ject. A twenty-room hotel was also constructed with Public Works 
Administration funds, thus making a total of three hotels on St. 
Thomas. Plans to construct another hotel at the Lindberg Bay estate 
were not implemented and the property was used for a golf course and 
a botanical garden. 2 Governor Pearson reported in fiscal year 1974 
that the tourist industry had increased greatly.3 Nevertheless. 
Lewis writes that the tourist program had little immediate effect, 
since cheap mass-tourist travel was unlikely to be implemented during 
a severe depression. 4 Even though the groundwork began during the 
lEvans, op. cit., pp. 295, 302, and 307. 
2Ibid . , pp. 284, 299, 302, and 307. 
3I bid. , p. 302. 
4Lewis, °E· cit., p. 82. 
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New Deal, tourism as a major industry did not become a reality until 
the 1960s. 
Impressive results were achieved, however, in modernizing the 
education system. The accomplishments included an increase in 
attendance at the summer school for teachers, the securing of 
scholarships for Virgin Islanders at Howard University and Hampton 
Institute, the initiation of an adult-education program, the emp1oy-
ment of teachers with higher qualifications, improvement in the 
curriculum in both quality and adaptability to local conditions, 
and the establishment of a vocational institute in St. Croix to 
promote native crafts and support the homestead program. Generally, 
the Pearson administration continued and improved on the methods 
used during the naval administration. 1 
Partial success was achieved with other objectives that 
Governor Pearson had publicized at the beginning of his adminis-
tration. For example. the reforestation of abandoned farms was 
initiated. 2 Comprehensive plans were completed for the estab1ish-
ment of a recreational park. a baseball league was organized in 
St. Croix, and a series of conferences were held to discuss the 
problems of orphans and adolescent gir1s. 3 
1Evans. OPe cit., pp. 294 and 297-8 and Dookhan, A History, 
p. 273. 
2Evans, Ope cit., p. 295. 
31932 Annual Report of the Governor of the Virgin Islands 
to the Secretary of Interior nvashington, D.C.: Government Print-
ing Office, 1932), p. 3. 
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Governor Pearson had promised in 1931 to reduce the number of 
government officials but their numbers had increased. The rehabili-
tation program itself led to the creation of new offices, thus ex-
panding, rather than contracting, the number of government officials. 
Lewis saw the governor's promise as an example of one of the serious 
internal contradictions in the basic principle of the New Deal 
philosophy for the Islands. l 
However, the most severe criticism of the governor was over a 
program of culture and entertainment that included the production 
of concerts and operettas. Jarvis, the native historian, wrote that 
however "valuable under other conditions, this program was decidedly 
out of place in the Islands." Fortunately, this phase of the 
rehabilitation scheme was soon abandoned. 2 Dookhan also writes that 
many concerts and entertainments were organized to create a feeling 
of satisfac"tion and well-being. This use of trifling achievements 
to indicate a return to prosperity in fact conflicted harshly with 
reality and helped to discredit the administration. 3 
Eventually. the unevenness of the rehabilitation program on 
the Islands and the initation of a full-scale rehabilitation program 
on the United States mainland led to a reevaluation of the Virgin 
Islands New Deal. 
lLewis, OPe cit., p. 83. 
2Jarvis, Ope cit., p. 167. 
3Dookhan, A History, p. 273. 
102 
The Virgin Islands Company 
The establishment of the Virgin Islands Company marked a 
turning point in the development of the Virgin Islands New Deal. 
The company enabled the rehabilitation program to avoid the 
bureaucratic requirements of government. l The essential components 
in the successful establishment of the Virgin Islands Company were 
Governor Pearson's ability as a lobbyist, his success in selling the 
idea of rehabilitation on a large scale t his ability to secure the 
needed funds, and the wholehearted support from Presidents Hoover 
and Roosevelt's Secretaries of the Interior. 2 
Generally, the company was expected to promote industrial 
development through the acquisition and cuttivation of abandoned 
land, to provide employment opportunities for the people, and to 
assist small farmers. 3 The company's overall goal was to relieve 
permanently "the widespread and chronic unemployment of a stranded 
community without capital resources, through the industrial develop-
ment of the islands in general and through the rehabilitation of 
agriculture.,,4 
The plan for the company had been devised by an Advisory 
Council for the Virgin Islands established by President Roosevelt 
in February 1934. 5' The company was to be incorporated under the laws 
lEvans, Ope cit., p. 303. 
2Jarvis, OPe         .• p. 167. 
3Dookhan. A History. pp. 272-273. 
41936 Annual Report of the Governor of the Virgin Islands to the 
Secretary of Interior (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1936), p. 7. 
5Grede, Ope cit., p. 14. 
103 
of the Municipality of St. Croix, the entire stock of the company 
to be held by three trustees--the governor, the Secretary of the 
Interior, and one other--who would in turn appoint a five man board 
of directors. The company also was directed to assist the Colonial 
Council in promoting education and social welfare programs. Initially, 
the company received a $1,000,000 grant from the Public Works 
Administration and smaller amounts from other federal agencies. l 
                  acceptance of the company by vested interests in the Virgin 
Islands proved a difficult first test. 
The New Deal had not been welcomed by the local residents and 
to many its early accomplishments seemed small in comparison with 
the withdrawal of the naval station in St. Thomas and the bankruptcy 
of sugar-production companies in St. Croix. There was much skepticism 
and some opposition to the whole homesteading scheme in St. Croix. 
This opposition surfaced with new intensity when the governor in 
1934 attempted to secure the Virgin Islands Corporation's charter 
from the St. Croix Colonial Council, since the principal work of the 
corporation would be the management of the homestead experitnent in 
St. Croix. 2 The landed aristocracy and merchants, both black and 
white, opposed this reform because poor people would benefit and 
taxes ·would rise. 3 Thus, the Colonial Council of St. Croix fought 
every phrase of the law. 
1$1,000.000 Granted by P.W.A. to Rehabilitate V.I.," The Virgin 
Islands Daily News, February 23, 1934. 
2Evans, op. cit .• p. 303. 
3Grede, op. cit., pp. 6 and 7. 
The most important stumbling block was the eminent domain 
clause which some Islanders felt was intended to take their homes 
and wives from them. l Failing to secure the charter from the St. 
Croix Municipal Council, the governor approached the St. Thomas 
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Municipal Council, which was nearly as recalcitrant. Nevertheless, 
on April 9, 1934. the Virgin Islands Company Act passed the Colonial 
Council of the Municipality of St. Thomas and St. John by a unanimous 
vote. 2 
The passage of the act provided the legal authority for the 
company to begin implementing the rehabilitation program. The 
company's greatest involvement was in agriculture,especially in the 
sugar industry where it engaged directly in cultivation and process-
ing or assisted local farmers. 
In addition to sugar, the company processed distilled rum. 
The lifting of the Prohibition restriction in 1933 had made this 
possible; markets for the rum were found locally, in the United 
States, Hawaii, and Alaska. The company also manufactured and 
sold a special distillate to a St. Thomas corporation for the 
manufacture of bitters. 
The Virgin Islands Company was also involved in financing 
industrial, commercial. and agricultural projects for private in-
vestors who could not obtain financial assistance through banking 
institutions. 
lJ' 't 169               OPe       ., p. . 
2I bid., and Evans, Ope cit., p. 303. 
In view of the inadequate rainfall in the Virgin Islands, 
the provision of water both for domestic and agricultural needs, 
was perceived as a priority of domestic development. The dams 
built at the company's behest drastically reduced the ill effects 
of droughts. 
Despite the company's many endeavors, the first and second 
fiscal years of operation resulted in financial losses of $23,000 
and $11,000, respective1y.l Additionally, the attitude of Virgin 
Islanders toward the company remained very negative. Crucian 
landowners feared company competition and believed the government 
would grant eminent-domain powers to the company. In their 
opinion, the cOIDP?ny would           the private producers. 2 This 
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skepticism about the company's value was even more severe when the 
comptroller general subsequently decided that the profits realized 
by the Company through use of federal money had to be remitted to the 
United States Treasury. The tax exemptions granted to the company 
were removed in 1936, but losses amounted to approximately $30,000 
annually. 3 
The company's operation was also affected by the mounting 
opposition to Governor Pearson who, unlike the naval governors, had 
shown considerable skill in dealing with the political reformists. 
lIsaac Dookhan. "The Virgin Island Company and Corporation: 
The plan for economic rehabilitation in the Virgin Islands," The 
Journal of Caribbean History, IV (May 1972), pp. 59-64. 
2Grede, OPe cit., p. 152. 
3Evans. Ope cit., p. 304, and Dookhan, "The Virgin Islands 
Company," p. 64. 
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He outplayed his opposition in publicizing his case and in lobbying 
the United States Congress and the administration. l He had retained 
the governorship, despite the change from a Republican to a Democratic 
administration in the United States. His success had only increased 
the frustration and determination of his opponents. 2 
After the incorporation of the Virgin Islands Company, the 
campaign to discredit Governor Pearson increased. An October 1934 
riot after a protest march by a native political leader led to a 
Congressional investigation of the Pearson administration. Among 
other things, the governor was charged with graft, corruption, in-
efficiency and waste. Jarvis describes these events in a sad 
commentary as a fiasco played to a large gallery of investigators, 
lawyers, and senators. The investigation resulted in the long-sought-
after removal of Governor Pearson. In July 1935 Lawrence Cramer 
3 became the new governor. 
Governor Cramer had been the government secretary under 
Governor Pearson; living in St. Croix, he had demonstrated con-
siderable skill in dealing with his political opponents. His approach 
was a judicious blend of firmness, frankness, and a willingness to 
compromise. 4 
The major events of his administration were the brief success 
achieved by the New Deal in the period from 1936 to 1938 and the 
lDookhan, A History, p. 278. 
2Ibid . 
3Ibid., p. 278, and Jarvis, OPe cit., pp. 170 and 182. 
4Dookhan, A History, p. 279. 
enactment of the 1936 Organic Act. 
Federal subsidies in the period between 1936 and 1939 were 
still perceived as necessary, but the New Deal spokesmen regarded 
them as temporary pump-priming which could soon be discarded. 
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The optimism was balanced during this period by tangible re-
sults. The Virgin Islands Company homestead program had involved 
hundreds of small farmers in sugar production and they compiled a 
respectable record of mortgage payments. By 1938 it was estimated 
that practically no one was out of work on St. Croix. The company 
directly employed fifteen hundred workers and mill hands amounting 
to one-third of the island's employable residents. Additionally, it 
provided indirect employment as a market for hundreds of small cane 
growers. 1 The Virgin Islands cooperatives expanded sales from 
$4,000 in 1931 to $25,000 in 1937. The tourist trade was up to 
11,000 visitors per year, three times the 1931 figures. Federal 
subsidies, at least in St. Croix, were declining. In 1931 the 
federal government subsidy for municipal services on all three 
islands was $230,000 and by 1936 this had declined to $150,000. 
Within the next two               St. Croix cut its deficit again as Virgin 
Islands Corporation taxes of $26,701 for 1937 and $35,532 for 1938 
were paid. 
By the end of fiscal year 1937, the company showed its first 
profit of $5,159,85. 2 Governor Cramer seemed to be on the way toward 
demonstrating that financial independence for the Virgin Islands 
lDookhan, "The Virgin Islands Company,"pp. 68-69. 
2Ibid., p. 63. 
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could be secured. l 
The 1936 Organic Act brought the much-awaited political changes 
and represented a considerable extension of political power. Most 
important was the provision granting the franchise to all residents 
of both sexes over age twenty-one who could read and write the 
English language. 2 The lower-class Virgin Islanders could finally 
elect representatives to address their needs. Under the old restric-
tive voting requirements there were 1,498 voters in 1936, but this 
3 number doubled by 1938. 
Universal suffrage led to the initiation and development of the 
first political party concerned with the black masses. The Virgin 
Islands Progressive Guide conducted an educational campaign to 
strengthen its membership and secure the support of the newly 
enfranchised poor voters on St. Thomas. The party secured three of 
the seven seats in the St. Thomas and St. John Municipal Counci1. 4 
On St. Croix the Political Guild, composed of the labor union leaders, 
won three of the nine seats as two established politicians lost to 
newcomers. S Unfortunately, both Municipal Councils were unable to 
address the needs of the newly enfranchised voters as the conservative 
interests continued their domination. By the time the voters went to 
the polls in 1938, the optimistic glow of 1936 had begun to fade. 6 
lGrede, £E. cit., p. 201. 
2Dookhan, A Historl. pp. 279-280. 
3Grede, °E' cit., p. 220. 
4Hill , A Golden Jubilee, pp. 128-130. 
SThe St. Croix Avis, October 31, 1938, November 5, 1938, and 
November 12, 1938. 
6Grede. op. cit., p. 207. 
109 
The economic decline soon dampened the political gains. The 
first blow wasthe 1938 drought. The long dry spell sealed the fate 
of the small farmers. The bright prospects for financial self-
sufficiency, as a result of the Virgin Islands Company's efforts, 
were destroyed; again the Islands had to rely on deficit appropriations 
from loJ'ashington. In effect, the Virgin Islands Corporation became 
a massive relief agency.l 
The Failure of the New Deal, 1939-1941 
The New Deal declined after 1939 and was barely recognizable 
by 1941. Nevertheless, the political changes which had occurred as 
a result of the 1936 Organic Act eventually produced far-reaching 
legislation. 2 In 1940, the candidates of the Virgin Islands Pro-
gressive Guide campaigned on the "Square Deal Ticket", pledging to 
address concerns such as the conditions of laborers in the Islands, 
the need to protect workers from job injuries, and a program of 
slum clearance and development of a federal housing program. The 
entire Progressive Guide slate of seven members was elected to the 
St. Thomas and St. John Municipal Counci1. 3 
The St. Thomas and St. John Municipal Council proceeded 
immediately to develop and pass legislation related to the concerns 
of the working class including Hill's Wage and Hour Act of 1941 which 
regulated the hours of employment and the wages that would be paid to 
1Ibid., p. 208. 
2Grede, op. cit., p. 204. 
3Hi11 , A Golden Jubilee, pp. 130-132. 
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workers in St. Thomas and St. John. Hill vividly describes the 
struggle that ensued between labor and the propertied class as a 
result of the introduction of this legislation. Although all the 
members of the Municipal Council were from the Progressive Guide, 
eight months were needed for the legislation to be passed and signed 
into law by the appointed governor. The successful fight for the 
passage of this legislation was later to be termed a "bloodless 
revolution. ,,1 
Other legislation included bills on rent- and price-control 
legislation t education for adults, workmen's compensation, scholar-
ships for college training on the United States mainland, improved 
health laws, and a strong antidiscrimination act. 2 
Changes in the St. Croix Municipal Council were much more 
difficult to achieve as the conservative business interests continued 
to dominate the Municipal Council, so parallel legislation was not 
passed until after the demise of the New Deal. 3 
The economic situation in the Islands continued to deteriorate 
at the same time that the United States Congress became increasingly 
reluctant t.o vote for deficiency appropriations 0 Grede expresses the 
, 
opinion that the Islanders unwillingness to tax themselves might have 
sprung from belief that they would never be self-supporting. 4 
lIbido, pp. 133-139. 
2Ibid ., p. 139, and Creque, op. cit., p. 113. 
3creque, op. cit., p. 115. 
4Grede,               pp. 213-214. 
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Grede suggests the following in summarizing the reasons for the 
economic shortcomings and disappointments of the declining Virgin 
Islands New Deal: droughts and opposing private interests affected 
adversely both the Virgin Islands Corporation and the homesteading 
program; an Advisory Council was supposed to set direction but was 
not used; an agricultural station was poorly managed and misused; and, 
basically, a sugar economy that required on-going subsidies and an 
undeveloped tourist trade meant that little hope existed of solving 
the economic problems that beset the Islands. l 
Lewis, on the other hand, sees the New Deal period as the 
application of the New Deal spirit to the colonial problem. It did 
not solve that problem but it did much to alleviate its worse 
features. The New Deal brought to the Islands all its remarkable 
qualities such as its willingness to try new ideas, its passion for 
innovation. its experimentalism. its infectious enthusiasm, its 
readiness to use the power of public government in areas where private 
enterprise had failed. However, the New Deal experiment in the Virgin 
Islands became enmeshed in the Washington political jungle and the 
energy needed to concentrate on local problems was not available. 
Lewis concludes that the failure of the New Deal program in the 
Virgin Islands--as on the national level--was due to the fact that 
it was not a bold coherent plan to reshape American economic society, 
but rather a hasty and improvised response to a sudden crisis. In 
                p. 217. 
the final analysis the economic program, despite the criticism of 
the naval                                 amounted to more of the same, that is, 
an accelerated injection of public works and relief programs. l 
Lewis, unlike Grede. views the failure of the New Deal as 
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part of Washington's failure to truly appreciate the colonial nature 
of the society. Grede's view is that the failure was an adminis-
trative one. compounded by natural disasters and the Islands' history. 
In the final analysis, the New Deal, like the naval administration 
that preceded it, failed to provide the economic stimulation that the 
community needed. Consequently, the Virgin Islands entered the war 
years burdened with a depressed economy •. 
The War and After, 1941-1954 
The period 1941 to 1954 encompassed two major eras in the 
Islands' economic history. First, the World War II period was 
characterized by extensive defense employment and abnormal tax 
collections that temporarily solved the Islands' economic problems. 
Second, the post-1945 period was marked by a return to economic 
decline. 2 
The World War II Period. World War II ushered in an era of 
prosperity and created previously unavailable opportunities including 
the 1943 extension of the Selective                 Act. 3 The extension 
1Lewis, op. cit., pp. 69-70 and 80-82. 
2Ibid ., p. 92. 
3creque, op. cit., p. 122. 
provided Virgin Islanders with job opportunities,enhanced their 
status "as United States citizens, and established their loyalty to 
the United States government. l The Virgin Islands servicemen 
received standard military benefits, improving the standard of 
living for many Virgin Islands families and raising expectations 
for the future. 
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Another factor that brought money into the Islands was German 
submarines. A German submarine force attacked the Aruba oil 
refineries in 1942, transforming the Caribbean into an active war 
zone. The Vichy government controlled the French Antilles and pro-
German sympathizers were strung throughout the Caribbean. The United 
States government's desire to safeguard the Caribbean shipping lanes, 
protect the Panama Canal from seizure. 2 and hold on to its Caribbean 
possessions led to a quick upgrading of the Islands' defense 
capability. 
Many laborers abandoned agricultural employment for more 
lucrative jobs on defense projects. 3 Defense employment demonstrated 
to many of them that even with limited skills they could improve 
their economic situation. The war thus temporarily solved the un-
employment and underemployment problems in the Virgin Islands. 
lIt is worthy of note that despite the reluctance of the 
United States government to grant Virgin Islanders the same rights 
and privileges as other United States citizens, they were expected 
in times of war to fight for the United States Government. 
2L· i 93 eW1S, OPe ct., p. • 
3Dookhan, A History, pp. 285-286. 
Peace ended the wartime prosperity. As troops and military 
personnel were pulled out, the economy suffered a major decline. l 
However, the laborers, to a large degree, were now un-
114 
willing to resume agricultural work that provided a bare subsistence. 2 
Thus, by 1946 the Virgin Islands could not provide the needed jobs 
or the kinds of jobs desired by the Islands' workers. 
The Post-1945 Period. A major factor impacting on the Islands' 
future was the return of a large group of young men from the United 
States military. Approximately eight hundred Virgin Islanders were 
conscripted for military service and by June 30, 1946, 650 service-
men had been demobilized and returned to the Islands. 3 They returned 
having experienced Jim Crowism. Their reactions to this experience 
were to be molded into a major political force that attempted to 
sweep aside the social, political, and economic injustices endured 
by lower-class Crucians. 4 
Coinciding with the return of the Crucian servicemen was the 
reorganization of the St. Croix Labor Union, whose membership con-
sisted for the most part of people exploited by traditional injustices. 
The St. Croix Labor Union and the ex-servicemen worked together 
to wrest political control from the old guard. The labor union 
lIbid., p. 99. 
2Dookhan, A History, p. 286. 
31946 Annual Report of the Governor of the Virgin Islands to the 
Secretary of the Interior (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print.ing 
Office), p. 15. No breakdowns are available on the number of Crucian 
soldiers in the group of 650. 
4Creque, op. cit., pp. 115-117. 
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appealed to their members to support the union leaders' bid for 
membership on the Municipal Council. The ex-servicemen, who had 
experienced and understood the needs of the agricultural workers, 
campaigned hard in the rural areas. The hard work by candidates 
and supporters who communicated extremely well with the masses paid 
off. In 1946, this group took control of the Municipal Council pf 
S C . 1 t. r01X. 
The Municipal Council gradually implemented regulatory programs 
to meet the needs of the laboring class, the conservatives, outvoted, 
delayed but could not block the enactment of needed legislation. 
It was not until 1947 that the Harrigan Minimum Wage and Hour Law, 
patterned after the 1941 Hill Wage and Hour Act, was passed. 2 Like 
the earlier act it also regulated the wages and working hours of 
the St. Croix labor force. 
In the St. Thomas and St. John district the return of the ex-
servicemen had an impact not only on the economic situation but 
on a critical political movement. This group of young men, who 
eventually became the nucleus of the Liberal Party, immediately 
were opposed by the previously formed Progressive Guide Party. 
Attempts to secure a place on the Progressive Guide's ticket met 
with failure, so the younge.r and more liberal group ran as inde-
pendents and won the support of the electorate. 3 The wartime 
lCreque, OPe ait., pp.115-ll7; Dookhan, A History, p. 298, and 
Hill, Rise to Recognition, p. 101. Creque makes the point that the 
assertiveness of the ex-servicemen was due to their experiences with 
racial discrimination in the American South. 
2Dookhan, A History, p. 288. 
3sill, A Golden Jubilee, pp. 141-142, and Hill, Rise to 
Recognition, pp. 101-102. 
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prosperity had lulled the Progressive Guide into a sense of complacency. 
Economic prosperity had also raised labor's expectations. The post-
war depression meant that the Progressive Guide was unable to deliver 
and could not meet the needs of the younger and more aggressive 
members of the population. Thus the domination of political power 
by the Progressive Guide in St. Thomas and St. John was threatened. 
Another indication of the declining power of the Progressive 
Guide was the passage of the Merit System Law by the Eleventh 
Legislative Assembly in 1946, despite the opposition of the Guide. 
The law established a modern civil service system. The Progressive 
Guide's power had been based on its ability to provide jobs for its 
uneducated and unskilled supporters. Most government jobs now 
required a high school education, thus reducing the Guide's ability 
to use government employment as a resource for its supporters. 1 
However, since a merit-system law was a prerequisite for the extension 
of federal grants to the Islands, this legislation was not altogether 
unpredictable. 
In 1949, opponents of the Progressive Guide created the Liberal 
Party to represent the interests of the younger and more liberal 
St. Thomians in opposition to the conservatism of the Guide. Governor 
Hastie, the first Negro appointed to the position, strongly urged the 
voters in a preelection rally to denounce the Progressive Guide and 
support the Liberal Party. The governor had administered the letter 
of the law and one of his first moves had been to have the court 
1Creque, Ope cit., pp. 128-129. 
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clearly define the separation of powers in the executive and legis-
lative branches of government. 
Hastie had argued that some members of the Municipal Council 
of St. Thomas and St. John were exercising authority as members of 
the Municipal Police Commission that was vested solely in the 
governor. He sought a declaratory judgment against these members 
and the court ruled in his favor. His relationship with the 
Municipal Council deteriorated and the resulting disharmony reduced 
the government to a state of inertia. Governor Hastie charged that 
the Guide was so monopolistic that it no longer represented the 
wishes of the electorate and was guilty of corrupt                      
This was the first time that an appointed governor had publicly 
taken a political stance in local politices. In voting, the one 
area where most Virgin Islanders had the power to express their 
desires, the citizens of St. Thomas and St. John strongly expressed, 
through their continued support of the Progressive Guide, their 
long-standing resentments against outsiders and their sense of 
identity with other Virgin                         To this day, some observers 
question whether the Liberal party candidates would have had a better 
chance if Governor Hastie had not campaigned actively.2 
1Ibid, pp. 129-130. 
2Hi11, A Golden Jubilee, p. 142. 
118 
The Consequences of Universal Suffrage 
The political revolution created by the 1936 Organic Act 
had shifted political power from the privileged classes of white 
and black sugar-cane planters, businessmen, and real-estate owners 
to the representatives of lower-class Virgin Islands voters. The 
Councilmen, as representatives of this new constituency, had to 
address the problems of employment and the social conditions of the 
masses. Consequently, they looked for ways to develop a stable 
economy. To this end. three important legislative bills were 
passed. The first created the Virgin Islands Housing Authority, 
enabling the Islands to qualify for federal funds to construct public 
housing. The second bill established the Apprenticeship Board of 
the Virgin Islands. creating the mechanism to protect the worker 
and provide him with training opportunities. The third bill created 
a Youth Planning Commission designed to identify the special needs 
of the Islands' young people. l 
As the 1950s began, the Councilmen proved they could pass 
enabling legislation for new programs but they knew that without 
money from Washington the programs would remain dormant. On the 
other hand Governor de Castro, the first native Virgin Islands 
governor, viewed the situation as one that required intelligent 
planning to combat wasteful spending. He proposed a program of 
reduced government expenditures and the promotion of agriculture 
lCreque. op. cit., pp. 130-131. 
and tourism, resulting, he contended, in self-support for the 
Islands. l The only part of the governor's program that appealed 
to the masses was the hope that tourism would in fact bring 
prosperity. Tourism was perceived as the only economic 
alternative available to the Islands. But tourism would have to 
be developed over the long term and Virgin Islanders needed jobs 
immediately. The legislators favored a continued reliance on the 
federal government. 2 This reliance conflicted with Governor 
de Castro's desire to make the Islands self-supporting. 
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In time, the develqpment of the tourist industry was contracted 
to outsiders while the local politicians emphasized the creation of 
government jobs to administer the health, education, social welfare, 
and public works programs. These positions were solidified after 
the passage of the 1954 Revised Organic Act. 
In effect, the post 1954 period saw the further consolidation 
of the union's power within the legislative branch of government. In 
the era prior to the passage of the 1936 Organic Act, the unions had 
been in the forefront in demanding political changes for the indigenous 
black population. In the aftermath of universal suffrage and particu-
larly after 1954, their influence in the Virgin Islands' Legislature 
provided them a more effective vehicle for protecting the interests 
11951 Annual Report of the Governor of the Virgin Islands to 
the Secretary of Interior (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, 1951), p. 1. 
2Lewis, Ope cit., p. 108. 
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of Virgin Islands workers. However, the development of a two tier 
employment system with the foreign worker on the bottom and the indige-
nous Virgin Islander in the middle and the lack of concern for the 
plight of the foreign worker meant that they ignored the provision of 
similar benefits and protections for that group. Consequently, the 
unions, instead of remaining an outside force in local affairs, became 
a part of the political establishment with an emphasis on protecting 
the public service employee and providing additional employment. This 
role was quite different from the role they had played in the earlier 
struggles for political advancement and for securing recognition of 
the rights of workers. 
Post-1954 Economic Development 
The two major influences that shaped the Virgin Islands' 
economy after 1954 were the Revised Organic Act and the foreign 
labor program. 
The Revised Organic Act. The Revised Organic Act of 1954 
mandated a single legislature and a single treasury. Most critical 
for the Islands' economic development were the financial provisions 
that paved the way for the economic progress that became evident 
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after 1954. These provisions provided for matching funds from taxes 
on articles produced in the Virgin Islands, especially rum, an 
additional sum of one million dollars or the balance of the internal 
revenues was available for emergency purposes and essential public 
projects, and permanent residents could satisfy federal income tax 
obligations by paying their tax on income derived from all sources 
into the Virgin Islands treasury. These provisions provided the 
jumping-off point for the local economy.l 
Additionally, the 1949 legislation that provided for designated 
tax exemption and industrial subsidies for eight years to new 
industries was reactivated in the 1950s. 2 
The Foreign Labor Program. As the foreign capital needed to 
fuel the tourist industry was invested, it became clear that the 
Virgin Islands could not supply enough unskilled labor. Business 
organizations, such as the Chamber of Commerce and the Hotel 
Association, pushed for the free ingress and egress of foreign labor. 
The business interests lobbied the                 visiting Congressional 
committees for a more liberal interpretation of the applicable sections 
of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act. Written petitions were 
submitted to the subcommittee of the House Committee on Interior and 
Insular Affairs. In February 1954, the subcommittee held hearings 
lBough and Macridis (eds.), OPe cit., pp. 7, 76-78, and Earl 
F. Brady, liThe Economy of the U.S. Virgin Islands"{Master's Thesis, 
University of Puerto Rico, 1963), pp. 19-20. 
2Dookhan, A History, p. 287. 
on immigration and labor problems in the Virgin Islands, but the 
Immigration and Nationalization Service remained adamant in its 
position that under the immigration laws it could not expedite the 
importation of foreign labor. l 
The pro-foreign-labor lobby next turned to a subcommittee of 
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the House Committee on the Judiciary which held hearings on the need 
for alien labor. Three principal groups presented testimony at this 
hearing. First, the Virgin Islands legislature overtly favored the 
importation of labor, but in fact the two-thirds majority necessary 
for passage could not be mustered. Opposition in the legislature 
centered around the fear of a future oversupply of local labor. 
Second. the business interests were represented by the Chamber 
of Commerce and the Hotel Association of the Virgin Islands. which 
favored the most liberal admissions policies. The business interests 
maintained that access to foreign labor was critical to the develop-
ment of the tourist industry. 
Third, organized labor was most hostile to foreign labor. The 
unions supported the existing certification system which required 
a petitioning procedure, denied the existence of labor shortages in 
certain areas, and emphasized that before any foreign labor was 
imported every resident Virgin Islander should be employed, followed 
by the tapping of other American sources of labor. Recognizing the 
lUnited States Congress, House, Non-Immigrant Alien Labor Pro-
gram on the Virgin Islands of the United States, A Special Study of 
the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law 
of the Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Congress, 1st Session, 1975, 
p. 30. 
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strength of the opposition, however, the unions suggested that if a 
liberalized program was implemented a control board should be created 
consisting of representatives of the Virgin Islands Employment 
Service, the unions. the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and 
the business community. The control board would validate requests 
for foreign labor. The control board would have provided Virgin 
Islands laborers with the necessary safeguards to insure that they 
would not be displaced by foreign labor.l 
The business community's position won over the subcommittee, 
which recommended to the Commission of the Immigration and Nationa1i-
zation Service that hotel and agricultural workers from the British 
Virgin Islands be admitted for seasonal employment. The subcommittee 
recommended·the development of a locally applicable British-American 
agreement such as the Mexican-American agreement. 2 
The foreign-labor program, instituted in March 1956, was 
administered by the Immigration and Nationalization Service and the 
Virgin Islands Employment Service. Initially, the program was limited 
to natives of the British Virgin Islands and the British West Indies· 
and restricted to agricultural and hotel workers. Within a few years 
the great demand for labor, combined with the ease of securing foreign 
labor and the lack of concern about obtaining labor locally, led to a 
lUnited States Congress, House, Report on the Administration of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act, Report of a Special Subcommittee 
of the Committee on .the Judiciary (Part 11, February 28, 1955), pp. 
117-123. 
2United States Congress, House, Non-Immigrant Alien Labor Pro-
gram on the Virgin Islands of the United States, Ope cit., p. 11. 
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further expansion of the program to the French and Dutch West Indies. 
At this point, the restrictions on occupational categories were 
removed. Employers were required to post a bond guaranteeing that 
the worker would not become a public charge, that he would maintain 
his status and depart at the expiration of his authorized stay.1 It 
is essential to note that provisions for health, housing, and other 
services were not required; the foreign laborer was responsible for 
making his own arrangements. 
Since the Immigration and Nationalization Service was unable 
to enforce the provisions of the bond, due to its limited staff, even 
the minimum requirements were violated. In fact a laissez-faire 
attitude toward the importation of foreign labor prevailed among 
local and federal officia1s. 2 The Virgin Islands Employment Service 
had been established to aid indigenous workers, but now was 
inundated with requests for foreign laborers. Its central activity 
became that of a middleman between the Islands' employers and the 
foreign laborers. In reality, the Virgin Islands laborers were 
forced into public sector employment with the government. 3 By using 
foreign labor, employers avoided the problem of employee unity in 
improving working conditions, since an employer could easily terminate 
1Ibid ., pp. 12-15. 
2Ibid .• pp. 60.-62. 
3In the 1970. Annual Report of the Virgin Islands Employment 
Secur:'.ty                   the authors state that with 45 percent of the total 
Iabor-force-coobisting of foreign nationals, the certification process 
occupied too many             of staff time to the detriment of other 
functions, pp. 2 and 3. 
1 a worker's bond and have him deported. 
Thus, the original position of the Immigration and Nationali-
zation Service that the workers needed in the Virgin Islands were 
permanent rather than temporary was accurate. However, the 
description of the program as "temporary" deceived the public into 
believing that the workers could be asked to leave the Islands 
whenever they were no longer needed. Of course, in the boom days 
of the 1960s this possibility was not an issue. 
The gradual development of the tourist industry did make an 
impact on the Islands' economy.· Business expanded, the job market 
increased, federal funds and programs flowed           the territory, 
improvements such as highways, public water systems, schools, 
housing, and hospitals were initiated. The standard of living rose 
for a great many Virgin Islanders. 
Summary 
As the preceding discussion indicates, the quest for the 
development of the Virgin Islands economy would seem to ·have had 
three goals: increasing employment opportunities for the average 
Virgin Islander, lessening the Islands' dependent-client relation-
ship with Washington, D.C., and improving the Islanders' overall 
living conditions. 
lThis in fact. did happen in some instances and workers were 
deported when they went on strike. (See the Virgin Islands Daily 
.News of December 8, 1964 in which 200 of the 280 strikers were 
aliens. Also see the Daily News, Tuesday, November 28, 1961.) 
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The 1936 Organic Act provided Virgin Islanders with legislative 
representatives who attempted through legislation to empower the 
traditionally exploited laborers. The Virgin Islands Corporation 
was a quasi-official agency devised by Governor Pearson to bypass 
bureaucratic red tape and support the flowering of agriculture and 
industry. Unfortunately, the corporation floundered after initial 
success and the federal government was forced to continue its 
subsidies of what President Hoover described as an "effective poor-
house." 
The economic prosperity generated by World War II improved the 
general standard of living. Additionally, a large number of young 
Virgin Islanders were drafted into the military, thus exposing the 
draftees both to mainland prejudice and hardening their determination 
to improve conditions at home. 
In reality. the lack of jobs and the demand for better jobs 
led to a continuing reliance on securing federal funds and the 
creation of government jobs. Given this harsh factor. liberal 
Virgin Islands legislators acquiesced to the development of the 
tourist industry by outsiders since local money was nonexistent. 
However, the workers' need for jobs could not wait until tourism 
was developed. On the other hand, businessmen insisted that the 
Islands could not supply enough workers to fill tourism-related 
jobs. 
Despite opposition, primarily from labor unions, the 
immigration laws were reinterpreted to allow for the easy entry 
of foreign labor. Because of chronic understaffing, the regulatory 
agencies could do little more than "rubber stamp" the entry of 
large numbers of foreign workers. The indigenous labor force 
was consigned to public-sector jobs and employers of foreign 
laborers effectively prevented them from improving working 
conditions. Although the growth of tourism expanded and 
strengthened the Virgin Islands economy, stimulating many improve-
ments, the underlying dilemma concerning foreign labor was not 
resolved. 
127 
          that we have introduced the subject of our study in 
Chapter I. examined the history of the United States Virgin Islands 
in Chapter II, and hopefully placed in perspective the socioeconomic 
factors leading to the problem of foreign laborers in Chapter III, 
we are ready to turn to Chapter IV, "Consequences of the Foreign 
Labor Program." 
CHAPTER IV 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE FOREIGN LABOR PROGRAM 
By the early 1950s, as we have seen, the Virgin Islands began 
to enjoy a growing tourist trade, an infusion of federal and private 
capital, and a rapid increase in public and private construction. 
These developments created a job market that demanded many more laborers 
1 than the Islands could supply. This gap was filled, as noted pre-
viously, by the large-scale" migration of West Indians. The large 
influx of foreign labor that began in 1956 created severe socioeconomic 
problems. Initially, there was no widespread concern about the impact 
that large numbers of foreign workers would have on the Islands, since 
these workers were perceived as temporary. This, in fact, had been 
the case with foreign workers imported for the St. Croix cane-cutting 
season. Given this prior experience, few planners anticipated anything 
different. 
In Chapter IV, we shall discuss the rapid, unexpected growth of 
the foreign-labor population in the United States Virgin Islands and 
the problems surrounding the presence of a large group of foreign 
laborers and their dependents. As we shall see, these problems were to 
ultimately engage the entire spectrum of government resources and 
1 James W. Green, "The British West Indian Alien Labor Problem 




services. Indeed, the impact of the foreign laborers affected every. 
part, both in the public and private sectors, of life in the United 
States Virgin Islands. 
Let us begin our discussion by reviewing the early history of 
foreign laborers in the Islands. 
Early History 
The Virgin Islands Corporation began importing laborers from the 
British West Indies in the early 1950s to insure an adequate labor 
supply for the sugar-cane harvesting season. Prior to this period, 
employment had been open to Virgin Islanders during the war in the 
construction of military establishments in St. Thomas and St. Croix 
at higher wages than those obtained in farming. After the war, these 
laborers were unwilling to return to agricultural jobs that paid, at 
best, a bare subsistence wage. Consequently, the resident labor force 
available to the corporation could not harvest its crop fast enough to 
keep the mill in continuous operation. Foreign laborers were thus 
required, but their numbers fluctuated according to the size of the 
crop. For example, during the 1954 harvest season, the average emp1oy-
ment was 1,053 per-diem workers and the number of British West Indians 
averaged 365. In 1956, the corporation employed 471 seasonal laborers 
and 78 percent, or 367, were immigrants. 1 
The cane-cutting crews of the 1950s came largely from Antigua and 
St. Kitts and were housed in old estate villages owned by the corporation 
lDookhan, "The Virgin Islands Company," £E.. cit., pp. 69-70. The 
1954 figures were secured from the 1954 Annual Report of the Governor 
of the Virgin Islands to the Secretary of Interior (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 57. 
130 
in abandoned army barracks, and in cheap frame houses which even by 
local standards were regarded as primitive. MOst of the housing was 
somewhat removed from the local population. They had minimum contact 
with most Crucians, for the Crucians did not fraternize with them. But 
these foreign laborers created a reputation for themselves--and, by 
association, for all British "down-islanders" who were to follow--as 
hard drinkers and tough fighters. The Crucians found their behavior 
offensive and the areas in which the laborers lived were given names 
that suggested to Crucians the                       of the inhabitants. For 
example, one of the former estate villages was renamed Korea. These 
1 male workers left the Islands when the harvest was completed. 
The laborers' relatively small numbers, their employment period 
of approximately five to six months, their relative isolation from the 
rest of the community, and the Immigration and Naturalization pro-
cedures regarding temporary labor prevented the foreign workers from 
impacting on the Virgin Islands community. In brief, this migratory 
labor force had a negligible impact and with rare exceptions did not 
become assimilated into the life of the Virgin Islands. 
The Immigration and Nationality Act that became effective on 
December 24, 1952 continued the provisions for non-immigrant laborers 
living temporarily in the United States. 2 This migration continued in the 
Islands until 1964 when the corporation terminated its sugar-care operation. 3 
lGreen, "The British West Indian," .2.£.. cit., pp. 67-68, and 
James W. Green, "Social Networks in St. Croix, United States Virgin 
Islands" (unpublished Ph.D.                             University of Washington, 
1972), pp. 93-94. 
2 U.S. Congress, House, Nomimmigrant Alien Labor Program on the 
Virgin Islands of the United States, p. 49. 
3Dookhan, "The Virgin Islands Company," ££.. cit., p. 75. 
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By March 1952, the St. Thomas Immigration and Naturalization 
Service was processing a number of visa petitions for hotel employees 
and domestics from the British Virgin Islands. The Selective Service 
1 Act had cut severely into the available labor supply. The Immigra-
tion Service, Governor de Castro, and the Virgin Islands Employment 
Service were concerned about permitting temporary foreign laborers to 
fill permanent jobs. After the 1952 act became effective, the Immdgra-
tion Service took the position that many of the jobs in the Virgin 
Islands were not temporary and therefore could not be filled by 
2 temporary workers. 
As we saw in Chapter II, the pro-foreign-labor lobby campaigned 
successfully in Washington for a relaxation of immigration rules. We 
might note here that the governor of the Leeward Islands in the British 
Virgin Islands was also very active in the struggle to relax immdgra-
3 tion laws so that the "temporary" workers would better themselves. 
lU.S. Congress, House, Non-Immigrant Alien Labor Program on the 
Virgin Islands of the United States, p. 59. During fiscal year 1951, 
inductions for military service were initiated due to the outbreak of 
hostilities in Korea in June 1950; 201 men were inducted or enlisted 
and 383 men were inducted or enlisted in fiscal year 1952. See 1951 
Annual Report of the Governor of the Virgin Islands to the Secretary of 
Interior (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), p. 12, 
and 1952 Annual Report of the Governor of the Virgin Islands to the 
Secretary of Interior (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office), p. 12. Although these numbers are small, they had a severe 
effect on an already tight labor market. 
2 U.S. Congress, House, Non-Immigrant Alien Labor Program on the 
U.S. Virgin Islands, p. 59. 
3For a detailed description of the position of the governor of 
the Leeward Islands, ·see the Statement of Kenneth W. Blackburn, governor 
of the Leeward Islands on December 3, 1953 to Senator Butler's 
Committee. Source: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior 
and Insular Affairs, Virgin Islands Report, pp. 56-57. 
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The 1956 Agreement 
On March 1, 1956, Commissioner Swing of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service met in the United States Virgin Islands with 
Governor Gordon, British officials, and a representative from the 
Caribbean desk of the Department of State. This meeting resulted 
in authorization for the temporary entry of workers in five categories 
from the British Virgin Islands: (1) agricultural; (2) hotel; 
(3) domestics; (4) unskilled laborers; and (5) construction. 
This agreement, effective on March 19, 1956, went far beyond the 
Congressional subcommittee's recommendation by including domestics, 
unskilled laborers, and construction or project workers. This require-
ment satisfied the Islands' business interests, British officials, and 
Governor Gordon's desire for workers for special projects. However, 
as discussed previously, many of the "temporary" jobs were in fact 
continuing, and foreign workers could be admitted for up to one year 
after which they were required to be physically absent for only one 
1 day in order to resume employment for another year. 
1 The Virgin Islands Employment Service initially issued clear-
ance orders for non-immigrants for up to one year, but this was later 
changed to six months. There are no clear indications in available 
documents regarding when the shift was made. The 1959 Annual Report 
of the Virgin Islands Employment Service (St. Thomas: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1959), p. 4, indicates that 3,008 openings 
were certified for the importation of foreign workers. The 1960 
Annual Report of the Virgin Islands Employment Service (St. Thomas: 
Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 5, states that a total of 
2,222 agricultural workers, involving over 1,000 workers since these 
orders had to be renewed every six months. This would seem to indi-
cate that the policy change occurred in the 1960 fiscal year. 
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Program Operation 
In August 1956, the Immigration Service adopted the requirement 
that the Virgin Islands Employment Service's certification of the 
unavailability of qualified local labor must apply to the British 
Virgin Islands. The Immigration Service had previously waived this 
requirement for British Virgin Islands laborers. l The petitioner for 
foreign laborers was also required to post a bond guaranteeing that the 
workers would not become public charges, that they would maintain their 
2 status and depart at the expiration of their authorized stay. This 
lUnder the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, the temporary 
admission of foreign workers is governed by section lOl(a) (15) (H) and 
section 2l4(c). Section lOl(a) (15) (H) provides for the entry of three 
subcategories of temporary workers as defined by the Immigration and 
Nationality Act; of which category (ii) other temporary workers, is the 
one most frequently used. Section 2l4(c) authorizes the Attorney 
General to make determinations regarding the importation of aliens under 
section lOl(a) (15) (H) upon' petition from the importing employers. 
Consultation with appropriate agencies of the government is also re-
quired. In the case of the H-2 worker, a reasonably formalized pro-
cedure for Justice Department consultation with the Department of 
Labor has been specified in regulations since 1953. The employment 
agencies of the Department of Labor have been involved in this proce-
dure. At the local level, the state employment agency affiliated 'with 
the Labor Department is the agency involved. The Virgin Islands Employ-
ment Service was created in 1951. According to the usual procedure, 
the initial action on the H-2 employer's application is made by the 
local office of the state employment agency which makes a recommendation 
regarding the unavailability of domestic workers. This action must 
be approved by the Labor Department and may be overruled by the Depart-
ment of Justice since the Attorney General has final authority on the 
admission of H-2 workers. The Virgin Islands non-immigrant alien labor 
program, as it evolved, represented a departure from the usual              
dure in regard to the role of the Virgin Islands Employment Service 
functioned more or less autonomously until 1967 when the Labor Depart-
ment began reasserting control. See, U.S. Congress, House, Non-Immigrant 
Alien Labor Program on the Virgin Islands of the United States, pp. 6-7 
and 14. 
2This requirement of a bond is the source of the term "bonded 
aliens:' which was commonly applied to the temporary alien workers or 
foreign workers on the Virgin Islands. See, Ibid., p. 13. 
     
practice was discontinued in November 1959; it was replaced with a 
signed agreement between the employer and the United States that in-
cluded a penalty payment by employers for violation of the agreement. l 
The 1956 program expanded rapidly due to the increase in con-
struction and the year-round boom in tourism. Certifications for 
foreign labor issued by the Virgin Islands Employment Service numbered 
1,256, 1,500, and 3,008, respectively, in the years 1957, 1958, and 
2 1959. 
In June 1959, the Immigration and Naturalization Service's central 
office discovered that through a misunderstanding, the officer in 
charge in St. Thomas had extended the special British Virgin Islands 
exemption to foreign workers from all of the British, French, and 
Netherlands West Indies. The central office directed that this un-
3 authorized practice be discontinued immediately; 1,038 men and women 
. 4 were affected by           change. Governor Merwin protested against this 
policy and on August 19, 1959, the Immigration and Naturalization's 
central office then reversed its position by issuing a memorandum 
authorizing the admission of certain workers from the British, French, 
and Netherlands West Indies under the so-called British Virgin Islands 
rule. 
lIbid., p. 14. 
21957 Annual Report of         Virgin Islands Employment Service 
(St. Thomas: Government Printing Office), p. 7; 1958 Annual Report of 
the Virgin Islands Employment Service (St. Thomas: Government Printing 
Office), p. 4; and 1959 Annual Report of the Virgin Islands Employment 
Service (St. Thomas:· Government Printing Office), p. 4. 
3 U.S. Congress, House, Non-Immigrant Alien Labor Program on the 
Virgin Islands of the United States, pp. 14 and 61. 
4The Virgin Islands Daily News, July 7, 1959. 
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In 1960, the Department of Labor's Bureau of Employment Security 
surveyed the procedures used by the Virgin Islands Employment Service 
to determine the unavailability of United States workers prior to the 
issuance of certifications. The procedures were found deficient in 
the protection they afforded domestic workers and a revised plan for 
certification was proposed by the Labor Department. These recommenda-
tions were not implemented due to the objections from the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service on the grounds that they seemed to include 
on-island               than off-island recruitment. l 
Unfortunately, the Labor Department did not demand the implemen-
tation of the new procedures--very few employers actually recruited 
outside the United States Virgin Islands. The actual practice was 
that a foreign national entered the Virgin Islands on a "visitor's 
visa" which generally was given for a twenty-nine-day period. The 
individual immigration authorities had considerable latitude in the 
length of time they could give and many "visitors" secured regular 
extensions or indefinite extensions. If the foreign national found 
a job while in the Islands on a "visitor's visa," his new employer would 
process the required documents for entry as a non-immigrant. 2 Other 
foreign nationals found jobs through letters, word of mouth, friends 
1 U.S. Congress, House, Non-Immigrant Alien Labor Program on the 
Virgin Islands of the United States, pp. 15 and 61. 
2 Social, Educational Research and Development, Inc., A Profile 
and Plans for the Temporary Alien Worker Problem in the U.S. Virgin 
Islands. A Final Report Submitted Under the Provisions of Contract 
Number OEO B99-4862, August 25, 1969, p. 26. The report also states 
that during the spring of 1969, there were about 16,000 aliens in 
the Virgin Islands on "visitor's visas." Many were wives and children 
so they were not all looking for work. 
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or relatives, and recruiters sent to the home island by Virgin Islands 
1 employers. 
By May 1963, the Virgin Islands Employment Service issued clear-
ance orders for any jobs for which there was a declared labor need. 
Thus the program's original geographical and occupational restrictions 
2 had been abandoned. The program, which had been developed to main-
tain the close social and economic ties between the British and 
United States Virgin Islands, had now expanded to include the entire 
Caribbean. All occupations were also covered and this had a signifi-
cant impact on the Virgin Islands labor market. 
Program Growth 
The placement activity of the Virgin Islands Employment Service 
during 1964 presented the paradox of a decreasing number of local 
workers and an increasing number of foreign workers. For example, 
total domestic placements during 1964 fell by 1,801 from 1960 which 
represented a percentage decrease of approximately 56.2. During the 
same period, job openings certified for the employment of foreign 
workers rose by 5,431 which represented a percentage increase of 210.9. 3 
A comparative analysis of local worker placements versus foreign 
1 Social, Educational Research 
the United States Virgin Islands: 
Economy, January 1968, p. 17. 
and Development, Inc., Aliens in 
Temporary Workers in a Permanent 
2 . U.S. Congress, House, Non-Immigrant Alien Labor Program on the 
Virgin Islands of the United States, pp. 15 and 61. 
31964 Annual Report of the Virgin Islands Employment Service 
(St. Thomas: Government Printing Office). pp. 12 and 13. 
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nationals by the major industrial sectors further confirmed this trend. 
For example, in fiscal year 1960 all industries showed a total of 
5,780 firm openings of which 3,203 or 55.4 percent were filled by 
placement and 2,577 or 44.6 percent by foreign labor. In fiscal year 
1964, there was a total of 9,410 firm openings of which 1,402 or 
14.9 percent were filled by local placement and 8,008 or 85.1 percent 
by foreign labor. 
As Table 2"shows, in those industries in which foreign labor pre-
dominated, such as construction, manufacturing, trade, hotel service, 
and private households, the shift was even more dramatic. By 1964, 
foreign laborers filled almost every position in construction and pri-
vate households. 
By 1960, the construction and service industries, including pri-
vate households, were the major employers of foreign labor. This 
might have been a reflection of the occupational restrictions of the 
1956 foreign-labor program. The foreign labor program expanded rapidly 
after 1964. According to unpublished Labor Department statistics, the 
number of non-immigrant workers more than doubled in the four-year 
period from 1964 through 1968, as foreign workers increased from 5,741 
to 13,288. By 1968, an estimated 45 percent of the total labor force 
of 27,000 workers were non-immigrants, with much higher percentages in 
some occupations. Foreign laborers were estimated to hold 90 percent 
of the construction jobs and 60 percent of the service jobs in 1968.1 
1 U.S. Congress, House, Non-Immigrant Alien Labor Program on the 
Virgin Islands of the United States, p. 15. 
TABLE 2 
PERCENTAGE OF JOB OPENINGS FILLED BY                       AND CERTIFICATIONS 
BY MAJOR INDUSTRIAL SECTORS FOR 1960 AND 1964 
Percentage Filled By 
Industry Year Openings Placements Certifications 
1960 1,667 3B.6 61.4 Construction 1964 2,992 7.1 92.9 
Manufacturing 1960 771 B7.4 12.6 1964 549 56.5 43.5 
Wholesale and 1960 535 B1.5 1B.5 
Retail Trade 1964 1,633 27.1 72.9 
Service 1960 901 49.B 50.2 
Industry 1964 1,329 11.4 88.6 
Private 1960 1,079 40.9 59.1 
Households 1964 2,B17 9.6 90.4 
Source: 1964 Annual Report of the Virgin Islands Employment Service (St. Thomas: Government 
Printing Office), pp. 17 and lB. 
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Impact On Labor Force 
In 1960, the Virgin Islands population over age sixteen totaled 
19,349 and equaled 58 percent of the total population of 33,425. In 
1967, the over-sixteen population totaled about 35,000 and equaled 62 
percent of a population estimated at 56,700 or 58 percent of an esti-
1 mated 60,700 people. The labor force also showed a dramatic increase. 
The 1960 census showed an employed labor force of 10,845 or 56 percent 
of the total population over sixteen; in 1967, the employed labor force 
was estimated at about 28,000 or 80 percent of the total population 
over sixteen. 
Three major developments accounted for this increase. 
First, the number of employed females increased. This number was 
much larger both absolutely and comparatively than in the 1960s, with 
women constituting about 45 percent of the labor force. This large 
increase in working women reflected the employment of domestic maids, 
primarily foreigners. The prevalence of domestic maids was seen as 
2 high by stateside standards. 
3 Second, there was only marginal unemployment. During this 
lThe 1967 figures were estimates hence both figures are used. 
See, Bruno Neumann, "The Economy of --the- U. S. Virgin Isla-nds--Some Basic 
Aspects," in Bough and Macridis (eds.),       cit., p. 147. 
2Ibid., pp. 147-148 and 154; 1966 Annual Report of the Virgin 
Islands Employment Service (St. Thomas: Government Printing Office), 
p. 10, indicated that there were 1,184 female foreign workers employed 
in private households. No figures are available for 1967 as the 
Virgin Islands Employment Service did not publish an Annual Report. 
3Neuman , "The Economy of the U.S. Virgin Islands,"       cit., 
pp. 148 and 154. This author writes that the key word is "reported" 
as unreported unemployment was seen as another matter. Foreign workers 
refrained from reporting when they became unemployed as they were then 
required to leave the Virgin Islands. 
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1 period, unemployment was generally less than 1 percent. Third, the 
steep increase in foreign workers by the late 1960s resulted in a 
dependence on foreign labor in certain subsectors of industry.2 
The reliance on foreign workers is generally thought to have 
resulted from (1) the growth of the tourist industry during the 1960s; 
(2) an apparent unwillingness on the part of the indigenous population 
to accept many jobs commonly associated with tourism; and (3) the 
depressed wages prevailing in occupations where foreigners were repre-
3 sented in large numbers. 
The expansion of jobs in the public sector, that is, government 
employment, was well advanced by the late 1950s. Virgin Islanders 
looked to government employment as a vehicle to improve their standard 
of living. In 1957, a local newspaper carried the headline, "Govern-
ment Employees One Out of Every Fourteen Virgin Islanders." The accom-
panying article stated that outside the seasonal demands of construc-
tion, agriculture, and sugar cane, federal and territorial government 
was the largest on-island employer with an estimated total labor force 
4 of 2,375. 
In 1961, the Department of Commerce reported that 37 percent of 
the Islands' labor ferce was now encompassed by professional, technical, 
1 U.S. Congress, House, Non-Immigrant Alien Labor Program on the 
Virgin Islands of the United States, p. 20. 
2 Ibid., p. 15, and Neumann, "The Economy of the U.S. Virgin 
Islands,"       cit., p. 147. 
3 U.S. Congress, House, Non-Immigrant Alien Labor Program on the 
Virgin Islands of the United States, pp. 15-16. 
4 "Government Employees One Out of Every Fourteen Virgin Islanders," 
St. Thomas Daily News, October 1, 1957. 
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managerial, office worker, and sales categories--an increase of 11 per-
cent over 1950. During the same period, the laborers declined by the 
same percentage, that is, from 23 percent of the working population to 
1 12 percent. This trend was further accelerated during the 1960s by the 
importance of federal grants-in-aid and matching funds in financing a 
wide range of public services and public works. Income taxes, which 
were levied according to federal standards but spent locally, were 
another major factor in the increase of government services and employ-
2 mente 
Government employment increased 310 percent between 1962 and 1970. 3 
By 1969, two-thirds of government revenues were spent on salaries and 
wages and perhaps 75 percent of all.native-born adults were employed 
4 by the government. 
The high cost of living in the Virgin Islands, higher, for example, 
than in Washington, D.C., discouraged the indigenous workers from ac-
cepting employment in the private sector, let alone workers from Puerto 
1 "The White Collar Trend," Editorial,· The St. Thomas Daily News, 
November 3, 1961. 
2 Neumann, "The Economy of the U. S. Virgin Islands," .5!E.. cit., 
pp. 145 and 153. In fiscal year 1968, federal grants-in-aid totaled 
about $5.4 million. Matching funds were generated by the stateside sale 
of Virgin Islands rum which is subject to the federal excise tax. 
The revenue derived is transferred (minus a small charge for adminis-
trative costs incurred) to the treasury of the Virgin Islands. In 
fiscal year 1968, this amounted to $12.4 million. The term "matching 
fund" stems from a legal requirement that the transfer of federal 
excise tax revenue must not be higher than, or must be matched by, 
revenues of local taxes. In fiscal year 1968, this amount was over 
$50 million. In fiscal year 1968, the revenue from individual and cor-
porate income taxes was about $26.0 million. 
3 u.s. Congress, House, Non-Immigrant Alien Labor Program on the 
Virgin Islands of the United States, p. 16. 
4 O'Neill,               p. 72. 
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Rico or the mainland. In 1969, a Labor Department official maintained 
that if the labor supply was as tight as employers contended, wages 
should have risen rapidly as employers competed for a limited labor 
supply. However, large numbers of foreign workers worked for the 
prevailing low wages. Consequently, no wage spiral occurred and wages 
1 remained artificially depressed. 
Income distribution and educational attainments tended to corres-
pond to population groups: foreign laborers were at the lowest level, 
native Virgin Islanders in the middle, and whites, mostly from the 
mainland, at the highest level. The greater part of the foreign 
workers were unskilled laborers, more than 25 percent of the employable 
natives worked in governmental service, including education. The rest 
were tradesmen, skilled workers, and white-collar workers. The majority 
of the whites worked in the tourist industry, in their own firms, as 
managers, or lolled in the sun during mainland winter. While consti-
tuting not more than one-fourth of the population, they owned more than 
half of the land which had been skyrocketing in value. 2 
The ease with which foreign labor could be obtained and the 
dramatic increase of these laborers suggest questions concerning 
whether the tourism industry was avoided by the indigenous workers be-
cause the large influx of foreign laborers meant that wages and working 
conditions were artificially depressed. O'Neill states that the 
1 U.S. Congress, House, Non-Immigrant Alien Labor Program on the 
Virgin Islands of the United States, p. 16, and "Bonded Aliens Make 
Up Nearly Half the Work Force iIi the U.S. Virgin Islands," Monthly 
Labor Review, September 1968. 
2Roy C. Macridis, "Political Attitudes in the Virgin Islands," 
in Bough and Macridis (eds.), ££. cit., p. 194. 
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absorption of the indigenous work force by the government meant that the 
conventional wisdom of the cynical continental that "the native Virgin 
Islander won't work," would go unchallenged. Whether the natives 
would have filled the boom-created jobs or not if foreign workers had 
not been as plentiful, given the expanding go 1 • vernment emp oyment, is a 
question that remains moot. l 
We might also consider whether the Virgin Islander was purposely 
excluded from the tourist industry and from the oil refining and 
bauxite processing industries in St. Croix. to some employers, as noted 
previously, a docile labor force appeared to be a very desirable advan-
tage. A worker who could be fired and deported within five days, or 
who could not switch jobs without leaving the Islands, was unlikely to 
militantly demand· better working conditions. Foreign laborers could 
and did join labor unions, but union effectiveness was limited by the 
five-day rule. A grievance could seldom be settled in five days and 
2 an effective strike was virtually precluded. 
The Legislative Response 
As we have seen, the United States Virgin Islands in the 1950s 
was a developing island society requiring expansion of support services 
such as housing, health care, education, social welfare services, e1ec-
tricity, garbage collection, water distribution, and sanitary faci1i-
ties. 
The legislature's quest to satisfy their constituents' needs 
during this period led to the search for local and federal funds to pay 
10' Neill,       cit., p. 73. 
2"Bonded Aliens Make Up Nearly Half the Work Force," £l!.. 
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for the services. With the rapid increase in the number of foreign 
workers, the legislators were faced with a problem of extending newly 
won benefits to the foreign laborers. However, since the hard-pressed 
Virgin Islands government could not afford to meet the needs of both 
the indigenous and the foreign-worker population simultaneously, it 
elected to bypass the problems of the latter. As we shall see, the 
needs of the powerless foreign workers could easily be ignored. 
This was further compounded by society's view of the foreign 
workers as temporary visitors. This concept was supported by the 
legal definition of aliens, the rules and regulations governing their 
status, and the consequent attitude that the foreign workers were in-
1 deed temporary. Second, their status as non-United States citizens, 
lacking voting rights, made them a voiceless minority in the Islands' 
political system. 
Congressman Philip Burton, in discussing the elected-governor 
bill for the Virgin Islands, pointed to the fact that if a governor was 
elected he was much more likely to serve the people who could vote for 
2 him rather than those who could not. This comment also was applicable 
to the Virgin Islands' legislators. ThirdlY,there were no major 
political, social, or civic groups to champion the foreign workers' 
3 concerns or needs. 
ISocial, Educational Research and Development, Inc., Aliens in 
the United States Virgin Islands: Temporary Workers in a Permanent 
Economy,       cit., p. 3. 
2 
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 
Election of Virgin Islands Governor, Part II, p. 698. 
3Social,Educational Research and Develepment, Aliens in the 
United States Virgin Islands: Temporary Workers in a Permanent 
Economy,       cit., p. 4. 
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We shall now describe some of the legislation aimed at protecting 
the indigenous workers and offer suggestions concerning its ineffec-
tiveness. 
Protective Legislation. The concern about the rapid increase in 
the numbers of foreign workers led the legislature to enact protective 
legislation as early as 1961. On October 30, 1961, the legislature 
added a new section to the Virgin Islands Fair Labor Standards Act man-
dating that preference should be given to resident workers in occupa-
. d . d • 1 t10ns an 1n ustr1es. On February 25, 1964 and subsequently, the 
legislature enacted detailed procedures to achieve the objectives of the 
October 30, 1961 act. Namely, that resident workers shall be given 
preference in employment and that the employment of non-resident 
workers shall not cause injury or adverse effects upon the wages and 
2 
working conditions of resident workers. Virgin Islands law also 
included the requirement that non-resident aliens be replaced when 
3 qualified resident workers became available. 
Enforcement of the provision that preference be given to resi-
dents was vested in the Virgin Islands' Commissioner of Labor who also 
had                               for setting the prevailing wage. The Virgin Islands 
Employment Agency was empowered to issue a clearance for the employ-
ment of non-resident workers for advertised job vacancies for which no 
qualified workers were available. Employers were required to enter 
into legally enforceable written agreements with the Commissioner of 
124 Virgin Islands Code 1 et. seq. 
224 Virgin Islands Code 125 et. seq. 
324 Virgin Islands Code l28(c). 
.Labor and, on request, with the Virgin Islands Employment Service 
1 regarding wages and benefits. 
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Both the Virgin Islands Labor Department and the Virgin Islands 
Employment Agency were criticized severely for their administration of 
the alien labor program during the 1960s. According to a United States 
Labor Department official, the Virgin Islands Employment Agency was 
overly permissive in issuing certifications, lax in determining wages 
which would prevent adverse effects, and neglectful of its placement 
duties. The Virgin Islands Labor Department was critfcized for its 
failure to enforce compliance--as evidenced by the widespread evasion, 
underpayment, and employment of illegally present foreign workers. 
While the local agencies were not singlehandedly responsible for the 
foreign labor problem during the 1960s, their administration was a 
2 major factor. 
The Virgin Islands legislature enacted sound laws for the.protec-
tion of resident workers. In one of the few instances when the Virgin 
Islands Labor Department enforced the regulations regarding payment of 
the prevailing wage rates and adherence to the forty-hour week for 
foreign workers in 1965, the District Court ruled that the Virgin 
Islands Act of 1964 as amended did not conflict with the Immigration 
and Nationality Act or the rules and regulations thereunder. The 
requirement that the Virgin Islands Commissioner of Labor rule on an 
employer's application was seen as an additional safeguard that the 
admission of foreign workers was in the public interest. 3 
124 Virgin Islands Code 127, 161. 
2 U.S. Congress, House, Non-Immigrant Alien Labor Program on the 
Virgin Islands of the United States, p. 20. 
3Gannet Corporation v. Stevens, 282 F. Supp. 437 (1968). 
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Another local law to protect resident workers was enacted on 
1 July 5, 1957, with subsequent amendments. This modification of the 
existing tax-exemption law stated that "not less than 75 percent of 
all persons employed in an industry or business with respect to which 
tax exemptions or subsidy benefits are granted shall be legal residents 
of the Virgin Islands." This law was circumvented by provisions or 
temporary waivers which were generally requested and granted. An in-
ternal United States Labor Department memorandum states that tax con-
cessions had attracted two major employers, aluminum and oil refining, 
to St. Croix. Approximately_ 80 percent of the employees were to have 
been native Virgin Islanders, but the reverse was closer to the facts. 2 
This finding would appear to support Moorhead's position that foreign 
capital sought cheap unskilled labor to insure high rates of profit. 3 
Although no general consensus exists about why the local govern-
ment failed to act, some answers might be found by discussion of the 
Islands' appointed governor during this development-decade, Ralph _M. 
Paiewonsky. He is described by Lewis as an able business-manager type 
whose vision of the general good was limited by his view that what was 
good for business was necessarily good for the Virgin Islands. Since 
Paiewonsky rarely delegated authority4 and was strongly pro-business, 
we may well appreciate why regulation of foreign workers was grossly 
inadequate. If the protective legislation had been enforced, we may 
133 Virgin Islands Code, 4051. 
2 U.S. Congress, House, Non-Immigrant Alien Labor Program on the 
Virgin Islands of the United States, p. 19. 
3 Moorhead,       cit., p. 96. 
4Lewis,       cit., pp. 305 and 298. 
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surmise that some of the flagrant practices of the foreign-labor pro-
gram would have been prevented. 
Thus, confronted with the dilemma of attempting to redress the 
problem and thereby possibly inhibiting economic growth, the Virgin 
Islands legislature in the mid-1960s opted to improve the standard of 
living of its constituency and ignore the growing foreign-labor popu-
lation and its potential to adversely affect the entire society. Lewis 
describes the essence of the problem as that of a rapidly increasing 
population accompanied by very little effort to accelerate welfare 
facilities and services to meet the population exp10sion. l 
Another important aspect of the decision not to inhibit economic 
growth in the Virgin Islands was the continuing and growing influence 
of the business eritrepreneurs in the u.s. Virgin Islands. By the 
1960's the two major corporations, Hess Oil and Harvey Aluminum, had 
established an oil refinery and a bauxite processing plant on St. Croix. 
In addition, major banking institutions such as the Chase Manhattan 
Bank, First National City Bank, Citibank, First Federal Savings and 
Loan Association and First Pennsylvania had established branches in 
the U.S. Virgin Islands and other large corporations involved in the 
construction, watch manufacturing, hotels, retail and wholesale indus-
tries had been established in the u.s. Virgin Islands. Their economic 
investment in the Islands and their extensive contribution to the 
Islands' treasury enabled them to exert an extremely powerful though 
subtle influence on political affairs. As the government's revenues 
have declined, large corporations such as Hess Oil can exert even more 
1Lewis,       cit., p. 225. 
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influence by agreeing, for example, to pay employees' withholding 
taxes or other taxes ahead of schedule to guarantee the local govern-
ment's financial solvency. Of equal importance, however, is the inf1u-
entia1 role which they play in the political process in the United 
States and their ability to secure favorable legislation in the U.S. 
Congress. The political clout which these industries have developed 
during their corporate history and the influence both nationally and 
locally will continue to playa critical role on the Virgin Islands' 
economic and political situation. 
The Virgin Islands Conference 
By 1966, the number of foreign workers in the Virgin Islands had 
increased to              
In 1966, the College of the Virgin Islands, with funds granted 
under Title I of the 1965 Higher Education Act, held a series of work-
2 shops on the foreign workers and their families. The primary subjects 
covered were immigration and employment, health, housing, social 
lThis figure was taken from the Social, Educational Research and 
Development, Inc., Aliens in the United States Virgin Islands: 
Temporary Workers in a Permanent Economy,       cit., p. 16. They had 
secured the figures from an undated manuscript titled "Temporary Alien 
Workers in the Virgin Islands Work Force" by the Branch of Immigration 
Analysis, U.S. Employment Service, Bureau of Employment Security, the 
U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, D.C. This figure is higher 
than that reported on Table 1 which was taken from local annual reports. 
2The College of the Virgin Islands, "Conference on the Alien 
Worker and His Family," St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, 1967 (mimeographed), 
pp. 1-3. 
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welfare, mental health, and education. The significance of the work-
shop series was that of a discussion forum where local and federal 
government representatives could exchange views concerning the impact 
that the large number of foreign workers and their families had on 
government services. While the needs of this large foreign-worker 
population could not be ignored entirely, local agencies resented the 
additional burden it imposed. Overall, of course, a policy on foreign 
workers was nonexistent. 
In the following sections, we shall discuss the positions ex-
pressed at the conference by government representatives concerned with 
mental health, health, social welfare, and housing and education. 
Mental Health 
The mental health division of the Department of Health recognized 
the stress and anxiety endured by foreign workers. Five factors 
affected the foreign workers' mental health: (1) separation from fam-
ilies and breaking of ties with friends; (2) loose alliances with native 
Islanders and lack of security concerning legal rights; (3) conceal-
ment of pregnancy to insure American citizenship for unborn children 
and prevent deportation; (4) severe day-to-day anxiety over the possi-
bility of job loss, the loss of a bond or non-renewal when visa time 
was up; and (5) antagonism from community members who feared lowered 
wages and were prejudiced against outsiders. 
The mental health workers recommended that equal opportunity be 
extended in regard to health, education, and social services. l The 
1 . Eldra L.M. Shulterbrandt and Leta Cromwell, "Mental Health and 
the Alien Worker," in the Conference on the Alien Worker and His Family, 
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mental health division, in fact, was the only agency that overtly 
recognized the foreign workers' mental stress and the need to respond 
positively. 
Health Services 
Foreign workers' depressed economic status meant that they had 
usually received inadequate medical attention in the past. They 
then emigrated to the Virgin Islands and lived in substandard heusing. 
Consequently, they had a high percentage of communicable diseases 
including parasitic infestation and venereal disease. 
The entry of foreign workers was perceived as having three detri-
mental effects on overall community health. First, the foreign worker 
was permitted entry into the United States Virgin Islands without a 
medical examination. Thus the public health services were unable to 
pp. 48-49. The following statistics indicate the numbers of foreign-
born mothers giving birth in the Virgin Islands were already showing 
a steady increase by 1963. According to the vital statistics of the 
Department of Health in the Virgin Islands, 1963 was the third con-
secutive year that tabulations by birthplace of parents revealed that 
in St. Thomas both fathers and mothers born in the British West ., 
Indies exceeded the number of fathers and mothers born in St. Thomas. 
Of the 901 infants born alive in St. Thomas, 437 mothers were born in 
the British West Indies (201 in Torto1a in the British Virgin Islands 
and 236 in other British islands). St. Croix was still reporting a 
predominance of native-born parents, but the number of alien mothers 
was rapidly increasing. The number of alien-born mothers increased 
by 58 over 1962 when there were only 55 alien-born mothers. See, 
Virgin Islands Vital Statistics 1963 (St. Thomas: Reproduced by 
Printing and Graphics Section of the Department of Health, 1964), 
pp. 9-10. 
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screen out foreign workers who had communicable diseases. Second, 
there had been a considerable improvement in Virgin Islands health 
standards since 1917 and many of the diseases that plagued tropical 
islands had been eliminated. The rest of the Caribbean had not made 
similar progress in health care, so fear was aroused that many of the 
eliminated illnesses and diseases would reoccur. Third, the foreign 
worker was usually unable to find satisfactory housing with sanitary 
f '1" 1                      
The public health services' attempt to improve community sani-
tary facilities was frustrated by the constant movement of foreign 
workers into substandard housing. Overall, the entry of foreign 
workers into the Virgin Islands affected the gains that had been made 
previously in health care. Consequently, the public health service 
representatives proposed pre-entry medical examinations for all foreign 
workers, screening out those with communicable diseases. They also 
recommended that equal health services be extended to all residents, 
thus protecting the Islands' health environment. 2 However, foreign 
workers continued to be excluded from the full gamut of available 
health services such as immunization, health education to encourage 
persons to seek the proper medical care, diagnostic and clinical 
lC. Warren Smith, M.D., MPH, "Principles of Health Services to 
Alien Workers," in the Conference on the Alien Worker and His Family, 
      cit., p. 15. 
2Ibid ., pp. 15-16. 
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treatment, particularly directed to chronic and communicable diseases, 
1 and periodic medical checkups. 
Social Welfare 
The Department of Social Welfare viewed the alien population 
as responsible for the increase in behavioral problems relating to 
the abandonment or neglect of children. Behavior problems such as 
stealing, truancy, deviant sexual behavior, and running away were 
said to be prevalent among the children of foreign workers. 2 
Evaluation of these problems by the Department of Social 
Welfare revealed that the foreign-worker parents of American-born chil-
dren expected the Virgin Islands government to assume full responsi-
bi1ity for the care of these children. Furthermore, parents were 
unable to provide proper care and supervision of their children and 
emergency trips often had to be made off-island to other children who 
had been left with friends or re1atives. 3 
1 Ibid ., p. 15. See Social, Educational Research and Develop-
ment, Inc., Aliens in the United States Virgin Islands: Temporary 
Workers in a Permanent Economy,       cit., pp. 47-49 for a detailed 
description of the health services and which ones were provided to 
foreign workers and their families. 
2Macon M. Berryman, "Welfare Services to Aliens," in the 
Conference on the Alien Worker and His Family,       cit., p. 41. 
No documentation was provided in the report on the numerical increase 
in service requests by foreign workers' families. 
3 . Ib1d., p. 42. 
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However, these attitudes were not truly unique to foreign-worker 
parents. During a 1952 conference on juvenile delinquency,        
example, a police court judge mentioned that some parents felt that 
government agencies should assume responsibility for children when 
they exhibited problem behavior. l Consequently, both indigenous and 
foreign-worker parents often requested placement of their children in 
foster homes or in the Insular Training School for Boys and Girls. 2 
Three conditions were characteristic of the foreign workers' 
relationship to their children. First. no provisions existed for 
foreign workers to bring any dependents with them. In some cases 
children were left in the British West Indies with other relatives. 
New families were often formed after the foreign worker came to 
the United States Virgin Islands. In order to keep their jobs, 
foreign workers frequently had to ignore the needs of their on-island 
families because working hours were extremely long. 
Second. the large percentage of female foreign workers employed 
as domestics assumed the child-caring and housekeeping functions of 
1The Governor's Conference on Juvenile Delinquency, Proceedings 
(St. Thomas: Government Printing Office, ,1952) , p. 5 •. 
2The author experienced such requests while employed as a child 
welfare worker with the Virgin Islands Department of Social Welfare 
from 1960 to 1962. 
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their employers,who worked primarily in government jobs. The foreign 
worker was expected to work a                                         day, leaving them 
very little free time. 
Third, we         surmise that when these mothers did return to 
their unsupervised and neglected children, they were too tired to 
pay much attention to their needs. Tous, lack of communication 
between parent and child led eventually to anti-social and/or illegal 
behavior. l 
Denied access to good child care, foreign workers were forced 
to resort to what was available. 2 Additionally, the legal requirements 
that foreign workers be physically absent once during the year meant 
that foreign-worker mothers often made less-than satisfactory arrange-
ments for the care of their American-born children since they could 
not always afford to take their children with them to the British 
West Indies. If they encountered difficulties in returning to the 
United States Virgin Islands, the children would inevitably be brought 
lThere was no available documentation of the problems faced by 
the foreign-worker parents who had children and also worked. Reportedly 
many parents sent their American-born children to the British West 
Indies until they were of school age, but documentation was unavailable. 
2When the author was chief of the Bureau of Day Care Services for 
the Virgin Islands Department of Social Welfare, a visit was made to the 
home of an elderly woman who was                     child care in a slum area in 
St. Thomas. The facility had been discovered by the Public Health nurse 
who made the referral due to concerns about the health of the children. 
Many foreign worker mothers used this facility where approximately ten 
infants and preschoolers occupied one room and slept on rags on the 
floor. In.the document by Social, Educational Research and Development, 
Inc. A Profile and pians for the Temporary Alien Worker Problem in the 
U.S. Virgin Islands, Ope cit., pp. 32 and               it was reported that in 
their study group of more than four hundred foreign workers that they 
were a much younger age group than Virgin Islanders; more were men (75.4 
percent of the study group) than women and they were likely to be single 
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to the attention of the Department of Social Welfare. Foster care 
placement and inquiries to the British West Indies about the 
children's parents could be the next step followed by the eventual 
return of the American-horn children to their parents in the British 
West Indies. l 
Too, the foreign worker not infrequently encountered problems 
with the child care arrangements for children left behind on their 
native islands. For example, relatives died or wished to be relieved 
of the responsibility. Godparents or friends themselves wanted to 
migrate to work in the United States Virgin Islands. The foreign 
worker generally had three options: (1) return to the British West 
Indies and take care of her American- and British-born children there; 
(2) leave the American-born children in the United States Virgin 
Islands with the expectation that foster-care placement would result; 
(3) bring her British-born children into the United States Virgin 
Islands on a visitor's visa. 2 
If the children entered as visitors they usually overstayed; 
as illegal aliens, they were ineligible for the school system, leaving 
though living with a mate. Of those who have children the average was 
better than 3.5 per person. Females in the sample had 2.62 children 
per person. Implications were that aliens are a prolific group and 
will continue to have children through their child-bearing lives. 
lBerryman, "Welfare Services to Aliens," Ope cit., p. 42. No 
data were given on the actual number of children who were provided 
services. 
2Visitors are aliens who arrive in the United States without 
a visa and are given a "visitor's visa" for twenty-nine days. These 
visits may be, and often are, extended for progressively shorter 
periods of time. 
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a great deal of unsupervised time to get into trouble. Even foreign-
worker parents, usually mothers, with the best of intentions could 
do little for their children under such crippling conditions. 
The Department of Social Welfare acknowledged that efforts to 
assist these parents and children were often blocked by the lack of 
adequate housing, ineligibility for public housing, inability to pay 
the high rents in the private housing market, the necessity of 
accepting live-in jobs which inhibited their ability to make adequate 
provisions for their children, the twenty-nine day visitor mother 
whose children were left behind with inadequate care, and the exclusion 
of             children from the school system. l Most of these constraints 
encountered by the Department of Social Welfare were in fact 
symptomatic of the foreign workers' exclusion from the society." 
Foster care, institutional care, day care, burial services, and 
other services were available only to tliose foreign workers who could 
pay their full cost. 2 Thus, the Department of Social Welfare, an arm 
of the government, effectively excluded foreign workers by requiring 
full payment for services from the people most in need of them, but 
lBerryman, "Welfare SerVices to Aliens," op. cit., p. 42. 
2In the document by Social, Educational Research and Development, 
Inc., A Profile and Plans for the Temporary Alien Worker Problem in 
the U.S. Virgin Islands, pp. 46, 40, and 134-136, indicates that the 
Virgin Islands Labor Department enforced wages, hours, and working 
conditions for all workers save domestics in private households. In 
the case of domestics, the U.S. Labor Department "set the standards, 
but there were no enforcement procedures." Wage rates for domestics 
can be as low as $.54 per hour. The law required that "live in maids 
receive $100 per month" and "live-out maids received $132 per month." 
Prior to this increase in 1967 domestics received $60 to $75 per month. 
As of May 27, 1969, minimum wages ranged from a low of $1.15 in the 
hotel industry to a high of $2.75 for a pipefitter in construction work. 
Since most foreign workers were in unskilled and skilled occupations 
in construction, hotels, and related work, they were paid at the lower 
end of the hourly wage rate range. 
158 
least able to pay.l 
Housing 
According to the 1954 "Governor's Annual Report," 80 percent 
of the homes in St. Thomas were substandard and 69 percent were slums. 
Slums in the United States Virgin Islands were described as those in 
which as many as nine people lived in a single room with no sanitary 
facilities and a leaking roof. The population was housed in a total 
of approximately five thousand dwellings. The limited incomes of a 
large segment of the population and the high building costs meant 
that private ownership of adequate housing was very rare. Thus, the 
public housing program was perceived as the only realistic way to 
provide decent, safe, and sanitary housing for this low-income group. 
Two public-housing projects--240 units in St. Thomas and 110 units in 
St. Christiansted--had been completed. 2 
An overall economic development program announced in 1962 defined 
the Islands' three major problems as substandard housing, water, and 
electricity. On June 18, 1962, the Department of Housing and Community 
Renewal was created by the Virgin Islands legislature. All housing 
lThe day care fee in 1967 was $1.25 per day or $25.00 per 
month. There is no information in the annual reports for the depart-
ment of Social Welfare on the monthly board rate paid to foster 
parents. The average cost per person per year at the Insular Training 
School was $4,177.95 during the 1967 fiscal year. See 1967 AnnuaJ_ 
Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. Thomas: 1967), p. 57. 
21954 Annual Report of the Governor of the Virgin Islands to 
the Secretary of Interior (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1954), pp. 2-4. 
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activities of the government were thus centralized. The small turn-
over in public housing and the absence of adequate private housing 
resulted in ever-increasing public-housing waiting lists. l 
In 1967, when the conference on foreign workers was held, 
housing was still a very critical problem. Hundreds of Virgin 
Islands families lived in substandard dwellings. The government's 
efforts over the past six years had produced major advances in 
housing. but limited funds had kept the program small. The expected 
completion of large low-cost housing developments by private builders 
was expected to alleviate the problem to a great extent. 2 
11962 Annual Report of the Governor of the Virgin Islands to 
the Secretary of Interior (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1962), pp. 71, 73-74. The average contract rent as of June 
30, 1962 was $26.63 per month. Nevertheless, more than 40 percent 
of the tenants were paying less than $20 per            
21967 Annual Report of the Governor of the Virgin Islands to 
the Secretary of Interior (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1967), p. 124. The Social, Educational Research and Develop-
ment, Inc., Aliens in the United States Virgin Islands: Temporary 
Workers in a Permanent Economy, Ope             p. 6)indicates that one 
room with no sanitary facilities or furnishings cost up to $75 a 
month, so rooms were often shared with another foreign worker. The 
Social, Educational Research and Development, Inc., A Profile and 
Plans for the Temporary Alien Worker Problem in the U.S. Virgin 
Islands, pp. 51-52, 55,indicates that in their study group 32.4 
percent paid $26 to $55 per month for rent, 18.4 percent paid 0 to 
$25 and 15.4 percent paid $56 to $85 per month. Under 30 percent of 
the study group earned less than $1.50 per hour, which excluding 
deductions and overtime was no more than $60 per week. Taking into 
account the size of the typical units and the facilities available, 
rent was not cheap. 33.6 percent of the study group lived in three 
to five rooms while 32.7 percent lived in one room and the third 
largest group of 25.8 percent lived in two rooms; 87 percent did not 
have running hot water, 42 percent did not have a stove or bath and 
37 percent did not have access to a refrigerator. In addition; 
access to water meant a walk of 50 to 100 yards and the sharing of 
toilet or bath facilities sometimes meant sharing with 6,8, or 10 
people or even the entire neighborhood. 
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However, as the government mobilized federal and local resources 
to combat the housing problem, large numbers of foreign workers were 
arriving and moving into a tight housing market. During the 1967 
conference, presentations on housing were made by officials from the 
Virgin Islands Planning Office, the United States Department of 
Housing and Urban Development. and from a former government secretary 
who had been involved in the Islands' emergency housing program. 
While all three presentations contributed to the conference. the 
remarks by the former government secretary illustrated the problem 
by developing adequate housing. 
In discussing the development of the emergency housing program 
in the late 1950s, this official pointed out that the Virgin Islands 
government wanted to end the outmoded and unsanitary night-soil 
removal system. Laws were enacted to force landlords to install 
modern plumbing. The landlords responded by evicting tenants and 
demolishing old buildings. replacing them with modern structures 
commanding higher rents. 
The result was many displaced tenants. Although some pUblic-
housing units were then under construction, immediate action was 
needed. Therefore, the government embarked on an emergency housing 
program that supplied only a fraction of the required housing. l The 
number of foreign workers was not as great in the 1950s as in the 
1960s. and the foreign workers were still seen at that point as 
IThe emergency housing program, which was under the auspices 
of the Department of Social Welfare, will be discussed in detail in 
Chapters V and VI. 
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temporary workers who would return to their home i.slands, 1 
The foreign workers were concentrated in predominantly sub-
standard urban housing. On St. Croix, many foreign workers also lived 
inadequately in rural areas. 2 Foreign workers in fact were living 
in housing vacated by indigenous workers who had secured better 
housing as a result of the several                 programs conducted by the 
Virgin Islands government for low-income residents. Consequently, 
although housing conditions for Virgin Islanders were gradually 
improving, the overall housing picture remained substandard. Since 
the housing supply was restricted, priority was assigned to residents 
first, resident aliens second, and non-immigrant foreign workers 
third. 3 
The deputy regional administrator for the United States Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development expressed concern at the 1967 
conference about the rapid increase in the foreign labor population 
during the preceding ten years. Since no housing registry existed 
in the Virgin Islands, information on how foreign workers satisfied 
their housing needs was obtained from observations or personal his to-
ries. Five categories were recognized: 
lRoy W. Bornn, "Experiences in Emergency Housing," in the 
Conference on the Alien Worker and His Family, OPe cit., pp. 32-35. 
2Thomas R. Blake, "Housing," in the Conference on the Alien 
Worker and His Family, OPe cit., pp. 27-28. 
3Ibid., p. 28 •. In the paper by Alonzo G. Moron on "Housing for 
the Alien in the United States Virgin Is1ands--1968", in the Conference 
on the Alien Worker and His Family, Ope cit., p. 19, he reported that 
as of January 1, 1966, there were 3,045 permanent resident aliens in 
the Virgin Islands. 
1. With relatives from the British and French West Indies 
who were no longer aliens. This was especially true for aliens on 
student or visitor's visas and for some non-immigrant foreign 
workers. 
2. In quarters furnished by employers. This was especially 
true on St. Croix. However, many of the maids and gardeners who 
remained on the Islands for any length of time eventually settled 
down to a two-home existence. 
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3. In buildings rented or constructed for single workers by 
employers of large cadres of foreign workers. Unfortunately, the 
quality of housing provided varied and was built with no consideration 
of existing housing or planned future development. 
4. In the general rental market, which included jerry-built 
housing especially constructed to house foreign workers. The 
spectacular increase in rents charged during the preceding five years 
meant that foreign workers were forced to crowd into these rental 
units. 
5. In shacks built by foreign workers and made of crates and 
cardboard with no sanitary facilities. In 1965, the Department of 
Health reported that more than four hundred of these shacks had been 
illegally assembled in St. Croix. Some 150 of these shacks were later 
torn down. 
The regional office of the United States Department of Housing 
and Urban Development, in recognition of the housing problems of the 
foreign workers, made the following policy changes; (1) approval 
was given to admit family groups in public housing if at least one 
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of the members was a resident alien. However, the legal requirement 
that priority be given to citizens and the long waiting lists meant 
little immediate improvements could result; 
(2) the regional office required that relocation plans include 
proposals for the relocation of foreign workers who resided in the 
relocation areas; and 
(3) the requirement for equivalent demolition of old housing 
for each new housing project was waived due to the existing housing 
shortage. l 
Interestingly. these policy changes were initiated by a federal 
agency. The local government had the legal tools to respond to 
complaints about overcrowding and exorbitant rent increases. but did 
little. Building. housing. health. fire prevention codes. and rent-
control laws were ignored; the overcrowding and rent exploitation 
continued to exist. Corrective steps would have cost money. reducing 
the incomes of many owners, so the codes were not enforced. 
The deputy regional administrator contended that the foreign 
worker was entitled both to share in the benefits of the Islands' 
economic progress and enjoy the same legal protection available to the 
general public. 2 However. no immediate changes were forthcoming and 
the foreign workers continued to live in the most deplorable housing 
in the Virgin Islands community. 
lMoron.                   for the Alien in the United States Virgin 
Islands--1966." op. cit., pp. 20-23. 
2Ibid •• p. 24. 
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Education 
The Education Department excluded foreign workers' children 
from the public-school system. The commissioner of education 
supported this exclusion on the grounds that the Virgin Islands school 
system had been victimized by years of systematic neglect, including 
inadequate facilities. Even though 166 classrooms had been built 
since 1961. public-school enrollment had increased by 44 percent, so 
classrooms routinely held thirty, forty, and even fifty children per 
class. The commissioner attributed the increase in enrollment to the 
influx of American citizens from the United States mainland, the expan-
sion of the Puerto Rican community in St. Croix, and the achievement 
of permanent-residence status by the children of foreign workers. l 
The Immigration and Naturalization Service required schools in 
·which foreign students were enrolled to verify the validity of the 
school. Schools awarded verification are then legally permitted to 
enroll non-citizen children. All the private schools in the Virgin 
Islands had completed verification and enrolled foreign workers' 
children on student visas. 2 Thus, these parents, many of whom earned 
minimum wages, paid a fee for their children's education. 3 This 
further strained those foreign-worker parents who were attempting to 
keep their families together. 
lArthur A. Richards, "Education of Non-Citizens" in the Conference 
on the Alien Worker and His Family, OPe cit., p. 37. 
2Social. Educational Research, and Development, Inc., Aliens in the 
United States Virgin Islands: Temporary Workers in a Permanent Economy, 
p. 39. This study also reported that in checking with two parochial 
schools there were approximately 371 children enrolled in their schools. 
3Richards, "Education of Non-Citizens," Ope cit., p. 37. No infor-
mation on the cost of private or parochial schools was readily available. 
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By 1966, the Education Department was forced to address the 
problem of non-citizen children when it was learned, during the summer 
of 1966, that there were 181 non-citizen children who did not attend school. 
The resulting pressure to admit all children to public education 
culminated in the enrollment of non-citizen children in public ele-
mentary and secondary schools. Admission was conditioned on the follow-
ing: (1) good health; (2) presentation of necessary school records 
or the taking of a placement test; (3) that enrollment would not 
cause the number of pupils in a class to exceed prescribed standards; 
(4) preference was given to parents who had worked legally in the 
United States Virgin Islands for at least two consecutive years and 
expected to remain in employment; and (5) the presentation of satis-
factory evidence that off-island guardians were unable to supervise 
the child or children for whom admission was sought. 1 
The Department of Education policy-makers apparently believed 
that this restrictive policy would prevent parents from bringing in 
more of their foreign-born children or transferring children from the 
private-school system. On the other hand, they apparently also believed 
that the policy would address the problems created by the large number 
of non-citizen children who did not attend. In reality, however, the 
very restrictiveness of the policy effectively eliminated large numbers 
of these foreign-born children as the overcrowded classrooms meant that 
very few children were admitted. 
117, Virgin Islands Code, 103-1. 
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Conference                                
Unfortunately, the 1967 conference goals were limited to pro-
viding a forum. Since the conference had not been convened by the 
governor or the legislature, its recommendations, which were sent to 
the governor for his consideration, were not implemented. 
The conference did. however, shed light on the nature of the 
problem. First. it was evident that the critical situation in housing 
and education was beyond the scope of the local agencies. Second, 
agencies, such as Social Welfare, which restricted their services to 
citizens were not addressing the                                   of foreign workers. 
Third, the quest to provide nee6ed services for the indigenous popu-
lation meant that scarce resources were allocated to the indigenous 
population. Thus, the needs of the foreign-worker population, by 
that time already assuming crisis proportions, continued to be ignored. 
In retrospect, we may surmise that the failure to address the 
problem at this midpoint--1966--would critically affect the Islands' 
social and economic development. 
The National Response 
Eventually, the problems of the foreign workers received 
attention from the executive and legislative branches of the United 
States government. 
John J. Kirwan, acting director of the Office of Territories of 
the United States' Department of the Interior in 1965, deplored the 
Islands' reliance on a continuing supply of cheap alien labor. He 
indicated that the continuing failure to address the issue would lead 
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to a deterioration of the quality o£ life. Kirwan compared the money. 
imagination, and effort that the Virgin Islands government expended 
furthering business interests with what it had done for the alien 
population. l 
Kirwan's attempt to secure the assistance of the commissioner 
of Immigration and Naturalization met with the response that the pro-
gram was based on the House subcommittee's recommendation that foreign 
workers in the Virgin Islands should be considered temporary, and that 
the admission of these workers was authorized only after clearance by 
the Virgin Islands Employment Service. 2 Clearly the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service had taken a hands-off position. 
The conclusions of the House study on the                           alien 
labor population in the Virgin Islands can be summarized as follows: 
1. the policies for admitting foreign workers to the United 
States Virgin Islands had developed sporadically, primarily in response 
to pressures from local government officials and businessmen. There 
had been no systematic or uniform enforcement of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act. 
2. the non-immigrant alien labor problems then confronting the 
United States Virgin Islands were the direct result of the inaction 
or misdirected action of the Department of Labor and 
lU.S. Congress, House, Committee on Territorial and Insular 
Affairs, Election of Virgin Islands Governor, Part 11, pp. 701-703, 
for letter from John.Kirwan to Governor Paiewonsky dated August 12, 
1965, and Lewis, op. cit., pp. 227-228. 
2U.S. Congress, House, Non-Immigrant Alien Labor Program on the 
Virgin Islands of the United States, p. 27. 
3. The Immigration and Naturalization Service had been given 
the statutory authority to admit temporary workers. but had totally 
ignored the alien labor program in the Virgin Islands. l 
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In hearings held in, 1967 on legislation authorizing the election 
of the Virgin Islands governor. the House Subcommittee on Territorial 
and Insular Affairs expressed considerable interest in the alien labor 
program and         proplems. Congressmen Morton and Carey were particularly 
critical of the program and the role of the Labor Department in the 
Virgin Islands. 2 
The United States Department of Labor, like other federal 
agencies. had taken a hands-off policy toward the foreign-labor pro-
blem in the Virgin Islands. However, as a result of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act amendments of 1965, which, among other things, 
abolished the national-origins quota system and increased the degree 
of mandatory participation by the Labor Department in authorizing the 
entry of certain immigrants, a new policy was developed for the Virgin 
Islands. 
The 1965 act provided for a transition period to July 1, 1968, 
during which as many temporary workers as possible would be converted 
to immigrant status. This approach was supported by the Virgin 
Islands governor and the Labor and State Departments. Procedures were 
developed to differentiate between temporary workers who worked at 
2U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Territorial and Insular 
Affairs, Election of Virgin Islands Governor, Part 11, pp. 695-698. 
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1 permanent jobs and workers whose jobs were truly temporary in nature, 
As a result of this policy, the number of immigrants admitted 
to the Virgin Islands increased dramatically: 708 immigrants had 
been admitted to the Virgin Islands in 1966, but by 1968 3,413 immigrants 
were admitted. Between 1967 and 1970, a total of 8,766 immigrants were 
admitted. 2 Since these permanent residents would be entitled to the 
society's welfare benefits, they would further strain existing services. 
It is appropriate to note that during this period several .major 
exposes on the foreign-worker problem appeared in the national news 
media. 3 The publicity meant that the problems could no longer be 
ignored either nationally or locally. 
The beginning of the 1970s marked a new period in the Islands' 
approach to the problem of the "temporary" alien worker. In the 
1970s, the Virgin Islands experienced another economic recession and 
was less able to afford the government benefits that people expected. 
Now these benefits were extended to the large, foreign-labor population. 
lU.S. Congress, House, Non-Immigrant Alien Labor                 on the 
Virgin Islands of the United States, pp. 20-21. 
2U.S. Department of Justice, 1970 Annual Report -                        
and Naturalization Service (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, 1971), p. 57. 
3Joseph P. Loftus, "Virgin Isles Face Issue of Aliena," The 
New York Times, December 17, 1968; "Aliens' Life Bleak on Virgin 
Islands," New York Times, August 29, 1969, p. C13 and Jack Star, 
"Virgin Islands: Shame in the United States Tropics, II Look, March 
10, 1970. The articles were all reprinted in the local press and 
generated a storm of. controversy. One example of this response was 
"The Look Story" (Editorial), The Home Journal, St. Thomas, March 3, 
1970. 
1M 
Three major developments led to the {oreign laborers' par tic i-
pation in the Island society: (l) the extensive review of the 
foreign-labor program by the United States Department of Labor;l (2) 
Public Law 91-225;2 and (3) the decision in the Virgin Islands 
district court in Hosier v. EVAns. 3 Let us examine these develop-
ments. 
The Labor Department Review 
Beginning in 1969, the United States Labor Department, partly 
in response to the reports on the foreign workers that had been 
developed by Social, Educational Research Development, Inc.,4 a 
consulting firm, began an extensive review of the foreign labor pro-
gram in the Virgin Islands. This review led to the May 1970 directive. S 
The establishment of a new policy was a direct acknowledgement 
on the part of the United States Labor Department that the procedures 
used by the Virgin Islands Employment Services had been ineffective 
and that a new approach was needed. The new procedures aimed to 
integrate non-immigrant workers into a permanent labor force and curtail 
the entry of new workers. 
lU.S. Congress, House, Non-Immigrant Alien Labor Program on the 
Virgin Islands of the United States, pp. 36-37. 
284 Stat. 116 (1970). 
3Hosier V. Evans, 314 F. Supp. 316 (Virgin Islands 1970). 
4See Social, Educational Research Development Inc., Aliens in the 
United States Virgin Islands: Temporary Workers in a Permanent Economy 
and A Profile and Plans for the Temporary Alien Worker Problem in the 
U.S. Virgin Islands. 
SU.S. Congress, House, Non-Immigrant Alien Labor Program on the 
Virgin Islands of the United States, p. 30. 
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This step symbolized the acknowledgement that the temporary 
foreign-worker program was, in reality, permanent, that foreign 
workers were essential to the Virgin Islands economy: The 
establishment of a local Labor Department office also marked the re-
entry of a federal agency into Virgin Islands' affairs in contrast to 
the years of the Department's indifference and neglect. 
The new procedures stipulated that all foreign laborers working 
in the Virgin Islands as of December 31, 1969 were part of the perma-
nent work force. Eligibility for indefinite certification was 
generally restricted to non-immigr:mt workers with labor certifications 
who had been employed on the Islands between July 1969 and December 30, 
1969; or to non-immigrant aliens without such labor certification who 
were documented as having been employed at the prevailing wage prior 
to January 1, 1970. Domestic workers without labor certifications 
were initially barred from indefinite certification, but this restric-
tion was subsequently relaxed under certain conditior .. ·· .. 
The identification and certification of the original group of 
eligible non-immigrants, totaling about 12,500 was completed in July 
1971.1 This sizable number refle.cted the Islands' dependence on 
foreign labor. 
This attempt to resolve the foreign-laborer problem was deemed 
successful by the Labor Department. However, it does not seem probable 
that all of the indefinitely certified workers will become permanent 
workers. According to the Labor Department's Manpower Administration, 
lIbid., p. 37. 
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at least 10,000 of the 11,200 foreign workers certified as of July 1, 
1973 will never qualify for permanent-resident status without 
Congressional action due to the low annual quotas of the not fully 
independent nation states in the British West Indies. l 
This group was almost evenly distributed between the two major 
islands with St. Croix having 5,925 workers and St. Thomas 5,000. Only 
275 of this group were employed in St. John. Also of interest was 
the fact that of this group of 11,200, only 180 were from the British 
Virgin Islands which historically has had the closest ties with 
St. Thomas. It can be assumed that the small number of workers from 
the British Virgin Islands reflected the long association between the 
American Virgin Islands and the British Virgin Islands, which would 
mean that many British Virgin Islanders were already naturalized citi-
zens and could more easily secure permanent residence for their rela-
tives. The largest group of 4,320 were from Anguilla, Nevis and 
St. Kitts with the second largest group of 2,575 from Antigua. Both 
St. Lucia and Dominica had over 1,000 workers while the other islands 
had numbers ranging from a low of 25 workers (from Barbados) and a 
2 maximum of 380 from Trinidad and Tobago. The foreign labor program 
              pp. 39-40. The not fully independent nation states 
in the British West Indies have 200 visas available annually. For 
example, Anguilla, Nevis, and St. Kitts have             foreign workers 
certified. Thus, it would take several decades for natives of those 
islands to secure a visa for entry into the United Sates. This 
situation will change more rapidly for those islands in the British 
West Indies which become independent. Independent countries of the 
Western hemisphere are subject to an annual overall quota of 120,000. 
2Ibid ., pp. 40-41. 
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represented a sizable influx of persons from islands which had not had 
close social or economic ties with the United States Virgin Islands. 
Dissatisfaction with the procedures was strong among the Islands' 
indigenous workers. The comparatively high unemployment rate combined 
with a large non-immigrant labor force strained an already delicately 
1 constructed arrangement. The most visible source of conflict lay in 
the fact that many of the indigenous workers were unemployed while 
employment was high among the foreign workers. The ostensible reason 
for the striking difference, of course, was that the foreign workers 
had jobs that Virgin Islanders had traditionally been unwilling to 
take. Clearly, however, fragmented and piecemeal planning was the 
real, underlying cause of the problem. 
lIbid., p. 42. In the fall of 1973, the Virgin Islands unemploy-
ment rates was running at approximately 5.5 percent of the            
force. By 1976 this had increased to 10.8 percent but the number of 
non-immigrants had also decreased to 7,250. Unempinyment figures were 
secured from the Department of Commerce's "Comprehensive Growth 
Statistics--1960 to 1977." The figure on number of non-immigrants 
in the Virgin Islands during fiscal year 1976 was secured from the 
St. Thomas office of the Manpower Administration •. 
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Public Law 91-225 • 
The enactment of Public Law               on April 7, 1970 
extended addi tion.a1 privileges to foreign workers. 1 This legislation 
was designed to facilitate the entry of certain non-immigrants by the 
establishment of a new visa classification for the dependents of 
foreign workers entering under one of the three ·standard "H" classifi-. 
cations: (1) persons of distinguished merit and ability; (2) other 
temporary workers; and (3) trainees. 
The specific problem that the legislation addressed was the fact 
that people in business and other professions were concerned about 
            inability to gain entry for managerial and professional staff 
members from their overseas branches for intracompany assignments 
which were outside the requirements for temporary workers under the 
provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Thus, these inter-
national employees had to wait for extended periods before receiving 
grant visas. This dilemma was particularly critical in American 
firms in Canada where employees often waited from ten to twelve months 
for immigrant visas. Consequently, American business was handicapped. 
Public Law 91-225 addressed this need by changing the intent of two 
of the three sections on temporary employees. It also permitted the 
entry of the families of all temporary workers. 2 
184 Stat. 116 (1970). 
2U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 9lst Congress, 
2nd Sess., 1970 (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Company and 
Brooklyn, New York: Edward Thompson Company, 1971), pp. 2,750-2,761. 
175 
Although there was some discussion about the Virgin Islands 
while the bill was under consideration, it is questionable whether 
the Judiciary Committee was fully informed about the probable impact 
of the new modifications provisions on the Virgin Islands. l This 
was yet another example of Congressional actions having an adverse 
impact on the Virgin Islands. 
The legislation provides for reunifications of the families of 
non-immigrants. Although the intentions of the bill were important 
for the foreign workers' families, this legislation would have been 
more valuable in the 1960s when the foreign-workers program was 
growing rapidly. Enactment in 1970 simply exacerbated problems that 
resulted from the mandated integration of the foreign workers into 
Virgin Islands society. 
The most immediate result of the modification of the visa 
regulations in the Virgin Islands was the rapid processing and arrival 
of between thirty thousand and forty thousand dependents of foreign 
workers already employed in the Islands. Needless to say, these 
dependents were legally entitled to government assistance and services 
in areas such as housing, health, and education. This heavy and 
onerous population increase during a period when even workers with 
two or three jobs found it difficult to meet the ever-escalating cost 
of living had detrimental .effect on these families and on the govern-
ment agencies supposedly servicing them. 
lU.S.                     House, Non-Immigrant Alien Labor Program on the 
Virgin Islands of the United States, p. 32. 
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Hosier V. Evans , < ,. 
The third major event was· the actj.on by the United States 
District Court in St. Thomas. When Public Law 91-225 was enacted a 
large number of foreign workers' children were not allowed to attend 
public schools because of the Virgin Islands Department of Education 
regulations. l A group of parents then sued the Virgin Islands govern-
ment and on June 26, 1970 the regulation was declared null and vOid,2 
clearing the way for children of temporary alien workers to attend the 
public schools. This decision was not appealed because the last 
appointed governor had promised the United States Congress, during 
confirmation hearings, that he would work toward admission of alien 
children into the public school system. 3 This decision eliminated 
the last major barrier that had denied alien children access to the 
Virgin Islands public schools. 
The impact of this decision was immediate--80 percent of the 
new enrollees in the public schools were alien children. By December 
1974, 32.5 percent of the total public school enrollment was composed 
of non-citizen ·children. 4 It is important to note that although 
approximately 25 percent of the total Virgin Islands government budget 
113 Virgin Islands Code, 103-1. 
2Hosier V. Evans, 314 F. Supp. 316 (Virgin Islands 1970). 
3U.S. Congress,' Senate, Hearing before the Committee on Interior 
and Insular Affairs, Nomination of Melvin H. Evans, of the Virgin 
Islands to be Governor of the Virgin Islands, 9lst Congress, 1st Sess., 
June 17, 1969, p. 10. 
4Un ited States Congress, House, Non-Immigrant Alien Labor Program 
on the Virgin Islands of the United States, p. 34. 
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was spent on education,l the government was                           to meet the 
demands of this sudden,steep increase in enrollment. In fact, split 
sessions. overcrowded classrooms. and shortages of equipment and 
supplies became the norm, eroding the quality of education for all 
students. 2 
Sununary 
As we have seen, the extensive review of the foreign-labor pro-
gram by the United States Department of Labor, Public Law 91-225, and 
the Virgin Islands District Court decision in Hosier V. Evans, awarded 
the foreign workers with some of the benefits that they would have 
been entitled to originally had their status been that of permanent, 
rather than temporary, workers. Unfortunately, during a period of 
IVirgin Islands Government, Budget                       Office, Summary 
of the Virgin Islands Executive Budget, Fiscal Year 1978 (St. Thomas: 
Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 6. 
2An examination of the record of attrition in the Virgin Islands 
public school system showed two parallel trends. First, the number 
of students who reached grade twelve and did not graduate has shown 
a definite increase over the years and, second, the number of students 
who started in grade nine diminished by about 50 percent by the time 
the class was ready to graduate. These trends developed at a time when 
"social promotion" was an accepted way of moving students through the 
educational pipeline. As a result of the "non-fail" approach, high 
schools were turning out functional illiterates. Of one hundred 
students who were tested at the College of the Virgin Islands in 
English and Math skills, seven passed the English test and thirteen 
passed the math test. All the students were graduates of the three 
Virgin Islands high schools. See Virgin Islands Economic Policy 
Council, Economic Development Policy Guidelines (Draft) (St. Thomas: 
Government Printing Office, January 1978), pp. 48-49 and 86-87. 
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economic recession, the Virgin Islands government was required to 
reorient its focus so that the                             population was. at 
least on an official basis, integrated into Virgin Islands society. 
This reorientation and extension of government services to the foreign 
workers has aggravated the resentments generated on the part of the 
indigenous workers during the many years of mass migration of foreign 
labor. The government was consequently overextended and unable to 
extend adequate benefits to either foreign workers or native Virgin 
Islanders. l 
In· our discussion 0f the history of foreign labor in the Virgin 
Islands, we have thus far viewed the Islands as they were before the 
magnitude of the foreign-labor dilemma became apparent as well as 
during the evolution of the problem. The Virgin Islands up until the 
early 1950s was a small, relatively undeveloped community with a 
common cultural tradition, mores, and beliefs. In such a society, 
there was little to attract newcomers to the Islands and the few that 
came were eventually integrated into the community. The economic 
development that began in the later 1950s, and was generated by the 
expanding tourist industry, changed the Islands from a stable, 
IGreen writes that many British islanders consider the cultural 
prejudice of local citizens who dislike British Islanders as one of 
the most serious sources of their discontent. He adds further that 
the rise of a large, resident-alien population in the Virgin Islands 
has contributed substantially to the sense of threat and isolation 
felt by many Virgin Islanders. See Green, "The British West Indian 
Alien Labor Problem in the Virgin Islands," p. 67, and Green, "Social 
Networks in St. Croix, United States Virgin Islands," p. 110. See 
also U.S. Congress, House, Non-Immigrant Alien Labor Program.on the 
Virgin Islands of the United States, p. 51, which states "There is 
serious concern among native Virgin Islanders and elected officials 
that regularizing the status of H aliens will eventually lead to the 
loss of political power." 
179 
underdeveloped, and agricultural society to a rapidly changing, indus-
trial, and developing society. St. Thomas and St. Croix still retain 
their distinctive differences due to their different geography and 
economic and political development. St. Thomas is still the commer-
cial 'and trade center with tourism and the cruise ship traffic an 
essential ingredient in the island's economic activity. St. Croix, on 
the other hand, has replaced its agricultural economy with manufac-
turing, specifically bauxite processing and oil refining with tourism 
being less developed on St. Croix than on St. Thomas. 
Such a society attracted many different people from the United 
States mainland and the rest of the Caribbean. These newcomers 
brought with them their own cultural traditions, mores, and beliefs. 
Such a massive influx provoked serious personal, social, economic, 
and familial stresses on every part of Virgin Islands society. These 
stresses were further compounded by the societal and offici,al view 
that a large majority of the newcomers were temporary, thus they 
did not need any services. Belated recognition of the needs of the 
newcomers created additional problems for an already overburdened, 
emerging society. 
In Chapter V, "The Development of Social Welfare," we will 
examine the response of the Virgin Islands social welfare system to 
the immense challenges that confronted it. 
CHAPTER V 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE 
The United States Virgin Islands was not exempt from the 
traditional pressures that beset a developing society. In emerging 
from an agriculture-based society and becoming an urban, industrial 
society. the Island government and its people were forced to cope 
with a host of interrelated problems encompassing housing, employment, 
underemployment. unemployment, juvenile delinquency, education, 
dependency due to income insufficiency, health, immigration, mental 
health, family breakdown and instability highlighted by an increasing 
birth rate, parent-child problems, deteriorating community mores, and 
the sociocultural conflicts arising from the clash of American culture 
and West Indian culture. Additionally, a large foreign-worker popu-
lation was present in the United States Virgin Islands during this 
period, further straining the overextended social fabric of the Islands. 
The population explosion ignited in the late 1950s was another 
major factor underlying the social, economic, and cultural problems 
resulting from the Islands' industrial development. l 
lIn 1940 the Virgin Islands population was 24,889 and in 1950 
it had increased to 26,665, an increase of 7.1 percent. The 1960 
population had increased to 32,009, a 20.4 percent increase. Date 
taken from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Sixteenth 
Cens_usof the United States: 1940-Virgin Islands of the United States-
Population, p. 5; 1950 Census of Population, General Characteristics 
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How were these problems to be                     In the Virgin Islands, 
the agency responsible for dealing with the social problems of 
juvenile delinquency, family breakdown and instability, dependency 
due to insufficient income, and                           problems was the Depart-
ment of Social Welfare. 
In Chapter V. we shall review the history of the Virgin Islands 
Department of Social Welfare from its beginnings during the New Deal 
era through its troubled evolution in the 1940s and 1950s. As we 
shall see, the Social Welfare Department, like theother branches of 
the Virgin Islands government, was handicapped by piecemeal legislation 
locally and nationally and restricted access to federal revenues. As 
is true throughout this study, any conclusions in Chapter V should" be 
considered tentative and subject to change. 
Let us begin by discussing the New Deal and social security. 
The New Deal and Social Security 
Two years prior to the Roosevelt New Deal, federal intervention 
in the Virgin Islands raised the Islanders' expectations and hopes for 
a brighter future. Thus, the Virgin Islands experienced a mini-New 
Deal. Two other major, related developments, as noted previously, were 
the transfer of the Islands' administration from the navy to the Depart-
ment of the Interior, so that the federal rehabilitation program could 
American Samoa,             Zone, Guam, Virgin Islands of the United States, 
p. 72 and 1960 Census of Population, General Population Characteristics-
Virgin Islands of the United States, p. 6. 
be properly executed, and the inclusion of the Islands in the 
emergency relief acts of the Roosevelt administation. l 
     
The Great Depression created a major philosophical upheaval in 
the United States about the role of the federal government, dramatizing 
the fact that the American worker was dependent on factors beyond his 
control for economic security. Federal action was perceived as necessary 
in dealing with the economic risks of unemployment, old age, death, 
and disability--for neither state. government, local government, nor 
private charities could cope with the forces unleashed by a nationwide 
economic disaster. In 1935, President Roosevelt proposed economic 
security legislation to the United States Congress; on August 14, 
1935, the Social Security Act was signed into law. 
The law established two national social insurance programs: 
a federal system of old-age benefits for retired workers who had 
been employed in industry and commerce, and a combined federal-state 
system of unemployment insurance. 
Federal grants-in-aid were provided to the states to help meet 
the cost of assistance to the needy aged and blind, and to needy 
children who had been deprived of support or care by a parent's death, 
incapacity, or absence. 2 Other federal grants were established to 
enable states to extend and strengthen maternal and child health 
services, services for crippled children, child welfare services, 
lEvans, Ope cit., pp. 67, 281-283, and 289. 
2U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Social 
Security Administration, Social Security Programs in the United 
States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 5-6. 
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public health services, and vocational rehabilitation services. l 
In the Virgin Islands assistance was provided to the poor in 
the form of pensions, emergency grants, institutionalization of the 
aged poor at a so-called poor farm, pauper burials, and the operation 
of the Boys Home in St. John. Funding of these programs was from 
money budgeted by the Colonial Councils and the interest from various 
trust funds. 2 Under the emergency relief program, cash relief, work 
relief, and food relief were provided to the needy but these funds 
were temporary and the Virgin Islands government was anxious to 
establish a permanent program. The public welfare commissioner was 
particularly concerned about establishing a home for girls, the re-
location and expansion of the boys home, the development of a 
compulsory social insurance system, the building of a community 
center, and the employment of two or more caseworkers for family 
welfare work. 3 
lRalph E. Pumphrey, "Social Welfare in the United States," 
Encyclopedia of Social Work, Fifteenth issue, 1965, p. 34. 
2During fiscal year 1934, 188 persons in St. Thomas and 24 in 
St. John received pensions from Municipal and Trust funds in the 
amount of $6,954.60. Data taken from Report of the Activities of 
the D.epartment of Public Welfare for the 1934 fiscal year, dated 
August 6, 1934 and submitted by Alonzo G. Moron, Commissioner of 
Public Welfare to Honorable Paul M. Pearson, Governor of the Virgin 
Islands, p. 2. (Typewritten) The 1934 Annual Report of the Governor 
of the Virgin Islands to the Secretary of the Interior (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1934), p. 20, stated that a like 
amount of money was spent in St. Croix for pensions and emergency 
grants, but numbers served were not indicated. 
3Report of the "Activities of the department of Public Welfare 
for the 1934 Fiscal year, Ope cit., p. 11. 
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However t an attempt to have the Virgin Islands included in the 
Social Security Act was denied by Congress on the grounds that the 
Virgin Islands did not pay federal taxes. 1 The exclusion, of course, 
was a great blow to the Virgin Islands government generally and the 
Department of Social Welfare in particular. 
During World War II the wartime posture, as we have seen, 
structured the Islands' economy. After 1943, the boom declined and 
the Islands again were in dire economic straits. 2 One of the con-
tributing factors was that economic recovery in the United States 
led to the                         of the Works Progress Administration in 
December 1942, removing an employment resource from the Virgin 
Is1ands. 3 
Now that we have reviewed briefly the Virgin Islands economy 
during the Depression and the early Wo.r1d War II years t let us 
discuss how the Virgin Islands government responded to exclusion 
from social security. 
11935 Annual Report of the Governor of 
the Secretary of Internor (Washington, D.C.: 
ment Printing Office, 1935), p. 15. 
2Lewis. op. cit., p. 94. 
the Virgin Islands to 
United States Govern-
3Helen I. Clarke, Social Legislation (New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, Inc., 1940), p. 525. The U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of the Census, 1940-Virgin Islands of the United States, p. 24 
indicated that of the 17,412 persons 14 years or older, 7,133 were 
employed and of that number 2,000 were public emergency workers. The 
termination of the Works Progress Administration created a severe 
employment problem for the Virgin Islands. 
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By the                       Virgin Islanders had already learned that 
changes requiring Congressional action would come only after a hard 
fight. Consequently, exclusion from the Social Security Act was the 
basis for an intensive drive aimed at altering the decision. The 
lobbying took two major forms. The first entailed the enactment of 
legislation establishing a local public welfare agency conforming to 
federal requirements. Second, a carefully coordinated series of 
lobbying efforts was initiated that had as its ultimate goal inclusion 
of the Islands in selected titles of the Social Security Act. 
The 1943 Act. The 1943 Social Welfare Act, enacted by the 
Legislative Assembly of the Virgin Islands, established the legal 
framework for implementation of the Social Security Act in the Virgin 
Islands. l This legislation modeled the Virgin Islands Social Welfare 
Department on state welfare departments on the mainland. A "state" 
office was opened. Municipalities became district offices. The 
social welfare director, equivalent to a commissioner, was appointed 
by the Secretary of the Interior on the basis of education, training, 
experience, and demonstrated ability in welfare administration. The 
act stipulated that consideration should be given to natives of the 
Virgin Islands in accordance with the 1936 Organic Act. 2 The Social 
lLegislative Assembly of the Virgin Islands of the United States, 
Bill No.1, An Act to Provide for Public Assistance and Welfare Services 
for the Virgin Islands, and for Other Purposes, Session 1943, DecembeE 
13, 1943. St. Thomas Public Library, Microfilm #332. 
2Section 23 of the 1936 Organic Act provided that the Secretary 
of the Interior should give due consideration to natives of the Virgin 
Islands in making appointments to executive and administrative offices. 
     
Welfare Department communicated directly with the federal government 
in establishing, expanding, and strengthening services and receiving 
1 federal funds. The public assistance programs, the activities of the 
board of children's guardians, the homes for the aged and the poor 
department of St. Crox were consolidated into the Department of Social 
Welfare. 
In defining the functions of the subdepartments a variety of 
services were included for adults, children, and the aged. 2 The act 
spelled out provisions for the amount of assistance, application for 
public assistance, investigation of application, approval of public 
assistance, redetermination of eligibility and amount of payment, 
appeal and fair hearing, confidential character of information, public 
                        not assignable cases, and a public assistance fund. 3 
Clearly, we may safely conclude that if the Social Security Act 
was extended to the Islands. the required administrative structure 
would be in place. 
lLegislative Assembly of the Virgin Islands of the United States, 
Bill No.1, OPe cit. 
2I bid. 
3Ibid. These prOV1S10ns would also enable the Department to 
insure that the Municipal Boards would only assume an advisory 
function, thus avoiding a repeat of the findings of the 1930 investi-
gation of the Committee for the Poor in St. Thomas. That investigation 
had confirmed complaints that persons of financial means were receiving 
doles, that signatures were being forged, that pensioners were in some 
cases employed in the households of committee members, and that certain 
members of the committee appropriated to their own use the pensions due 
to persons who had left the Islands. See Evans, Ope cit., p. 113. 
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Lobbying E{forts to Secure Extension. Over a period of several 
years, the commissioner of social                   Roy W. Bornn, with the 
support of the various Virgin Islands governors, testified before 
Congress both in Washington, D.C., and in the Virgin Islands. He 
also appeared before federal agencies such as the Department of the 
Interior and the Federal Social Security Board,                       about the 
socioeconomic conditions in the Virgin Islands that generated high 
unemployment and extreme poverty.1 In 1944, the                 received 
the support of the Federal Social Security Board, which in turn 
recommended to Congress that the public assistance, maternal, and 
child welfare and public health titles of the Social Security Act 
be extended to cover the Virgin Islands. 2 . 
Despite these ongoing efforts, Congress maintained its 
position that because the Islands paid no income taxes into the 
federal treasury, the Social Security Act should not be extended. 
Consequently, the local government had to rely on its own limited 
financial resources when the various federal emergency relief programs 
were terminated. 
Since the Virgin Islands government, as an unincorporated 
territory, had no representation in the Congress in the 1940s, its 
lobbyists enlisted the support of liberal Congressmen, sympathetic 
federal officials, and formal arguments to Congress and federal 
11946 Annual Report of the Governor of the 
to the Secretary of Interior                           D.C'.: 
Virgin Islands 
United States 
Government Printing Office, 1946),         11-12. 
21944 Annual Report of the                   of the Virgin Islands 
to the Secretary of Interior (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1944), p. 7. 
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agencies. It was to take more than a decade before these efforts 
brought results. 
First Social Security Programs 
On January 1, 1947, the Virgin Islands government won the first 
major victory with the extension of Title V--Grants to States for 
Maternal and Child We1fare--of the Social Security Act to the Virgin 
Islands. l Although the 1943 Social Welfare Act had included child 
welfare services in the Department's mandate, this program had not 
been implemented due to financial limitations. In 1944, a program 
of child welfare services was implemented on a temporary basis. The 
child welfare consultants of the United States Children's Bureau 
and the Civilian Public Service unit of the Brethren Services 
Committee, a private group, worked together to secure the assignment 
of a professional social worker to the St. Thomas district. 
The child welfare worker's initial efforts were concentrated 
On delinquent children. The board of management, which administered 
the Juvenile Home for Boys, an institution for delinquent boys, 
sought the worker's assistance in doing a careful study of all boys 
referred for admission to the home. Additionally, the worker, a 
woman, provided casework services to families where children were 
neglected, mistreated, or presented behavior problems. Referrals 
were also made by the schools, the police, and the courts. A total 
11951-52 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare, 
(Mimeographed), p. 1. 
of 115 to 125 children were served during the one-year period of 
1 this project. 
The positive impact on the community by a professional social 
worker convinced the St. Thomas Municipal Council that a-child 
welfare program could no longer be omitted from the Department's 
activities. 2 Funds for a child welfare worker were added to the 
Department's 1945 budget,3 Unfortunately, the low salary proved a 
stumbling block in enticing a social worker from the main1and. 4 
This one-year demonstration project had resulted in a commitment to 
child welfare services from the St. Thomas community, but the lack 
of a professional social worker halted further development of this 
service. 
However, extension of the child welfare title did insure 
implementation of a much-desired and long-awaited child welfare 
services program. The sum of $10,167.00 was budgeted for the first 
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six months of the program and the Department quickly implemented the 
lBery1 E. Bryan, "The Development of Public Welfare in the 
Municipality of St. Thomas and St. John, Virgin Islands of the United 
States" (Master's thesis, Columbia University School of Social Work, 
1952), pp. 41-42. 
2As early as 1934, the Commissioner of Public Welfare, Alonzo G. 
Moron, had recommended the employment of two or more caseworkers for 
family welfare work to lay the foundation for improving family life. 
See "Report of the Activities of the Department of Public Welfare for 
the 1934 fiscal year," dated August 6, 1934 and submitted by Alonzo 
G. Moron, Commissioner of Public Welfare to Honorable Paul M. Pearson, 
Governor of the Virgin Islands. (Typewritten.) 
3Reports on the activities in St. Croix during the 1945 fiscal 
year were not available. It could be assumed that similar actions 
was not taken in St. Croix since there were no indications that a 
professional social worker had been assigned to St. Croix. 
4Bryan, OPe cit., pp. 42-43. 
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mandated federal requirements. These requirements included the 
development of a "Plan for Child Welfare Services" that spelled out 
the services which the Department would provide.1 The federal funds 
could be used only for personnel, staff training, and administrative 
costs. Thus, the newly established child welfare division emphasized 
the strengthening and further development of the institutional pro-
gram for delinquent boys and the establishment of a foster-care 
program. 
The institutional program for delinquent boys was transferred 
to the Department of Social Welfare in 1948 through an executive 
order of the governor. 2 Prior to the transfer, the juvenile home 
had been administered by a board of management and financed entirely 
by local funds. 3 With the program's transfer to the Department of 
Social Welfare, many of the overdue improvements were made. 
Prior to placement in the juvenile home, it was often necessary 
to temporarily place boys in a controlled environment. Since there 
were no separate facilities to provide detention care to delinquent 
youngsters, they were detained in the local jails. When the public 
was made aware of this situation, the resulting uproar culminated in 
detention centers for bOYS, established as separate facilities in 
the local jails in 1949. 4 The Department's institutional program for 
11947 Annual Report of the Governor of the Virgin Islands to 
the Secretary of the Interior (Washington, D.C.: u.S. Government 
Printing Office, 194?), p. 8. 
21948 Annual Report of the Governor of 
the Secretary of Interior (Washington, D.C.: 
Printing Office, 1948), p. 12. 
3Bryan, OPe cit., p. 44. 
4Ibid ., p. 45. 
the Virgin Islands to 
u.S. Government 
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delinquent boys thus consisted       a juvenile home and detention 
centers. 
The Foster-Care                
The second program established was the foster-care program. 
Foster care provided a substitute home for children who--for a 
variety of reasons such ·as abs·ence or death of their parents or the 
inability to cope with a child's disruptive behavior--could not remain 
in their own homes. Foster care was not a new idea in the community,l 
but in the               structure developed by the child welfare division, the 
service was not easily implemented. Since federal funds were to be 
paid to the foster families, certain standards and requirements had 
to be met. Given the financial difficulties of the time and the 
substandard housing of the majority of the population, it was not 
surprising that the Social Welfare Department had many more children 
awaiting foster-home placement than families qualified to take them. 
Despite these difficulties, a major effort was made to secure 
foster homes. These efforts resulted in limited progress and several 
lThe second Public Welfare Commissioner, Alonzo Moron, in dis-
cussing the problems of child welfare work in the home noted the high 
frequency with which the foster parent appears in the population. He 
noted that the average foster parent was not chosen by a social agency 
but by anyone who happens to be willing to take an orphan or a child 
left on the Island by a parent who wishes to go to the United States 
to "better her condition." The average foster parent is old, 
physically unable to stand the strain of rearing an adolescent and 
many are barely able to take care of themselves financially, much less 
bear the added costs of a growing child. See Report·of· the Activities 
of the Department of Public Welfare for the 1934 f·iscal year, Ope cit., 
p. 9. ' . 
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families                     to become foster parents. l In addition to these 
foster homes, the Department also established subsidized foster homes 
on both islands, providing care for six children each.2 The realign-
ment and upgrading of the fos'ter-care program revealed, among other 
things, that a great need existed for a detention facility for girls. 3 
Another major concern in operating the child welfare division 
was the lack of trained staff members. In an effort to address this 
need, a social work institute was conducted by the Department of Social 
Work at the University of Puerto Rico. Staff members from allied fields 
and both municipalities attended the institute. It was very successful 
in stimulating an improved attitude on the part of personnel and much 
interest in the community in general. 4 This institute enabled the 
Virgin Islands government to successfully publicize the need for trained 
lAs of June 30, 1951 there were '10 foster homes and 11 children 
in foster care, in addition to 31 children in the Queen Louise Home, 
a. private child care facility supported by the Lutheran Church which 
received a small grant from the Municipality of· St ... Croix. See 1950-
51 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare for the 
Municipality of St. Croix, p. 12 and Schedule F. No figures were 
available for St. Thomas. By July 1, 1951, there were 23 children in 
foster homes and in subsidized foster homes (14 St. Croix and 9 in 
St. Thomas). These figures had increased to 32 (16 St. Croix and 16 
St. Thomas) by June 30, 1952. 1951-52 Department of Social Welfare 
Annual Report, Part 111, Child Welfare (St. Thomas: Government Print-
ing Office, 1952), pp. 6-7. 
2Bryan, Ope cit., p. 45 and 1950-51 Annual Report of the Depart-
ment of Social Welfare-St. Croix Municipality, Ope cit., p. 12. 
31949-50 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare for 
the Municipality of St. Thomas and St. John (Mimeographed), p. 13. 
41946-47 Annual Report of the Governor of the Virgin Islands to 
the Secretary of Interior (Washington, D.C.: U.S.' Government Printing 
Office, 1947), p. 8. 
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social workers. In 1948, the Social Welfare Department, though the 
use of federal child welfare funds, sent two Virgin Islanders on 
scholarship to the mainland to study for a master's degree in social 
work education. The students were under contract to return to the 
Islands for staff assignments. l 
Despite the availability of federal funds to send a few Virgin 
Islanders yearly to the mainland for their graduate education, this 
could not satisfy the immediate need for administrative personnel 
to implement the child welfare program. Consequently, professional 
social workers were imported from the mainland. 2 Such a move, of 
course, produced a clash between mainland American culture and West 
Indian cu1ture. 3 This clash was further compounded by the mainlanders' 
inability to grasp the local dialect and its cultural nuances. In 
brief, the social workers from the mainland found themselves isolated 




11947-48 Annual Report of the Governor 
Secretary of Interior (Washington, D.C.: 
Office, 1948), p. 12. 
of the Virgin Islands to 
U.S. Government Print-
2Although the funds to implement a Child Welfare program were 
received in January 1947, there was difficulty in recruiting profes-
sional personnel and the program did not begin until June 1947 when 
a trained social work supervisor from the U.S. mainland was recruited. 
See Bryan, Ope ·cit., p. 43. 
3-John Speigel, "The Resolution of Role Conflict in the Family" 
in A Modern Introduction to the Family. ed. Norman W. Bell and Ezra 
F. Vogel (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 394-402. 
For example, in a society with minimal emphasis on time, 
weekly scheduled conferences with the social worker at an exact 
time were unrealistic, but not to the mainlanders. l Despite the 
problems. the extension of the child welfare titles of the Social 
Security Act was the direct reason for the establishment of a child 
welfare program in the Virgin Islands. 
However, the most urgent need in the late 1940s was financial 
assistance to alleviate the depressed economic conditions on the 
Islands. Within this context, the extension of the child welfare 
titles meant that some of the limited municipal resources had to be 
directed toward the child welfare program. 2 Many of the problems 
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lOne of the social workers recruited from the mainland in the 
1940s tells the story of making a presentation on the Mandah1 School 
to some St. Croix youngsters recommended for admission. At the end 
of the presentation, one youngster remarked to the other in the local 
dialect that she (the social worker) spoke funny. They haq apparently 
understood very little of her presentation. 
2The Child Welfare Expenditures for 
fiscal years were as follows: 




the period 1947 to 1949 




As the above indicates, there were increases of $5,240.00 and 
$4,550.00 in local funds during 1948 and 1949. This represents a 
substantial increase in local expenditures and when one considers 
that at the time public assistance grants were based on standards that 
averaged less than 30 percent of actual minimum need, one wonders if 
the additional local funds wouldn't have been used more appropriately 
for the public-assistance program. 
*This amount represents a six-month allotment. 
Sources: Bryan, op. cit., p. 43; Municipal Council of St. Thomas-St. 
John, Budget for Fiscal Year 1947, Bill No. 237; Municipal Council of 
St. Thomas-St. John, Budget for Fiscal Year 1948, Bill No. 32; Municipal 
Council of St. Thomas-St. John, Budget for Fiscal Year 1949, Bill No. 
252; 1948-49 Annual Report of the Governor of the Virgin Islands to the 
Secretary of Interior (Washington. D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
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of these children and their families might have been eliminated by 
cash assistance grants. The limited political clout of the Virgin 
Islands in Congress resulted in yet another case of the Islands' 
needs being defined and controlled by others. 
The Public Assistance Titles 
The second major victory for the Virgin Islands government 
was the extension of the public assistance titles--Titles 1, IV, 
and V--of the Social Security Act. Almost unbelievably, fifteen 
years after the establishment of the public assistance program on 
the mainland. the program was finally extended to the Virgin Islands. 
A compromise was finally reached involving, as per the by-now 
customary pattern, extension of the public assistance titles on a 
more limited basis than for the mainland. l 
On October 1, 1950 the public assistance program was inaugurated 
in the Virgin Islands, but the total amount certified under these 
titles could not exceed $160,000 and the federal share of expenditures 
was limited to 50 percent. 2 Technical assistance was secured from 
federal representatives and a "Plan for Public Assistance in the 
1949), and 1951-52 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare 
(St. Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 4. 
lU.S. Congress, House, ·Social Security Amendments of 1950, 
Pub. L. 81-734. 8lst Congress·, 2d sess., 1950, H.R. 6000, p. 638 
(64 Stat. 477). 
2Social Security Act Amendments of 1950-H.R. 6000, U.S. Code 
Consressional Service, Lesislative History, 8lst Congress, 2d Session 
1950 (Brooklyn, New York· and St. Paul Minnesota: Edward Thompson 
Company and· West Publishing Company, 1951), p. 3510; and 1951 Annual 
Report of the Governor of the Virgin Islands to the Secretary of 
                  (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 30. 
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Virgin Islands·II was developed and approved. The plan provided for 
the handling of assistance on a thoroughly modern basis on principles 
accepted nationally as sound and just, and applied uniformly through-
out the Virgin Islands."l 
Substantial improvements were seen in the public assistance 
program immediately. The total assistance distributed in 1951-1952 
was about double the total in 1949-1950, the year before the federal 
public assistance program was extended. 2 . Despite a 40 percent increase 
in caseload average, monthly grants per person during 1951-1952 were 
$8.40 per person or ahout half agaih the average of $5.90 per 
person in 1949-1950. Municipal appropriations of the program were 
12 percent higher than 1949-1950, the year before federal matching 
began. 
11951 Annual Report of the Governor of the Virgin Islands to 
the Secretary of Interior (Washington. D.C.: U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, 1951), p. 30. Prior to 1948, the poor relief amounts 
were lower in St. Croix than in St. Thomas. The average monthly 
grant in St. Thomas-St. John for the 1950 fiscal year was $6.47 
provided to 622 persons. In St. Croix a total of 500 needy persons 
received cash grants averaging $6.95. In fiscal year 1948, a total 
of 469 needy persons received monthly cash grants averaging $2.50 in 
St. Croix while the average grant in St. Thomas was $6.67. The 
increase in the St. Croix grants was due to the receipt of federal 
funds for a deficit appropriation for the local government in the 
1949 fiscal year. By 1951 due to the receipt of federal public 
assistance funds the average grant in St. Thomas-St. John was $8.17 
to 684 persons and 787 cases in St. Croix received a monthly average 
of $8.91. See 1948 Annual Report of the Governor of the Virgin Islands 
to the Secretary of Interior (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, 1948); 1949 Annual Report of the Governor of the Virgin 
Islands to the Secretary of Interior (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1949); 1950 Annual Report of the Governor of the 
Virgin Islands to the Secretary of Interior (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1950); and 1951 Annual Report of the 
Governor of the Virgin Islands to the Secretary of Interior, Ope cit., 
p. 31. 
21952 Department of Social Welfare Annual Report (St. Thomas: 
Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 1. 
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The caseload for 1951-1952 was 1,734 persons, 40 percent greater 
than the caseload of 1,248 persons in 1949-1950. The aim, beginning 
in October 1950,was to assist all applicants whose resources fell 
below 60 percent of actual minimum need and to give assistance at 80 
percent of client's budgetary deficit on these 60 percent standards 
that were applied to federal and non-federal categories (general 
assistance). This new budgetary standard resulted in an increased 
caseload and a higher average grant. 
Scarce municipal resources threatened the maintenance of this 
new standard. Additionally, the Department wanted to increase the 
caseload by covering all persons who met the new standards of need, 
maintain the uniformity of assistance in both municipalities despite 
the varying abilities to contribute to the program, and to carry 
forward the general modernization of the program that was required by 
the Federal Security Agency. 
To maintain the gains of the program's first nine months the 
following would be needed: 
1. A larger local appropriation was neeaed to match available 
federal funds. 
2. A greater effort was needed on the part of existing staff 
to carry through unaccustomed and exacting requirements. 
3. Additional staff members were needed to carry through 
enormously increased duties. 
During the nine months of the program's operation in 1951, a 
total of $89,230.30 was provided from Municipal appropriations. This 
represented a total of $49,129.59 for the municipality of St. Thomas-
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St. John and a total of $40,100.71 from St. Croix. The initial 
municipal appropriation for 1951-1952 was too low to maintain the 
standards that had been set in October 1950. This amount was increased 
from $122.495 ($60,000 from St. Thomas-St. John and $62,495 from 
St. Croix) to $133,529 ($64,534 from St. Thomas-St. John and $68,995 
from St. Croix). The extensive poverty in St. Croix accounted for 
its greater caseload (the total number of persons receiving grants 
in St. Croix increased 50 percent from 626 to 987 persons while in 
St. Thomas, which had had a more adequate program of assistance, the 
increase was from 622 to 716 persons) and its greater difficulty in 
budgeting its full share of the public-assistance program. Since the 
Virgin Islands lacked an insular treasury, varying rates of matching 
from the poorer counties could not be implemented. 
The federal matching was limited to $92,078.34, although the 
Virgin Islands was entitled to receive $160.000. Due to the Islands' 
poor economy and low government revenues, the Department could not 
approach the appropriation ceiling as long as the matching formula 
was restricted to the dollar for dollar basis.1 
1The preceding information was taken from the 1951 Annual Report 
of the Governor of the Vir$in Islands to the Secretary of Interior 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951), pp. 30-32; 
1952 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare, Parts 1 and 11 
CSt. Thomas: ·Government Printing Office, 1952); the 1952 Annual Report 
of the Governor of the Virgin Islands to the Secretary of Interior 
(Washington. D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952). The follow-
ing chart from p. 25 of that report gave the following expenditure 
information: 
Virgin Islands 1949-50 
(Oct. 1949) 
Total V.I. appropriation $107,728.00 












A second need was a greater effort on the part of existing staff 
members to carry through unaccustomed and exacting requirements. For 
example, federal regulations required that home visits be made to each 
client, but public transportation was limited or unavailable and 
there were few government vehicles on the Islands. 
On St. Croix, which is the largest of the three primary islands, 
only one vehicle was available to cover the entire island. l Addition-
ally, most homes were unnumbered, there was limited telephone serVice, 
clients visited the offices infrequently, and clients were often 
absent at the time of the worker's visits. Staffs were small, 
vancies remained unfilled, and retention of staff members was diffi-
cult because of the low salaries and the limited numbers of qualified 
people. Verification of birth records were also required and for 
many recipients these records were unavailable. In addition, loss 
or destruction of records made it impossible to verify birth dates 
of people born before a certain period of time. 2 Since birth records 
were generally not used, many people were known by other names and 
had used names other than those on their birth certificates all their 
lives. 
lIn St. John, for example, where there were few roads, workers 
would have to travel by donkey to get to clients. In St. Croix and 
St. Thomas people walked or used horse and carts if they lived in the 
rural areas. 
2In those                       where birth records could not be secured, 
affidavits were secured from people who had known the recipients and 
those clients were placed on general assistance. This practice is 
still used for clients born before a certain period of time. 
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Although the mailing of checks resulted in a more efficient 
administrative procedure, it created hardships for the large number 
of clients who could not write and needed assistance in the signing 
and cashing of their checks. l The elimination of the monthly visits 
to the offices to pick up the checks meant that workers could no 
longer assist clients on these visits. 2 Consequently, many of tha 
clients who needed ongoing service could not receive it for workers 
were physically unable to visit all of their clients. The establish-
ment of a uniform public-assistance fund resulted in centralization 
of accounts and disbursement, resulting in the St. Croix municipality 
losing some of its earlier autonomy.3 
The third need was additional staff members to· carry out the 
enormously increased duties imposed as a result of the implementation 
of the federal program. The administrative activities were many times 
the volume of those under the old local program. They included the 
exacting demands for investigation of applications, the maintenance 
of complete case records for each client, accounting by categories, 
pro-rating of administrative costs, and extensive statistical report-
IAccording to the U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Bureau of 
Census, 1950 Census of Population, General Characteristics--American 
Samoa. Canal Zone, Guam, Virgin Islands of the United States, pp. 54-
77. It indicates that of the 12,296 persons 25 years old and older 
5.9 percent had no education and 22.0 percent had I to 4 years of 
elementary schooling. Due to the emphasis on education during the naval 
administration, one could assume that the elderly were disproportionately 
represented in the 5.9 percent of the population that had no formal 
education. 
2Clients from the rural areas could plan their monthly visits to 
town around the receipt of their checks and could either walk or hitch 
a ride since public transportation was limited and recipients had 
limited funds to pay for transportation. 
31951 Annual Report.of the Department of Social Welfare, St. 
Croix Municipality (Mimeographed). pp. 2-3. 
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ing to federal agencies. Additionally, eligibility workers provided 
services in securing support for children from their parents and vice 
versa, guiding Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) families regarding 
children needing school adjustments or showing delinquent tendencies, 
and helping families overcome problems in domestic relations. 
Nearly all the administrative costs were defrayed by the federal 
share so only a small fraction had to be borne by local funds. Never-
theless, the increased volume placed great demands on the limited 
staff, especially since there was a great deal of staff turnover. l 
This problem created a tremendous burden on administrative personnel 
as ongoing staff training was also required. 2 
Before the federal program was inaugurated, there were eighteen 
staff members. This number had increased to twenty-six by January" 30, 
1952, but nine of these were in general administration. The public-
assistance caseload was administered by eight high-school and college-
level caseworkers, whose average caseload was 161 cases. As of June 
1952, only 50 percent of the workers had been on staff a year or 
longer. There was also a great deal of difficulty in recruiting trained 
and capable leadership and after some temporary assignments by mainland 
agency heads, a permanent public assistance director from the mainland 
was named in March 1952. Nevertheless, the commissioner was also 
-11952 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1952), pp. 19 and 23. 
2An administrative review by the federal agency during fiscal year 
1952 pointed out the need to improve staff training and provide for 
educational leave as staff needed strengthening in social investigation 
process and in assisting clients to develop potential resources. See 
1952 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare, Ope cit., p. 27. 
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required to carry some supervisory responsibility.l 
The requirement that supervisory and administrative personnel be 
experienced social workers meant that personnel had to be recruited 
off-island. Even though support for the training of Virgin Islanders 
was                     two years were needed to complete a master's degree and 
work experience was required prior to promotion. As noted previously, 
mainland personnel were unprepared for the facts of life in the Virgin 
Islands. 
In summary, the extension of the public-assistance titles improved 
the public-assistance program in the Virgin Islands. Higher benefits 
were received by more people. Nevertheless, implementing a mainland 
system of public assistance proved traumatic. The United States Virgin 
Islands, an undeveloped and depressed economy, had limited local resources 
such as funds, professional and paraprofessional manpower, public trans-
portation, or the administrative system to effectively mold a Depart-
ment of Social Welfare. The 50 percent match on federal funds meant 
that the Virgin Islands could not spend the federal dollars that were 
available for the program due to their limited resources. 
Although the representatives of the federal agencies recognized 
the unique problems of the Virgin Islands, the Department was still 
expected to conform to federal rules and regulations. The Virgin 
Islands government strove to comply with the rules and regulations, 
but continued its attempts to secure the elimination of the discriminatory 
provisions, that is,. the 50 percent matching formula, the ceiling on 
federal dollars, and equal treatment with states on the mainland. 
11952 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare, pp. 21 
and 22. 
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Centralization of the Department 
Many difficulties in herent in a municipal system of government 
were eliminated with the passage of the 1954 Revised Organic Act by 
the United States Congress. The act provided for the establishment of 
1 an insular system of government. The separate municipalities, 
separate treasuries, separate municipal councils, and separate depart-
ment governing boards were abolished. 
Under the act, the governor was given the authority to reorgan-
ize and consolidate the executive branch into not more than nine depart-
2 ments. Under the reorganization, the Department of Social Welfare 
was continued as an executive department and its scope broadened to 
include all public social welfare services: 
The department shall have general authority over, and jurisdic-
tion to administer, all public social welfare programs in 
the Virgin Islands, shall exercise general control over the 
enforcement of the laws rEHating to Social Welfare, shall 
make studies of, and recommendations for, and shall develop 
plans and programs aimed at                     a high level of social 
welfare throughout the territory. 
The following critical changes were required to achieve this 
goal: 
1. The abolishment of the municipal superintendent positions with 
all activities directed from the district offices in Charlotte Amalie 
and Christiansted, and branch offices in Frederiksted and St. John. 
497. 
lRevised Organic Act of 1954, July 22, 1954 (Ch. 558, 68 Stat.) 
2 Ibid. 
3 Virgin Islands Code, Volume 1, Title 3--Executive, Chapter 21 
(Department of Social Welfare), section 371 and 372 (Orford, New 
Hampshire: Equity Publishing Corporation, 1958). 
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2. The abolishment of the two municipal departments and the 
assumption of their functions in one centralized Department of Social 
Welfare. 
3. The development of one integrated budget, resulting in central-
ization of financing of the public                       fund. 
4. The establishment of a new division of institutions and 
special programs that operated the home and shelters for the aged and 
special programs such as the cancer program, housekeeping services for 
the feeble-aged, and providing for needy families. 
5. The appointment of a centralized board of social welfare with 
representatives from all districts. The Commission on Children and 
Youth, previously without an affiliation, was renamed the Advisory 
Youth Commission and placed within the Department of Social Welfare. l 
Thus, for the first time since passage of the 1943 Social Wel-
fare Act, the government and administrative mechanisms were implemented 
to finally enable the Department to establish an insular program, 
assess territorial needs, and develop and finance programs to meet the 
needs of the territory. For example, a work relief project was needed 
in St. Croix, but the municipality did not have the funds to initiate 
the program. The centralized Department was able to do so. 
1 1955 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1955), Part 1, pp. 4-6. 
The Department in the Late 1950s 
By 1956, when the foreign-labor program was initiated, the 
Department of Social Welfare had been reorganized from a municipal 
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to a centralized department and had been receiving federal funds for 
the child welfare program since January 1947 and for the public assis-
tance program since October 1950. Thus by 1960, when increasing num-
bers of foreign laborers were entering the Virgin Islands, the Depart-
ment had thirteen and ten years, respectively, in developing child 
welfare and public-assistance programs. Limited local funds had 
inhibited the development of the non-federal programs. This short time 
span, as we shall see in Chapter VI, had not allowed sufficient time to 
implement a truly comprehensive social service delivery system or 
resolve the multiple problems related to limited resources. 
To appreciate the problems of the 1960s and 1970s, therefore, a 
review of the Department's activities in the late 1950s is helpful. 
The three Department divisions carrying out the mandate of the Depart-
ment of Social Welfare were institutions and special programs, the 
child welfare division and the public-assistance division. 
Institutions and Special Programs 
The division of Institutions and Special Programs administered 
the Queen Louise Home in St. Thomas for the elderly who needed cus-
todial care and managed the shelter homes on St. Thomas and St. Croix 
for the elderly who could provide their own care. In addition, the 
department certified the indigent aged for admission to the Kings Hill 
Home for the Aged run by the Department of Health. In 1959, the Virgin 
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Islands legislature authorized the governor to transfer the adminis-
tration of this facility to the Department of Social Welfare. Trans-
fer was withheld pending the completion of a survey conducted by a 
National Institutes of Mental Health team which determined whether the 
1 institution should be changed to provide care for the mentally ill. 
It was felt that with the transfer to the Department, which was finally 
made on January 1, 1962, better care could be provided to the 
residents. 2 
Special Programs. Special programs provided by the division 
included work                 cancer care, burial services for indigents, 
services to the mentally ill in the local hospitals, after-care services 
to discharged formerly institutionalized mental patients, and emergency 
housing. The division also functioned as the operations arm of the 
Community Chest, an independent, voluntary charity program. 
After the termination of the New Deal programs in the 1940s, work 
relief projects were severely curtailed. By the late 1950s, only two 
programs operated on an occasional basis: a work relief project for 
1 Virgin Islands Department of Social Welfare Annual Report for 
the Fiscal Year July 1st, 1959 to June           1960 (St. Thomas: 
Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 12. 
2The author's "experience was that the quality of care at the 
Herbert Grigg HDme improved cyclically. Concern about the quality of 
care was expressed periodically and, at those times, money and 
additional staff members were provided. When the quality of care 
again declined, money and staff were again added. The most recent of 
these cyclical up-swings occurred during 1975-1976. 
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needy handicapped persons on St. Thomas who were unable to secure 
employment through other means and a sewing project on St. John which 
provided work relief for approximately three to four months in 
1 1959 and 1960. The program never got under way in St. Croix because 
2 of personnel problems. As employment opportunities increased in the 
late 1950s, there was less need for work relief projects and the pro-
gram was not expanded. 
Through the cancer care program, the Department provided contact 
and escort services to Virgin Islands cancer patients referred by the 
Health Department for care at the Puerto Rico Cancer League facilities. 
Some of the treatment services at the Puerto Rico Cancer League were 
provided without charge, but special services and the board rate were 
paid by the Virgin Islands government. Local funds were provided for 
the program; in St. Thomas, the Community Chest provided the major por-
tion of the funds. By 1960, eight persons received services at a cost 
of $4,910.90 as compared with total expenditures of $6,052.00 in 1959 
when seventeen people received services. Only $1,920.89 was spent in 
1 $216.95, $356.50, and $677.19 was provided for the St. Thomas 
work relief project for 1958, 1959, and 1960, respectively. In 
1959 and 1960, the Virgin Islands' legislature made a special appropri-
ation for the St. John sewing project of $5,000. No figures on the 
number served were provided, although the 1955 Annual Report, Part 1, 
noted that 24 persons were assisted in 1956 with total funds of 
$1,721.45. See 1956 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare 
(St. Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 9; 1958 Annual 
Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. Thomas: Government 
Printing Office, 1958), p. 3; 1959 Annual Report of the Department of 
Social Welfare (St. Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 4; 
and 1960 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare           Thomas: 
Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 3. 
2 1958 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare, ££. cit., 
p. 3, and 1959 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare, 
£p.. cit., p. 3. 
208 
1955 wheu deep x-ray treatment was available at the St. Thomas hos-
pita1 and patients did not need to travel as frequently to Puerto Rico 
1 for treatment. (No figures on numbers served were available for 1955.) 
In lieu of on-island cancer services, the joint agreement between 
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands continued to provide a much-needed 
service. 
The Department was also responsible for providing burial 
services for indigents. By 1956, free graves, coffins, and funeral 
transportation were provided on both islands. Prior to this date, 
the Department's services in St. Thomas were limited to the provision 
of free graves while the Department of Health provided coffins and 
funeral transportation. This change in policy resulted in the pro-
vision of a uniform service in both districts. Burial services were 
used more extensively on St. Croix, reflective of that island's de-
pressed economy and the hardships imposed on the elderly population. 
For example, burial services in St. Croix were provided to 93 
persons in 1951, 116 in 1954, and 76 in 1957 compared with the provision 
in St. Thomas of four free graves in 1953,2 two free graves in 1954, 
and none in 1957. 3 The Federal Old Age and Survivors program, extended 
1 1955 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare,       cit., 
p. 12; 1959 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare, ££. 
cit., p. 13; and 1960 Annual Report of the Department of Social Wel-
fare,       cit., p. II. 
2No figures were available for 1951 or 1952. 
31951 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare, 
St. Croix Municipality,       cit., p. 9; 1955 Annual Report of the 
Department of Social Welfare, p. 12; 1957 Annual Report of the Depart-
ment of Social Welfare, p. 11; and 1953 Annual Report of the Depart-
ment of Social Welfare (St. Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1953), 
p. 10. 
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to the Virgin Islands in 1951, had begun to impact on the elderly by 
the late 1950s. l During 1960, burial services were provided to only 
fifty-one people on both islands. 2 Burial costs covered by the Federal 
Old Age and Survivors program were refunded to the local government, 
3 thus reducing the total costs of the program. 
Casework services were provided to the mentally ill hospitalized 
in the St. Thomas hospital. Upon discharge, the division provided 
after-care services to patients and their families. Additionally, the 
division also had responsibility for planning and arranging the return 
of mental patients from St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, D.C. 4 
Access to this facility,provided by an act· of Congress, represented the 
only residential treatment facility available to the mentally ill of 
the Virgin Islands. 5 
lThe Old Age and Survivors Insurance Title of the Federal Social 
Security Act was extended to the Virgin Islands effective January 1, 
1951 and offices of the Federal Social Security and Internal Revenue 
were opened to administer the provisions of the Old Age and Survivors 
Insurance Title. See 1951 Annual Report of the Governor of the 
Virgin Islands to the Secretary of Interior,     .. cit., pp. 30-31. 
2 1960 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government                   Office,               p. 13. 
3 1956 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare 
(St. Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 10. 
4 1956 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare 
(St. Thomas: Government Printing Office, i956) , p. 11. 
5 U.S. Congress, Senate, An Act Relating to the Admission to 
St. Elizabeth's Hospital of Persons Resident or Domiciled in the 
Virgin Islands of the United States, 54 Stat. 766, 24 U.S. Code, 1946 
ed., 7/18/46, sec. 1960 and U.S. Congress, Senate, An Act Relating to 
the Admission to St. Elizabeth's Hospital of Persons Resident or Domi-
ciled in the Virgin Islands of the United States by Enlarging the 
Classes of Persons Admissible into St. Elizabeth's Hospital and in Other 
Respects, Pub. L. 81-613, 8lst Cong., 2d sess., 1950, S 2227. 
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The St. Thomas Community Chest. The Community Chest of St. 
Thomas, organized in August 1938, was an independent voluntary charity 
program administered by a board of directors. However, the Department 
was very involved in the management and promotion of the fund drive and 
the programs of the Community Chest. The division of Institutions and 
Special Programs provided a housekeeping service for the aged, bedside 
nursing care, and a special needs program. Personnel in the house-
keeping services program swept and cleaned the homes of the indigent 
and the infirm and provided laundry, messenger, and shopping services 
to those clients. Through the bedside nursing care program, nursing 
aid was provided to sick indigents who remained in their own homes. 
The special and emergency needs program provided appliances for handi-
capped persons, emergency needs for household furnishings, special 
comforts for the sick, and loans and grants for any emergency needs of 
indigents. The chest also provided a monthly allowance for the indi-
1 gent residents of the Queen Louise Home for the Aged. 
The Community Chest of St. Thomas enabled the Uepartment to pro-
vide additional services and to secure items needed by clients which 
the                       itself was prohibited from providing. 
During 1950, $4,562.17. was spent for the activities of the Com-
munity Chest. By 1955, these expenditures were $8,112.13, and by 1960, 
expenditures were $13,952.85, the highest on record. Major expenditures 
lThe preceding was summarized from the available Department of 
Social Welfare Annual Reports for the period 1950 to 1960 fiscal 
years. The 1956 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare 
(St. Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 12-14 and 18 
provided the best summary of the program. Also see the 1959 Annual 
Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. Thomas: Government 
Printing Office, 1959), pp. 14-15. 
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were for the housekeeping and laundry services, cancer care program, 
1 and home nursing, in that order. 
The St. Croix Community Chest. The St. Croix Community Chest, 
patterned after the St. Thomas Community Chest, was organized on 
September 26, 1957 but did not have the same kind of leadership, 
organizational history, community support, nor sound organization. Al-
                  it did provide some services, such as the provision of medical , 
appliances and small emergency loans to individuals, ··it qid not have the pro-
grams established by the Chest on.St. Thomas due to its much smaller budget. 2 
Emergency Housing 
The division was assigned responsibility for the management of 
the emergency housing program in 1958. 
The program was developed in response to the critical housing 
shortage in the Virgin Islands. By the late 1950s, an accelerated 
building and remodeling boom occurred, particularly in St. Thomas, 
where many slum areas were converted into high-rental residential or 
industrial properties. This posed a problem for low-income families 
who were unable to pay the higher rents. Consequently, many of these 
low-income families turned to the Department of Social Welfare for 
assistance. The Department increasingly found itself unable to assist 
these low-income families as the stock of low-income housing shrunk. 
11950 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (type-
written), p. 19; 1955 Annual Report of the Department of Social Wel-
fare, £2.. cit., p. 16, and 1960 Annual Report of the Department of 
Social Welfare, £2.. cit., p. 14. 
2 1960 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare,       cit., 
p. 15. 
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Eventually, the Department conducted a survey of families evicted be-
cause their landlords wanted to renovate. Fifty-eight family groups 
and 43 single adults, consisting of a total of 359 persons, were 
. d 1               . Single adults were not eligible for public housing, which 
was restricted to families of at least two related persons. Public 
housing could not accommodate all of the eligible family groups. 
The seriousness of the problem resulted in the passage of en-
abling legislation to erect emergency houSing. 2 Attention was then 
directed toward meeting the needs of low-income residents who were des-
perately in need of immediate housing at affordable rents. 
During the emergency housing program's first year of operation in 
St. Thomas, 186 applications totaling 894 persons were received. Of 
this number, 19 families consisting of 97 persons were housed in 6 units 
of varying sizes which were constructed or remodeled by the Public 
Works Department. At the end of 1960, 161 families, totaling 759 per-
sons, were still in need of housing. 3 
Clearly, the receipt of federal housing funds and the construc-
tion of public housing c·ould not keep pace with the growing number of 
eligible low-income families. 
In summary, then, the programs provided through the division of 
Institutions and Special Programs were locally funded programs and 
1 . 1958 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare 
(St. Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 13. 
2Ibid • 
31960 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare 
(St. Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 13. 
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addressed the needs identified by Virgin Islands residents as critical. 
The Community Chest of St. Thomas, a voluntary charity organization, 
provided funds to meet additional program needs. As new areas such 
as emergency housing were identified, the·division also had to imple-
ment those programs with limited resources. However, since federal 
funds were not available for these programs they could be more easily 
adopted to local needs. Nevertheless, the division still had unmet 
needs including the need for more adaptable quarters and an activities 
program for the Queen Louise Home, the need for extensive repairs to 
the cottages at the Corneiro Home as well as the development of a 
social and recreational program, a community building for religious and 
social gatherings at both shelter homes, an expanded homemaker service, 
and a nursing home service for the chronically ill and senile. 
Between 1955 and 1960, there was over a 100 percent growth in 
expenditures; further growth was restricted by limited funds. l The 
increase in population further strained the Department of Social Wel-
fare's ability to service the people. 
The Child Welfare Division 
The purpose of the federal child welfare grant-in-aids to states 
was to establish, extend, and strengthen services to children. Great 
emphasis was placed by the Department of Social Welfare on services to 
children in their own homes. Other essential services such as foster-
family home care and institutional care were provided to homeless, 
1See Table 3 for a comparison of the expenditures of the Division 
of Institutions and Special Programs during 1955 and 1960. 
TABLE 3 
COMPARISON OF THE EXPENDITURES OF THE DIVISION OF 
INSTITUTIONS AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS IN 1955 AND 1960 
Program 1955 
Institutional Care $24,959.10 
Burial of Paupers 2,293.50 
Work Relief/Sewing Project 1,388.48 









Source: 1955 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare 
(St. Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1955), Schedules E 
and F; and 1960 Annual Report of the Department of Social 
Welfare (St. Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1960), 
Schedule A. 
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dependent, neglected, pre-delinquent, and delinquent children. l New 
services were also instituted such as adoption services, day care, and 
advisory servi.ces to the Insular Advisory Commission on Children and 
Youth. 2 
Initially, strict controBwere placed on case loads to keep them 
small enough to be workable. This was necessitated by limited funds, 
lack of                       and lack of voluntary agencies or other community 
facilities and resources. 3 In 1952, services were provided to 238 
youngsters, 414 in 1955, and to 818                   in 1960. 4 
Separate detention facilities for youngsters were provided in Forts 
in Christiansted, Frederiksted, and St. Thomas. Although these 
facilities were deemed unsatisfactory, funds were unavailable for an 
alternative program. In 1959, Fort Christiansted was turned over to 
the United States Park Service, thus detention facilities in St. Croix 
were eliminated, as youth care at Fort Frederiksted had been terminated 
earlier. Plans for new facilities on St. Croix and on St. Thomas were 
5 eventually formulated. 
Foster care showed continuing growth and was one of the most 
1 1955 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare,       cit., 
Part III, pp. 4-5. 
2 1958 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare,       cit., 
pp. 11 and 13; and 1960 Annual Report of the Department of Social 
Welfare, p. 8. 
31955 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare,       cit., 
p. 6. 
41952 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare,       cit., 
p. 5; 1955 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare,       cit., 
p. 9; and 1960 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare,      
cit., p. 8. 
5 1959 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare,       cit., 
p. 9; and 1960 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare,      
cit., p. 9. 
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encouraging phases of the division's operations. With the development 
of a centralized government system, foster-home board rates were 
increased to $30.00 per month--an increase of $5.00 for St. Thomas and 
$10.00 for St. Croix. Total expenditures for the foster-care program 
in 1960 were $34,386.30 compared with $16,986.47 in 1955.1 
A foster-parents' club was established in St. Thomas in 1954 and 
in 1956 in St. Croix. These clubs assisted the Department in interpre-
ting the program to their communities. They also provided a forum for 
discussion of child care and other services. A "Foster Mother of the 
Year Award" was estab1ished. 2 By 1960, a total of 145 children were in 
foster homes compared with 111 in 1955 and 80 in 1954. 3 
Federal funds had enabled the Department to employ a profes-
siona1 administrator for the Mandah1 School for Boys and staff members 
were sent to the mainland for training. However, the facility's opera-
tion funds, which came from the local government were limited, thus 
program development and maintenance of the facility were minimal. 4 
In March 1955, the first legislature of the Virgin Islands enacted 
1 1960 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare,       cit., 
p. 9; and 1955 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare, 
      cit., p. 8. 
2 1955 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare, ££. cit., 
p. 8; and 1958 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare, 
      cit., p. 12. 
31960 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare,       cit., 
p. 9; 1955 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare, 
      cit., p. 9; and 1954 Annual Report of the Department of Social 
Welfare,       cit., Part III, p. 11. 
4 1952 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare,       cit., 
Part III, pp. 7-8. 
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legislation creating the Insular Training School. l In August 1955, the 
school was moved to Anna's Hope in St. Croix, a 225-acre facility for-
merly occupied by the Federal Agricultural Experiment Station and a 
2 vocational institute. The Education Department continued to pro-
vide teachers for the academic program and a farm program was estab-
lished. By 1960, two additional counselors and a caseworker were 
employed, enabling the Department to strengthen the program. 3 
On March 5, 1958, the Home for Girls was established at the 
Anna's Hope estate. The drive for the establishment of this home had 
been spearheaded by the Women's League, a civic organization on 
St. Thomas. Due to limited local" funds, the St. Thomas Community Chest 
provided initial funding. Although the facility's capacity was limited 
to ten girls, it provided a resource for adolescent girls who were 
unable to adjust in foster homes. 4 
During 1955, the child welfare division accepted responsibility 
for completing the adoption studies on adoption petitions filed with 
the district court. These adoptions were primarily those of British 
West Indian children by their relatives. 5 Few local children were 
lFirst Legislature of the Virgin Islands, Act No. 17, To Provide 
for the Establishment and Operation of Insular Training Schools and 
For Other Purposes; Approved March 28, 1955. 
2 Division of Mental Health, Virgin Islands Department of Health, 
Childhood Behavior Problems in Social Focus by Robert H. Dalton, 
July 1968, p. 5. 
31960 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare,       cit., 
p. 9. 
41958 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare,       ill·, 
p. 12. 
5 1955 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare,       cit., 
p. 9. 
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available for adoption. Although children were often given to rela-
tives, godparents, or friends, these arrangements were informal. It 
was also hard to preserve confidentiality in a small community if the 
adopted child was of a local mother. By 1959 some children were avail-
able locally, because young women from the mainland came to the Virgin 
Islands to give birth and then placed the children for adoption. 
Arrangements were also worked out with adoption agencies on the main-
1 land to place children with families residing in the Virgin Islands. 
During 1955, the Department completed ten adoption studies for the 
court, placed three children for adoption, and provided supervision for 
one child placed by a mainland agency. By 1960, eleven children were 
2 received from agencies on the mainland and placed in local homes. 
Staff services were provided to the Citizens Advisory Commission 
on Youth which spearheaded the development of youth centers on each 
island. Unfortunately, budget difficulties and lack of trained super-
3 visors made it difficult to fully activate the youth centers. By 1960, 
the commission's priority had shifted to the development of the 1960 
Virgin Islands report for the White House Conference on Children and 
4 Youth. 
11959 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare,       cit., 
p. 9. 
2 1955 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare,       cit., 
pp. 9-10; and 1960 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare, 
£E. cit., p. 9. No figures were given on the number of adoption 
petitions for the courts, although reference was made to the fact that 
this service was continuing. 
\959 Annual ReEort of the DeEartment of Social Welfare,       cit., 
p. 10. 
41960 Annual ReEort of the DeE.;lrtrnent of Social Welfare, £E. cit., 
p. 10. 
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As noted previously, federal funds had enabled the Department to 
implement a scholarship program enabling native Virgin Islanders to 
earn their professional social work degrees. The goal was to develop 
an on-island capability and a cadre of indigenous professionals. How-
ever, the Department found it difficult to maintain its trained staff, 
for many left the Islands for other professional opportunities, moved 
to other Virgin Islands government agencies, or married and left the 
1 Islands. The turnover problem resulted in a continued reliance on 
recruitment of professional staff members from the United States main-
land and frequent vacancies in administrative positions. 2 
On June 10, 1959, new legislation was approved authorizing the 
commissioner of social welfare to stimulate the development of day-care 
facilities for the children of                 mothers. 3 The program was 
initiated during 1960 with the establishment of private centers on 
St. Thomas and St. Croix. An average of sixty children (St. Croix, 
twenty; St. Thomas, forty) ranging in age from three months to four 
1 Accurate records have not been kept on the number of employees 
who received educational leave or scholarship grants. Available 
sources indicate that twelve people received training through this 
program since its initiation in 1950. In the ten-year period, three 
completed only one year and of this number only two remained with the 
Department. Of the other nine, three had left the island, two were 
with other agencies, and four were still with the Department. (See, 
Department of Social Welfare files on the Scholarship Program.) 
2 1955 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare,       cit., 
Part III, pp. 17-18. 
3Third Legislature of the Virgin Islands, Act No. 455, An Act to 
Amend Titles 17 and ·34 of the Virgin Islands Code to Authorize the 
Commissioner of Social. Welfare to stimulate the Development of Day 
Care Facilities for the Children of Working Mothers and For Other Pur-
poses, Approved June 10, 
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and one half years used the service. l 
Major unmet needs at the beginning of the 1960s, as identified 
by the Department, included the establishment of detention facilities 
on St. Thomas and St. Croix and increased day-care services. These 
items were included in the Virgin Islands report to the White House Con-
ference on Children and Youth. The report also recommended provision 
2 of youth shelters and community centers. 
In the period from 1955 to 1960, local expenditures on child 
welfare services had more than doubled. Although federal expenditures 
had almost doubled, the local government, with its limited resources, 
3 still provided almost three-fourths of the total costs. The local 
government was thus severely strained economically. 
The Public Assistance Division 
The public-assistance division also experienced consistent growth, 
but the work of the division was marked by a continuing struggle on two 
fronts. One problem was to hold the caseload down to those in acute 
need, so that they could receive adequate help; the second problem was 
. 4 to increase the public-assistance grant to a realistic level. 
11960 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare, ££. cit., 
p. 10. 
2 Ibid., pp. 9-10 and Children and Youth of the Virgin Islands, 
prepared for the 1960 White House Conference on Children and Youth, 
March 27-April 2, 1960 (St. Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1960), 
pp. 8-10. 
3 See, Table 4 for Local and Federal Expenditures for Child Wel-
fare Services in 1955 and 1960. 
4 1960 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare,       cit., 
p. 4. 
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On February. 1, 1954 assistance rates were raised from 48 percent 
of minimum needs to 60 percent. In 1955, the new revenues available 
through the financial provisions of the Revised Organic Act were chan-
neled into public assistance to provide grants at 100 percent of so-
called minimum needs for food and clothing. Other items in the 
client's budget were not changed. l Average grants increased from 
$8.50 per person per month in June 1953 to $14.34 per person in June 
1958 and $18.88 per person in June 1960. 2 
In the first two years of the program's operation, the caseload 
had risen substantially and by June 1955, the total public-assistance 
caseload covered 1,673 persons. Due to a drop in public-works employ-
ment, many parents received reduced incomes, causing Aid to Dependent 
Children (ADC) caseloads to increase from 571 in June 1954 to 757 in 
3 June 1955. By 1958, the total caseload had decreased to 1,657 in 
response to major efforts to rehabilitate employables, the improving 
economic conditions, and the gradually developing benefits of the Old 
4 Age and Survivors and Insurance program. By June 1960, however, the 
caseload had increased to 1,716 due to liberalized standards of assis-
tance and eligibility and the increase in grants for ADC children 
through a special appropriation of the Virgin Islands legislature that 
1 1955 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare,       cit., 
pp. 4 and 9. 
2 1958 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare,       cit., 
pp. 6 and 7, and 1960 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare, 
p. 6. 
3 1955 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare,       cit., 
pp. 10-11. 




LOCAL AND FEDERAL EXPENDITURES FOR CHILD WELFARE SERVICES 
IN 1955 AND 1960 
Funding Source 1955 1960 
Federal Funds $26,456.60 $ 49,442.59 
Local Funds 
Child Welfare Program 25,728.26 54,738.21 
Insular Training School 34,685.03 83,536.74 
Total Local Funds $60,413.29 $138,274.95 
Source: 1955 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare 
(St. Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1955), Schedule A 
and B, pp. 22 and 23; and 1960 Annual Report of the Department 
of Social Welfare (St. Thomas: Government Printing Office, 
1960), Schedules F and G. 
1 raised food allowances for children under thirteen years of age. 
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Local expenditures for the public-assistance program continued to 
increase and by 1956 federal matching funds were in the vicinity of 
$180,000 or $20,000 more than the $160,000 annual ceiling. Gradual 
increases in the federal ceiling had been secured; by 1960, federal 
matching funds were $216,116.23, still below the federal ceiling of 
2 $300,000. Predictably, the Department would soon meet this maximum. 
The local share had increased by $85,000 in the 1955-1960 period while 
. 3 federal expenditures had increased by only $71,527. 
The major unmet need at the beginning of the 1960s, therefore, 
was aimed at the Department's continuing efforts to secure a federal 
matching formula which would be the same as the states,.4 Another major 
problem, however, was the fact that despite the small size of the Virgin 
Islands, it was required to carry the usual state and local responsi-
bilities and meet the same federal administrative requirements as the 
large states. With the caseload divided among the three islands, 
opportunities for consolidation of caseloads and of casework 
1 1960 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare,       cit., 
pp. 4 and 5. 
21956 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare,       cit., 
Part II, p. 2; and 1960 Annual Report of the Department of Social 
Welfare, p. 7. See Table 4 for Federal and Local Expenditures from 
1950 to 1960 fiscal year. 
3 See Table 5 for a comparison of total cost of assistance pro-
gram (Assistance and Administrative Costs) for 1955, 1958 and 1960. 
41960 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare,       cit., 
p. 
TABLE 5 
COMPARISON OF TOTAL COST OF ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 



















Source: 1955 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1955), Part II, 
Schedule K; 1958 Annual Report of the Department of Social 
Welfare (St. Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1958), 
Schedule K and 1960 Annual Report of the Department of Social 
Welfare (St. Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1960), 
Schedule B. 
supervision were limited. Despite these unfavorable factors, the 
Islands' administrative costs were below the national averages. l 
Summary 
At the end of the 1950s, the Department of Social Welfare 
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achieved the organizational objectives of the 1943 Social Welfare Act, 
namely, the establishment of a centralized Department of Social Wel-
fare. The extension of the public-assistance titles and the enactment 
of the Revised Organic Act enabled the Department to achieve uniform 
policies for its federal programs. However, the extension of the 
federal social security programs still did not bring enough federal 
dollars to effectively implement these programs. Congress                
cellings on the amount of federal dollars available to the territory, 
including an unfavorable local-to-federal dollar match. Despite these 
limitations, the Department of Social Welfare was still required to 
meet all the federal rules and regulations for program operations. 
Thus, limited local funds were necessarily used to implement these pro-
grams. Consequently, program development was uneven and in programs 
such as the Insular Training School for Boys, federal dollars were 
available for staff members and training, but the operating and main-
   
tenance expenses, paid from local dollars, were often inadequate. This 
severely affected the program's quality and its ability to respond to 
changing needs. Additionally, even though there was an increase in the 
public-assistance payments, the increases were still insufficient to 
11955 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare,       cit., 
Part II, p. 26. 
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meet the clients' minimum survival needs. 
The development of local programs was also handicapped even after 
the development of a government centralized structure; certain local 
programs, such as work relief, were available only-in certain dis-
tricts. Several other programs, such as bedside care and housekeeping 
services, were financed by a local charity on St. Thomas. These pro-
grams were unavailable in St. Croix. 
Despite all these limitations a tremendous expansion in available 
social welfare services occurred in the 1950s. Many observers thus 
anticipated that the 1960s would see continued growth, more favorable 
treatment from the federal government, and the provision of more compre-
hensive services to the                             Virgin Islands population. 
As we shall see in Chapter VI, "Special Programs and Public 
Assistance, 1960-1976," the rapid population explosion of the 1960s 
made the desired progress an often unachievable goal. 
\' 
CHAPTER VI 
SPECIAL PROGRAMS AND PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, 1960-1976 
At this point in our discussion of the foreign-workers program 
in the United States Virgin Islands and its effect on local govern-
ment                     it is appropriate to survey pertinent comments by 
several writers and to review briefly the findings thus far. As 
mentioned previously, any findings should be considered tentative 
and subject to future revision. 
Although the United States has been described as a nation of 
immigrants, its government policies do not always reflect the fact 
that migration is often a normal condition of living during which 
vulnerability to stress and crisis can be heightened. Eaton suggests 
that a national migration policy would bring new resources into an 
area so that the people already in residence could remain without 
suffering from a reduction of their own opportunities and services. I 
Lourie, in describing what he terms "the migration mess," 
contends that the United States has always let things happen and then 
interpreted any humanity-negating results as the will of Providence, 
the law of the jungle, or some other variation of the helplessness-of-
man theme. This thinking is perceived by Lourie as reflecting the 
lEaton Ced.), Migration and Social Welfare, Ope cit., p. xvi. 
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obsolete concept that individual actions only affect those who are 
immediately involved. He states that as an industrial, pluralistic, 
democratic culture, we (in the United States) must accept and deal 
with our own dynamism, viewing our conflicts in terms of people rather 
than things. For example, in crea.ting massive job opportunities, 
human environment consequences must be high on the list of priorities. 
If not, the result of massive migration will be further disintegration 
of families and neighborhoods, disparity in               levels and living 
standards. and instability in the sHpply of and demand for manpower. 
Migration, as a normal contemporary phenomenon. therefore, can be 
either constructive or disruptive to the family and community. Thus, 
it must become an integral part of all community planning and pre-
ventive health, mental health, and social welfare programs. l 
Golan and Gruschka write that immigration consists of two 
complementary processes: integration into the community by the 
immigrating individual or family unit and absorption of newcomers 
by the host community. They describe the dislocation experienced by 
the community that must open its structures, as less explicit--but 
certainly as disruptive--than the state of crisis often experienced 
by the immigrant. 2 
Findings and Overview 
As we have detailed previously, the dislocation in the Virgin 
Islands was compounded by a visible unwillingness to accept the new-
lNorman V. Lourie, "The Migration Mess," Social Work, XVII 
(January 1972), pp. 85-86. 
2Naomi Golan and Ruth Gruschka, "Integrating the New Immigrant: 
A Nodel for Social Work Practice in Transitional States," Social 
            XVI (April 1971). p. 83. 
comers. The result was a hostile welfare policy in regard to these 
West Indian migrants. l 
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As noted in Chapter IV, the absence of migration planning in the United 
States Virgin Islands· created severe consequences for both the indigenous 
Virgin Islanders and the foreign laborers who were attracted to the 
Islands during the boom years of the 1960s. As we saw in Chapter IV, 
the human environment consequences of foreign workers' mass migration 
into the United States Virgin Islands was not planned or anticipated 
but rather was allowed to happen. The consequences of this unplanned 
movement,with which the Islands' government .was ill-prepared to cope, 
included those specified by Lourie, above. Additionally, as we saw 
in Chapter V, the social welfare services in the Islands were deve10p-
ing and not equipped to offer a comprehensive social welfare services 
program. 
In Chapters VI and VII, we will discuss the scope of· thIs welfare 
policy by examining the Department of Social Welfare and its response, 
or lack of response, to the social welfare services needs of the 
foreign-labor population from 1960 to 1976 •. (It is appropriate to 
note here that 1976 marked the twentieth anniversary of the foreign-
labor program in the Virgin Islands.> 
The social problems already evident in the 1960s were further 
heightened in the 1970s not merely by the continued residence of the 
foreign workers in the Virgin Islands, but also by their increased 
numbers, the large size of their families, and their unvarying sub-
standard living conditions. 
lSee Eaton's figure on "Welfare Policy Alternatives with Respect 
to Migration" in Chapter I. Figure taken from Eaton, Migration and 
Social Welfare, op. Cit., p. xv. 
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Two of the Department's three division were federally funded 
and required to follow the same federal regulations as public welfare 
agencies on the mainland. The third division, Institutions and Special 
Programs, was locally funded, was not constrained by federal require-
ments, and consequently was more flexible. 
Kahn describes housing, health services, and income security as 
three of the five fields that traditionally have been the purview of 
social welfare. Chapter VI, therefore, will focus on two divisions--
Institutions and Special Programs, and Public Assistance. These 
divisions together encompassed housing, health, and income maintenance • 
. The child welfare division, on the other hand, Kahn calls the 
sixth human service system--the general or personal social services: 
child welfare, family services, community programs for the aged, 
community centers and settlements, homemakers, day-care congregate 
meals and meals-on-wheels, self-help and mutual-aid activities among 
the handicapped, institutional care and residential treatment of 
adjudicated delinquents and children in need of supervision. Counseling 
services for adolescents, and protected residential arrangements for 
young people living away from their families. l All of the above were 
not provided by the Department, but many fell within the purview of 
the child welfare division, as we shall see in Chapter VII. 
In 1960, four years after commencement of the foreign-labor 
program, the foreign-born population of the Virgin Islands represented 
lShei1a B. Kamerman and Alfred J. Kahn, Social Services in the 
United States-Policies and Programs (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1976), pp. 4 and 503-504. 
12 percent of the total population of 32,099. The 1970 census 
reported a doubling of the population totaling 62,468. Of this 
                30 percent were foreign-born without citizenship.l This 
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period may certainly be termed the growth years of the foreign-labor 
population, the time of greatest need for social welfare services. 
Chapters VI and VII will address the following: 
1. How many of the services designed for low income Virgin 
Islanders also met the needs of the foreign workers? 
2. Were the services available to them? 
3. What was the Department's posture toward the foreign workers? . 
4. What were the group's unmet needs? 
Institutions and Special Programs 
i ;: 
This division provided supervision of the custodial and shelter 
institutions for the aged, referral and escort services of the cancer 
program, services to the mentally ill, work relief programs and support 
services to the ill and disabled aged that were funded by the Community 
Chest. 
The programs provided to the aged were based not on citizenship. 
Many elderly Virgin Islanders had migrated to the United States Virgin 
Islands as young men and women, established families in the Islands, 
but never adjusted their citizenship status. These long-time residents 
were well known in the community. On the other hand, the new West 
Indian migrants were young people of working age and did not need the 
IU.S.                     House, Nonimmigrant Alien Labor Program on the 
Virgin Islands of the United States. p. 15. 
232 
services provided to the elderly. 
Referrals through the cancer program were available to foreign 
workers if they could afford to pay for their care. The other 
services provided to the mentally ill, the aged, and the unemployed 
were not extended to                 workers; mentally ill foreign workers 
could be deported, they were not old enough for services for the 
aged, and since employment was a condition of entry into the United 
States Virgin Islands, a work relief program was precluded. 
The two other major special programs were the emergency housing 
program and the surplus food distribution program. Both of these 
programs could also help low wage-foreign workers and their families. 
Emergency Housing. The emergency housing program, created in 
1959, sought to provide low-income housing to Virgin Islands residents 
who were evicted from slum areas that were being rehabilitated. This 
program was able to increase the housing stock of low-income dwelling 
units, but supply lagged far behind demand. Preference, therefore, 
for Virgin Islanders or families headed by native Virgin Islanders 
h . d I w 0 were most       nee • 
As Table 6 indicates, on June 30, 1962 only fifty families 
of 295 had been housed in St. Thomas. More people were housed in 
St. Croix, since the Department leased housing from the Virgin 
Islands Corporation, but only eighty families, a little more than a 
third of the eligible, were housed by June 30, 1962. 
1See Table 6 for numbers of applications received. and numbers 
of people served. 
TABLE 6 
EMERGENCY HOUSING PROGRAM STATISTICS 
TOTAL APFLICATIONS RECEIVED AND Nu}WERS HOUSED 
DURING FISCAL YEARS 1960-1962* 
"9 t.' 'Thomas , 
Applications Received 
During 1959-60 
Total Housed During Year 
Applications Pending 
June 30. 1960 
Applications Received 
June 30. 1,961 
Applications Pending +' 
June 30. 1961 
Total Housed July 1, 1960 




.June 30. 1962 
Total Housed July 1, 1961 
Total Housed June 30. 1962+ 
St. Ct:oix·· 
Total Applications 
August 1. 1960 
Applications Pending 
.June 30. 1961 
Applications Received 
During 1961-62 
Total Housed July 1. 1961 



































*In August 1962 and' November 1962 in St. Thomas and St. Croix. respec-
                this program was transferred to the Department of Housing and 
Community Renewal. 
232A 
**Pifty-one (51) applications were received in August 1960. but additional 
applications were not accepted until June 1961 when plans were initiated 
      develop an Emergency Housing Program on St. Croix. 
+ These fIgures are cumulative figures. 
Source: 1959-60. 1960-61. 1961-62, 1962-63. Annual Reports of the 
Department of Social Welfare. 
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Foreign workers, of course endured de-facto exclusion from the 
housing program. Consequently, they resorted to a variety of mostly 
unsatisfactory housing arrangements: living with relatives, living 
in quarters furnis·hed by employers, buildings built or rented by 
employers, jerry-built houses and shacks built by the foreign workers, 
who squatted illegally on unoccupied land. 1 
In August 1962, with the creation of the Department of Housing 
and Community Renewal, this program was transferred from the Depart-
ment of Social We1fare. 2 Adequate housing remained a major unmet 
need for both indigenous Virgin Islanders and foreign workers. 
Surplus Food Distribution. In 1961 the Department of Social 
Welfare was assigned responsibility for the distribution of federally 
donated surplus-food commodities through an agreement with the United 
States Department of Agriculture. This program provided surplus foods 
to improve the nutrition of low-income public-assistance fami1ies. 3 
By 1963, the program was extended to needy citizen families ineligible 
for public assistance, thus effectively excluding the foreign worker 
and his fami1y.4 Further expansion occurred during 1965 and 1966 
when the financial requirements for non-public assistance families 
IMoron, "Housing for the Alien in the United States Virgin 
Islands· - 1966", Ope cit., p. 21. 
21963 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government                   Office, 1963), p. 21. 
31962 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 19. 
41963 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare, 
Ope cit., pp. 21-22. 
were again liberalized. l However, the citizenship requirement was 
retained. 2 
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By the               the increased population, the economic downturn. 
and the reoccurrence of heavy unemployment in the Virgin Islands 
created new demands on social services. These were reflected in the 
increased numbers of families and individuals participating in the 
food distribution program. During 1969-1970, 1,294 families repre-
senting 4,397                   participated. By 1970-1971. another 521 
families had been added. bringing the total program caseload to 
1,715 families composed of 6,227 persons. 3 
Three additional major factors contributed to increased 
participation in the surplus-foods program. First, a change in the 
Department's regulations during 1970-1971 finally entitled foreign 
workers to participate.4 Second, the foreign workers' families often 
ballooned as a result of the family reunifications authorized by 
passage of Public Law 91-225. Third, the prevailing low-wage 
economy qualified many people. 
The Department kept abreast of the upsurge through receipt of 
additional federal funds. In 1971, $22,139.86--an increase of 
$12,639.86 over the 1970 .a11otment--was received from the United 
States Department of Agriculture, enabling the Department to rent 
11966 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing                 1966). p. 22. 
2Berryman, "Welfare Services to Aliens," Ope cit •• p. 46. 
31970 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 19 and 1971 Annual 
Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. Thomas: Government 
Printing Office, 1971), p. 22. 
41971 Fiscal Year Annual Report of the Department of Social 
Welfare (St. Thomas: Government Printing Office. 1971). D. 22. 
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additional warehouse space, purchase vehicles? and employ more staff 
members. l 
The numbers of families fluctuated, but there was a noticeable 
increase in the non-public-assistance case10ad because of the in-
c1usion of the foreign-worker fami1ies. 2 During 1971-1972, the 
Department increased the commodities allowed per family, but this 
move was handicapped due to lack of warehouse space. By the follow-
ing year, efforts were under way to construct a new warehouse. 3 How-
ever, before this could be implemented the surplus-food distribution 
program, then composed of 10,301 recipients, was terminatud by the 
federal guve!:nmcnt on June 30, 1974 and replaced by the food stamp' 
program. 4 
As Table 7 indicates, the local government paid more than the 
federal government. Even with the increase in federal expenditures, 
it was not until 1974 that the federal share exceeded the percent of 
the local share. Certainly, we may surmise that the expense of the 
program accounted significantly for the Virgin Islands government's 
reluctance to include foreign workers. 
2There are no statistics on the numbers of persons served by this 
program in the fiscal year 1972 or 1973 annual reports of the Depart-
ment of Social Welfare. There are also no figures on the number of 
foreign-worker families served. One would assume from Table 7 on 
"Federal and Local Expenditures" in the Surplus Foods Distribution 
Program during the 1970 to 1974 fiscal years that there was a continuing 
increase in this program in both years. 
31972 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1972),p. 13 and 1973 Annual 
Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. Thomas: Government 
Printing Office, 1973), p. 11. 
419 74 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office), p. 22. 
TABLE 7 
FEDERAL AND LOCAL EXPENDITURES 'IN THE SURPLUS FOODS DISTRIBUTION 
PROGRAM DURING THE 1970 TO 1974 FISCAL YEAR 
1969 - 1970 1970 - 1971 1971 - 1972           - 1973 1973 - 1974 
Federal Funds $ 9,500.00 $22,139.86 $ 27,175.57 $ 45,324.40* $ 43,095.00 
Local Funds $62,666.08 $61,765.79 $ 83,509.90 $103,286.81 $ 74,619.00 
Total Expenditures $72,166.08 $83,905.65 $110,685.47 $148,611.21 $117,714.00 
(Taken from Schedule A on "All Expenditures by Source of Funds and Objects of Expenditures" from the 
1970-1974 Annual Reports of the Department of Social Welfare). 
*Increase in federal funds was due to legislative changes in the surplus foods distribution program which 
increased the total appropriation available for the Virgin Islands. Information secured from former 
Commissioner of Social Welfare, Macon M. Berryman, in December 1978. 
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The Department of Social Welfare began preparations to imp1e-
ment the food stamp program in Jaunary 1974. The food stamp benefit 
levels were determined by two variables: the monthly food stamp 
allotment which was based on household size; and the purchase price 
which was based on net monthly household income. The food stamp 
law required that monthly food stamp allotments be set according to 
the dollar costs of obtaining a "nutritionally adequate diet" for 
various household sizes in the Virgin Is1ands--provided that the 
allotment was exceeded by the allotment in at least one of the fifty 
states. 
For example, the higher cost of food in Alaska and Hawaii 
raised the level of the benefits of the fifty states. During the 
July to December 1977 period, the monthly. allotments for a one-person 
household in the forty-eight states and the District of Columbia, 
Alaska, and Hawaii were $52.00, $70.00, and $68.00 respectively. 
The allotment for the Virgin Islands during the same period was 
1 $64.00 for a one-person household. Since benefits in the food stamp 
program were related to household size and the actual cost of a 
"nutritionally adequate diet," the high cost of food and the low-wage 
Virgin Islands economy entitled more people to benefits. 2Eligibility 
in the surplus food distribution program had been based solely on 
family income· 
1United States Congress, House, Food Stamp Act of 1977. 
2This policy was unanticipated as in the past U.S. poverty levels 
had been applied to the Virgin Islands even though the Virgin Islands 
cost of living was higher than Washington, D.C. 
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The food stamp program in the Virgin Islands was inaugurated 
on October 1, 1974; by June 30, 1975, 6,175 households participated,l 
representing approximately 18,500 persons. This figure was almost 
double the 10,301 individuals who were participating in the surplus 
food distribution program in June 1974. The facilities and staff 
were inadequate for the program and the local government could not 
match the federal funds to ensure adequate facilities and staff. 
Even though the bonus coupons were paid with federal funds, 
the administrative costs of the program were only matched by 50 per-
cent federal funds; the local government was therefore required to 
use scarce local dollars to expand the program. As with all other 
Departments of Social Welfare programs, the needs exceeded the 
Department's resources. 
The Public Assistance Division 
Established in 1950 with the extension of the public assistance 
titles of the Social Security Act to the Virgin Islands and the 
receipt of federal funds, the public assistance division also provided 
services to low-income Virgin Islanders. Cash grants were provided 
to recipients in the federal categories of Old Age Assistance (OAA), 
Assistance to Dependent Children (ADC), Aid to the Blind (AB), and 
Aid to the Disabled (AD). General assistance, a locally funded pro-
gram, met the needs of those recipients who did not fit in the federal 
categories. Aid in the form of food grants, work-relief assignments, 
11975 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 28. 
and Christmas grants were also provided. 
The work of this division was characterized by a continuing 
struggle in two areas: (1) holding the caseload down to those in 
acute need so that the recipients might receive help of the highest 
level as possible; "and (2) increasing resources so that standards 
of assistance could be geared to providing more of the requirements 
of life for recipients. l 
The division's work will be discussed by focusing on the 
following: (1) the benefits provided foreign workers and their 
families; (2) the administrative changes required by the numerous 
social security amendments in the 1960s; (3) the growth of the 
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public assistance case10ad; (4) the federal financial discrimination 
of the public assistance; and (5) the impact of this discrimination 
on public assistance grants. 
Benefits for Foreign Workers 
Public assistance eligibility required that a recipient's 
income and resources be below basic budget standards, that the 
recipient reside in the Virgin Islands, and that residence be in 
the Islands at the time of application and during the period of 
assistance. Although foreign workers might have insufficient income, 
they were not considered residents and were thus ineligible. Generally, 
the foreign workers also were excluded because of the following 
additional reasons: (1) a family with mother and father living 
11961 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 4. 
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together did not qualify for public assistance; (2) foreign workers 
were permitted to enter under the assumption that they would not 
become public charges; and (3) children born in the United States 
Virgin Islands of alien mother and father who were deserted by one 
or both parents received public assistance while definite plans 
were made for them. 
Of central importance was the social welfare commissioner's 
statement that inadequate local funds and limited federal funds 
proscribed the extent of the public assistance program, hindering 
revision and expansion. 
Those with permanent resident visas, rather than the temporary 
visas held by most foreign workers, were eligible to receive services. 
Forty-one adults who were resident aliens received public assistance 
and of these eight were officially non-residents. These eight were 
all elderly people, well known in the community, who had been 
residing in the Virgin Islands for many years but had never bothered 
to have their status adjusted. The forty-one were a small percentage 
of the 761 adult recipients. 
Of the children receiving AFDC, six were permanent residents 
and twenty-three were American citizens. l The parents excluded from 
the grant were named payees on behalf of their children. 2 Presumably, 
lBerryman, "Welfare Services and Aliens," op. cit., p. 46. 
2A former public assistance supervisor advised that prior to 
the late 1960s, foreign workers could not serve as payees for their 
American-born children. This might account for small numbers as AFDC 
caseload in Fiscal Year 1967 consisted of 1,263 persons. No information 
was available on number of children. See 1967 Annual Report of the 
Department of Social Welfare, op. cit., p. 20. 
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it was not generally known in the foreign-workers' community that their 
American-born, and thus permanent resident, children were entitled to 
benefits depending on family income. l Additionally, as grant levels 
increased, more single-parent low-income families became eligible for 
assistance payments, but increases were rare during these years. 
The 1960s Social Security Amendments 
The 1960, 1962, 1965, 1966, and 1967 amendments resulted in a 
series of reorganizations of the public assistance division and in-
creased the Department of Social Welfare's problems in complying with 
federal regulations. Limited funds, shortage of paraprofessional and 
professional workers, frequent staff turnovers, resistance to change, 
and long-standing staff vacancies hindered the department's ability 
to achieve compliance. 
In February 1961, a plan for medical assistance for those aged 
sixty-five or older, whose income and resources were insufficient to 
meet the costs of necessary medical care irregardless of whether they 
received assistance for other needs,was established pursuant to federal 
and local legislation. 2 Ultimately, many elderly people who were not 
public assistance recipients were assisted by this program. 3 
lThe above is supported by the findings in the Social, Educational 
Research and Development, Inc., "A Profile and Plans for the Temporary 
Alien Worker Problem in the United States Virgin Islands," in which it 
was indicated that in their study group 62 percent of the foreign 
workers knew of the existence of social welfare but only 2 percent had 
contacted the department and less than 1 percent had been contacted by 
the Department. Information taken from Table XXXVI on "Service Organi-
zations in Terms of Study Group Knowledge and Experience," (Percentages), 
p. 79. 
21961 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 7. 
3U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Census 
of Population: 1960,Virgin Islands of the United States, pp. 55-113. 
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An average of 462 participants were helped annually. This group 
represented less than one-fourth of the 1960               figure of 2,207 
residents sixty-five years of age or older. l Again, the federal 
government paid only 50 percent of the program costs, so the Virgin 
Islands government spent scare,local dollars to implement the program. 2 
lU.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Census 
of Population: 11960, Virgin                 of the United States, pp. 55-113. 
21962 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare 
(St. Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1962), Schedule B. 
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On.July 1,1963, the Public Assistance division moved to imple-
ment the provisions of the 1962 amendments to the public assistance 
title of the Social Security Act. The amendments prescribed the pro-
vision of social services to public assistance recipients and the Virgin 
Islands acted to comply even though the 75 percent match for services 
was not extended to the territories. 
Under the new plan social studies on all cases in the federal 
category were required, but the divison was able to complete only 
50                 of the social studies due to critical staff shortages. With 
an extension and ongoing staff training, the division, which changed 
its name to the Division of Family Services, was able to provide numer-
ous services such as educational or vocational training, health care, 
improving financial functioning, maintaining and improving family life, 
and self-support to those clients who were found in need of social 
services. The division report for the quarter ended June 30, 1965 re-
vealed that of 318 AFDC cases, 198 were defined as service cases and 
113 actually received services. Out of 553 cases in the adult cate-
gories, 124 were defined as service cases and 57 received social 
services mostly in the area of health care, protective services for 
adults, self-care, and self-support services. l 
Under Title V of the Economic Opportunity Act, a grant was re-
ceived to initiate projects for public assistance recipients who could 
profit from training and work experience. A project coordinator and 
staff were hired and. thirty-two persons were placed by the end of the 
1 1965 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 4. 
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1 year. By 1967, the level of participants maintained on the program 
decreased tremendously; only public assistance recipients could be 
2 included and their numbers were               because of low grant levels. 
The program was phased out in 1968 and replaced by the work incentive 
3 program operated in conjunction with the Department of Labor. 
As a result of the 1966 Amendments, a plan was developed to 
implement Title XVIII (health insurance for the aged) and Title XIX 
(medical assistance). The Department of Social Welfare mandated to 
certify individuals for medical assistance. The old medical ass is-
tance to the aged                 was, therefore, terminated on June 30, 1966 
when th.e new medical assistance program was established. 4 
Under this program, foreign workers could be certified for medi-
cal assistance and receive hospital care, medicine, and other medical 
services if they met the income test of need. 5 This was a timely and 
very critical breakthrough for foreign workers, ·as they gained access 
to health services. 
The 1967 amendments raised the ceilings on federal financial 
participation annually over the following six years. The additional 
aid was required to be applied to administrative costs. This limitation 
imposed serious privations on the Virgin Islands, retarding the 
lIbid., p. 8. 
2 1967 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 29. 
3 1968 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 8. 
4 1966 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 2 and 6. 
5 Berryman, "Welfare Services to Aliens," .££.. cit., p. 46. 
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Department's efforts to provide uniform grants at the minimum·subsis-
1 tence level. 
In summary, these various amendments created tremendous changes 
for the public assistance division. Given the ongoing problems related 
to recruitment and retention of staff, the changes made it extremely 
difficult for the agency to meet the new mandates and it was often 
unable to do so. The continuing federal financial discrimination also 
compounded this problem, since it severely limited the amount of 
available money. 
During the 1960s, the division moved from establishing'a pro-
gram of social services for public assistance recipients to a transfer 
of this function and a concept that separated services from income. 
These were major changes for all public assistance agencies but the 
constraints under which the Virgin Islands program was forced to 
operate compounded the problems faced by the Department in providing 
adequate services to its clientele. 
Growth of the Public Assistance Caseload 
Due to the full-employment market in the Virgin Islands during 
the 1960s, everyone able to work was employed. Between 1959 and 1964, 
the Old Age Assistance Case10ad (OAA) had decreased by 134 persons, 
Aid to the Blind (AB) by 5, and Aid to the Disabled (AD) by 11 persons. 
Aid to Families of Dependent Children had increased by only 274 per-
sons during this six-yea!' period. 
11968 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Print"i.rg Office, 1968), p. 10. 
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Factors such as standards of assistance, economic need, social 
conditions prevailing in the community, eligibility requirements, and 
1 the adequacy of appropriations all affected the size of the caseloads. 
As Table a indicates, the number of persons receiving Old Age 
Assistance continued to decline throughout the 1960s. This may have 
reflected the fact that more elderly Virgin Islanders were entitled to 
social security payments and no longer applied for public assistance. 
In contrast, the AFDC caseload continued its steady increase during 
this period; between 1964 and 1970 it increased by 797 persons. 
The economic decline that began in the early 1970s was immedi-
ately reflected by the public assistance caseload. In the year be-
ginning June 30, 1970, the AFDC caseload rose from 440 to 660; by the 
2 end of the following year, the caseload was 785. This rise in the AFDC 
caseload occurred as husbands and male companions left the Islands to 
seek employment elsewhere and laid-off foreign workers who could not 
secure new employment in the Virgin Islands were forced to return to 
the West Indies. 
The female foreign worker was ineligible for public assistance, 
but her United States citizen children were eligible if her income was 
3 insufficient to meet her family's needs. 
1 
1964 Annual Report .of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 9. 
2 1970 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 22; 1971 Annual Report 
of the Department of Social Welfare (St. Thomas: Government Printing 
Office, 1971), p. 24; and 1972 Annual Report of the Department of 
Social Welfare (St. Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 21. 
3The statistical records in the Department of Social Welfare's 
Annual Reports do not indicate the numbers of foreign workers who were 
payees for their United States citizen children. However, permanent 
TABLE 0 
COMPARISON OF NUMBER OF PERSONS SERVED 
JUNE 1960 TO JUNE 1975 
Category June June June June June June June June June June June June June June June June June* 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Old Age Assistance 561 527 532 491 461 450 423 400 372 369 345 348 324 316 307 291 
Aid to Dependent Children 922 865 1043 1032 1156 1039 1263 1441 1623 1685 1953 2543 2900 3603 4523 4111 
Aid to the             19 19 16 15 15 10 10 10 9 7 8 9 8 7 7 7 
Aid to the Disabled 107 98 96 92 91 55 47 50 65 69 61 61 63 61 94 105 
Medical Assistance 
to the Aged 288 451     496 
Total Federal Categories 1609 1797 2138 2110 2219 1554 1743 1901 2069 2130 236; 2961 3295 3987 4941 4514 
General Assistance 107 -.!1i 140. 160 163 ..1Q! -ill. 162 171 112 225 282 -ill. 360 328 320 
Grand Total 1116 1921 2278 2270 2382 1756 1932 2063 2240 2302 2592 3243 3611 4347 5269 4834 
*Comparable figures are not available for June 1976. 
Source: Taken from Comp&riaon of Number of Persons Served for Fiscal Years·1960 to Fiscal Years 1975 from the Department of 
Social Welfare's Annual Reports. 
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Federal Financial Discrimination 
Public assistance expenditures were directly related to the dis-
criminatory treatment of the Virgin Islands in the public assistance 
titles of the Social Security Act. The old dollar to dollar matching 
formula was mandated for the Virgin Islands compared with the states, 
which received four federal dollars for every state dollar. Addition-
ally, a ceiling on the maximum amount that could be received by the 
Islands was also imposed. During the 1960s the federal ceiling was 
$330,000. In 1967, the social security amendments raised the ceilings 






$800,0001 and thereafter 
As Table 9 indicates, total expenditures for the public assis-
tance program rose slowly during the early 1960s. Nevertheless, the 
local share consistently exceeded the federal share. This was clear 
proof of the local government's commitment to this program. However, 
due to the discriminatory provisions and the tight local budgets, rapid 
residents and naturalized citizens were entitled to public assistance 
and by 1970 many of the former foreign workers had had their citizenship 
status adjusted. 
lDepartment of Social Welfare, "Statement of League of Women 
Voters" in Statements Presented at Town Meeting on Welfare Reform, 
March 24, 1977, p. 33. 
     
growth and improvements in benefit levels were stymied. 
Program costs continued to escalate and the 1972 ceiling remained 
in effect despite increased overall costs. The result is that in 1972 
the federal government paid only 22.5 percent of the cost of public 
welfare in the Virgin Islands. States such as Alabama, Arkansas, and 
Louisiana received 77 percent, 78 percent and 71 percent in federal aid. 
Although the Supplementary Security Income (SSI) program replaced the 
separate programs for aged, blind, and disabled persons in January 1974, 
this program was not extended to the territories. 
The result of this discrimination is that since 1974 when the 
maximum federal participation of $800,000 was reached, every addition 
to the caseload, every new staff position, and every additional dollar 
of services purchased were paid for by local funds. 
MOre damaging than the direct costs to the department were the 
costs to clients and the general public of acknowledged deficiencies 
. . III 1n ass1stance eve s. Let us survey this dilemma more carefully. 
Public Assistance Grants 
Title 34, Chapter I, Section 6 of the Virgin Islands Code, in 
discussing the amount of assistance, states that the amount of assis-
tance shall be sufficient to provide the recipient with a reasonable 
subsistance compatible with health and well-being. 2 
lDepartment of Social Welfare, Federal Financial Discrimination 
in the Public Assistance Program of the U.S. Virgin Islands (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 1, 5 and 9. An example 
of this is the fact that the maximum public assistance a family receives 
is $166 while the food stamp program provided $204 for a family of four 
just for food. 





















SHARING OF TOTAL COST OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 
FISCAL YEARS 1961-1976 
Federal Share Local Share Total Cost 
$ 251,154.02 $ 313,818.86 $ 564,972.88 
312,153.91 410,894.47 723,048.38 
300,704.03 416,318.11 716,922.59 
337,619.03 456,461.63 794,080.66 
352,041.37 483,541.87 835,583.24 
350,609.31 541,333.62 891,942.93 
330,000.00 657,716.14 987,716.14 
414,902.57 795,646.59 1,210,549.16 
500,000.00 788,510.24 1,288,510.24 
592,792.21 613,508.01 1,206,300.22 
700,000.00 1,347,487.58 2,047,487.58 
829,356.13 1,839,494.78 2,668,850.91 
837,653.75 2,159,093.27 2,996,747.02 
824,329.00 2,300,949.00 3,125,278.00 
823,879.00 2,559,826.00 3,383,705.00 
1,333,073.00 3,024,315.00 4,357,388.00 
Taken from Schedule B from the Fiscal Years 1961 through 
Fiscal Years 1976 Annual Reports of the Department of Social 
Welfare. 
The amounts over $800,000 in the federal share for the period 1972 to 
1975 represents payment for the Work Incentive Program (WIN). 
The 1976 federal share includes the $500,000 which the Virgin Islands 
received from unexpended balances from Title XX funds, which were not 
used by the fifty states and the District of Columbia. 
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During 1961, public assistance recipients received two increases 
averaging $3.00 to $4.00 per person. These increases brought all food 
grants up from 50 percent to 75 percent of minimum need and the average 
grant per person to $24.20 in June 1961. 1 In June 1963, the average· 
was increased to $30.24. The average AFDC grant for the Virgin Islands 
was $16.42 as compared with $3.61 in Puerto Rico and a national average 
2 of $31.24 in fiscal year 1963. Food allowances for adults were 
increased during the 1965 fiscal year from $21 and $23 per month to 
$28 during October 1964, thus providing 100 percent of food needs for 
the first time. 3 In 1967, new rates for public assistance grants were 
put into effect. The average grant for an AFDC family increased from 
$78.90 to $109.93 per month, resulting in a 21 percent increase in over-
all spending for all categories of public assistance. 4 Despite the 
increase in federal financial participation provided for in the 1967 
social security amendments, the money could be used only for adminis-
5 trative costs. 
1 1961 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 4 and 6. 
2 1963 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1963),pp •. 7 and 8. Puerto Rico 
matches the federal share on a dollar-to-dollat basis; thus, payments 
have remained very low as no extra local dollars are spent on the pro-
gram. 
31965 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare,      
cit., p. 6. 
41967 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 18. 
5 1968 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare,      
cit., p. 10. 
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On July 1, 1970, the public assistance grant for one person was 
raised from $44 to $52 per month due as a result of federal regulations. l 
A couple got a maximum of $92 per month and a family of four received 
a maximum grant of $166 per month. These grant levels were still in 
effect in 1976. What this meant is that after paying $8 a month for 
food stamps, a disabled single person had a total of $44 per month to 
pay for all clothing, rent, transportation, and utilities. An AFDC 
family of four, after paying for food stamps, had about $130 to meet 
all of the same expenses. 
The level of public assistance was patently insufficient. Be-
tween 1970 and 1976, the Islands' Labor Department and a report from a 
consultant indicate that the cost of living increased approximately 
75 percent. 
The average public assistance case was a family of two or three 
members,indicating that the average recipient who bought the entire 
food stamp allotment received an income equal to about 50 percent of 
need. In order to fulfill the manda te to provide a "resonable subsis-
tence," single individuals should receive $242 monthly, a family of two, 
$331 monthly, and a family of four, $451 monthly. The cost of in-
creased public assistance benefits ,for the amounts indicated, would 
have been over $5,000,000 for the 1976 caseload--and at least as much 
to pay even partial benefits to newly eligible applicants. 2 Obviously, 
11971 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare,      
cit., p. 17, and Department of Social Welfare, "League of Women Voters 
Statement," in Statements Presented at Town Meeting on Welfare Reform, 
March 24, 1977, p. 33. 
2Department of Social Welfare, "A Proposal for a Revised Standard 
of Need and a Revised Benefit Payment Schedule for Public Assistance 
Recipients in the U.S. V.I.," 12/75 (mimeographed), pp. 1, 4-6. 
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the Virgin Islands government did not have the money, so families con-
tinued to receive a substandard subsistence. 
Summary 
Analysis of special programs and public assistance during the 
period 1960-1976 was hampered in certain respects by the lack of readily 
available data on the numbers of foreign workers, and their families, 
who were in need of the food distribution and public assistance pro-
grams. There were in fact no statistics on the numbers of foreign 
workers served in either of these programs, making it difficult to 
accurately predict how much of the total caseload increase was caused 
by the expanding population of foreign-born residents. Additionally, 
their American-born children were United States citizens and thus en-
titled to all benefits. Nevertheless, given the socioeconomic con-
ditions under which they were forced to live, one might well surmise 
that there were substantial numbers of foreign workers' families 
served. However, it is also reasonable to expect that many more who 
were eligible did not participate in these programs because of lack of 
information. 
The 1960s marked a turning point in the previously depressed 
Virgin Islands economy. Business expanded and industrial development 
accelerated. The population grew, spurring an immediate need to im-
prove public services. In the quest to gratify these needs, the foreign 
workers were excluded. Economic development had been seen as the 
mechanism that could improve the plight of the Virgin Islands masses--
who were low income, unemployed or underemployed. 
253 
Major problems confronted the foreign laborers because only 
single foreign workers were permitted entry into the United States 
Virgin Islands, employment was often unstable, and the number of foreign 
workers increased rapidly. 
First, entry into and residence in the Virgin Islands were 
dependent on the whims of immigration officers and the employers, thus 
the workers continued residence in the United States Virgin Islands 
was always uncertain. 
Furthermore, the foreign worker was not permitted to bring his 
family with him: spouses had to obtain employment in order for fam-
ilies to stay together. Even when a spouse obtained employment, its 
continuation was uncertain. In most instances, only one spouse 
migrated and then established new personal alliances and families. In 
an environment where family ties were discouraged and permanent resi-
dence was uncertain,                         or feelings of responsibility as a 
contributing member of the society were neither fostered nor easily 
acquired. 
Second, to keep a job, the foreign worker seldom complained about 
salaries, working conditions, or long working hours. The foreign 
workers were thus easily exploited. A docile labor force did foster a 
low-wage economy. As the cost of living escalated in the 1960s, the 
1 foreign workers found it increaSingly difficult to live. 
lIn the Social, Educational Research and Development, Inc., "A 
Profile and Plans for the Temporary Alien Worker Problem in the U.S. 
Virgin Islands," £E... cit., pp. 55 and 72. Figures were given for 
monthly rent and health and medical care paid by the 400-plus foreign 
workers in the study group. No figures were given on child care or 
educational expenses and. there is no other readily available data that 
gives this information. (See Tables 10 and 11). 
TABLE 10 
}10NTHL Y RENT PAID BY STUDY GROUP MEMBERS 
Rent Number Percent 
None II (Squatters)- 53 13.0 o to $25 75 18.4 
$26 to $55 132 32.4 
$56 to $85 63 15.4 
$86 and over 40 9.8 
Othe rs and No Answer, 
Don't Know, etc. 45 11.0 
TOTAL 40p}:.1 100.0 
llFigureS include the 22 (5.2 percent live-in) domes-
tics included in the sample who receive housing from 
employer. 
            total does not add to 422 because 14 owners have 
been excluded. 
TABLE 11 
EXPENDITURES DURING THE PAST YEAR ON ALL HEALTH 
AND MEDICAL CARE FOR ENTIRE FAMILY UNIT 
Expenditure Number Percent 
Nothing or Do Not Know 157 37.2 
Less than $25 131 31.0 
$26 to $75 74 17.6 
$76 to $125 25 5.9 
More than $125 35 8.3 
TOTAL 422 100.0 
Table 11 above, indicates that in terms of expendi-
tures, the largest category of responses consists of 
those who spent nothing or do not know what was spent--
presumably very little. 
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Third, the expanding economy lured thousands of foreign workers 
from throughout the Caribbean in a very short period. The program had 
begun in 1956 and by 1960 foreign workers represented 12 percent of 
the Virgin Islands population. By 1970, 30 percent of the Virgin 
Islands population was foreign-born. l 
The failure to address the foreign workers' needs eventually cre-
ated severe socioeconomic disruptions in the Virgin Islands community. 
The lack of concern about the foreign workers' needs was linked 
directly to the overriding problem of scarce local government income 
and perpetually strained budgets. Thus, the foreign laborers, having 
virtually no voice in the government, were awarded the least possible 
because they were powerless. .Discriminating federal funding crippled 
effective execution of programs to Virgin Islands residents. Both 
the food distribution program and the public assistance programs re-
ceived federal funding, but the larger percentage of the cost of these 
programs was borne by the local government. This severely handicapped 
these programs, for local funds also had to be expended on non-social-
welfare items such as public works and police and fire departments. 2 
In the late 1950s, programs were initiated to solve the housing 
problem, but the need far outdistanced the supply. Federal funds 
helped in the construction of new public housing projects. 3 The 
lUnited States Congress, A SpeCial Study on Nonimmigrant Alien 
Labor Program on the Virgin Islands of the United States, 94th Congress, 
First Session, October 1975, p. 15. 
2See Appendix·C for budgets of fiscal years 1960, 1967, 1971, 
and 1976. Governor's Budget of Estimated Receipts and Expenditures 
for the respective fiscal years. 
3Building costs in the Virgin Islands were very high due to the 
fact that all building materials had to be imported and rentals were 
high due to the tight rental market. 
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1 program, however, was based on the 1950 census. The resulting in-
ability of many people to secure low-income housing was brought to the 
attention of the Social Welfare Department by residents who were being 
displaced. The Department's response was to assess the need, develop 
a program, and obtain funds from the local government for an emergency 
housing program. The foreign workers were almost entirely excluded 
from this program .• Indeed, they frequently moved into slum housing 
. 2 abandoned by indigenous workers. 
The experience in housing was repeated in many other areas during 
the 1960s and the 1970s. The increasing demands overwhelmed the Virgin 
Islands government including the Department of Social Welfare. 
In Chapter VI, we have discussed the various programs encompassed 
by the Social Welfare Department's divisions of Special Programs and 
Public Assistance. In Chapter VII, we shall turn to the services pro-
vided by the Child Welfare division, many of which Kamerman and Kahn 
describe as the sixth human service system, that is, the general or 
personal social services. 3 
lBornn, "Experience in Emergency Housing in the Virgin Islands." 
      cit., p. 34. 
2 Moron, "Housing for the Alien in the United States Virgin 
Islands." .2£.. ci t., p. 21. 





Chapter VII continues our discussion on the delivery of social 
welfare services to the foreign labor                       in the United States 
Virgin Islands from 1960 to 1976. As we saw in Chapter VI, many of 
the services provided by the Child Welfare division were what Kamerman 
and Kahn refer to as the sixth human service system, that is, the 
general or personal social services. l Although the Child Welfare 
division did not provide all the services that are included in the 
personal or general social services, its major casework services were 
directed toward children in their own homes, foster care, institutional 
care for dependent, neglected or delinquent children, adoption services, 
and day-care services. 
In Chapter VII, we shall scrutinize each of the above services 
in order to understand clearly the vast array of problems associated 
with service delivery to both indigenous children and the children of 
foreign workers. 
Stresses Faced by Foreign Workers 
Family stresses were especially severe for the foreign workers 
who left their families behind when they came to the Virgin Islands. 
lKamerman and Kahn, op. cit., pp. 503-504. 
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Although the foreign workers initially entered as temporary workers 
their jobs, in most cases, were actually permanent and they remained 
in the Virgin Islands for many years. Subsequently, many established 
new families in the Virgin Islands. The conditions under which most 
of these families lived generated very acute problems, including child 
care problems, but unfortunately social services agencies were un-
available to assist them. 
As we have noted throughout this study, the foreign workers 
endured uncertainty as a condition of everyday existence: they could 
be fired from their jobs and deported at any time. There were no 
safeguards. If a male foreign worker who had fathered a child was 
deported, the child's mother usually would be entirely responsible 
for the child because it was most unlikely that· the absent father could 
afford to support two families. Since he was back with .his original 
family. the new family in the Virgin Islands usually did not have his 
financial assistance. 
If the foreign worker was a pregnant woman, and was deported, 
she and her child were usually deprived of the father's support. 
This dilemma confronted large numbers of foreign-born women who for 
the most part were shunted aside to fend for themselves . 
. Nevertheless, as Table12· demonstrates, the percentage of 
mothers .who were citizens of a foreign country continually increased 
and their percentage of illegitimate births also increased. Thus, 
even when female foreign workers managed to give birth in the American 
Virgin Islands, they still faced a host of serious problems related 
directly to illegitimacy and the non-support of these children's 
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TABLE 12 
LIVE BIRTHS AND ILLEGITIMATE BIRTHS BY 
                      OF MOTHER, VIRGIN ISLANDS 
1957-1976 
Virgin Islands ForeiS!! Country 
Illegitimate Illegitimate 
Year Live Birth Births Live Births Births 
1957 57.2 63.9 18.7 13.1 
1958 53.7 57.6 24.1            
1959 54.4 56.6 23.6 19.6 
1960 52.5 59.1 25.0 20.8 
1961 50.8 54.1 28.1 24.6 
1962 48.6 53.6 32.8 29.6 
'1963 45.1 45.6 38.3 37.2 
1964 41.4 42.8 4l.5 44.2 
1965 36.3 33.7 49.4 54.6 
1966 35.7 33.4 50.8 55.5 
1967 l1.9 29.8 5l.5 52.5 
1968 29.4 29.5 57.9 62.3 
1969 27.4 26.4 59.9 65.6 
1970 21.8 25.5 '53.3 '67.4 ' 
1971 25.4 30.1 61.l 59.8 
1972 25.9 36.1 62.2 52.4 
19"3 23.1 23.1 62.7 62.7 
1974 24.9 38.5 62.2 50.9 
1975 26.0 44.2 52.1 40.5 
1976 29.5 46.0 57.1 41.0 
Source: Department of Health, Vital Statistics-1966 (St. Thomas: 
Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 85 and 87; and Department 
of Health, Vital Statistics-1976 (St. Thomas: Government Printing 
Office, 1976). pp. 62 and 64. 
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fathers. These problems, of course, impaired the mothers' abilities 
to provide the stable, nurturing and supportive environment that 
their children needed. The United States Virgin Islands government 
was thus faced with a growing population of non-citizens who needed 
help. 
The Child Welfare division documented increases in the following 
problems of children born to foreign workers: abandonment of children, 
gross neglect, behavior problems such as stealing and truancy, deviant 
sexual behavior, and running away from home. There was also an in-
crease in the number of adolescent girls pregnant out of wedlock by 
male foreign workers. l 
Many of the problems experienced by the children of foreign 
workers were related directly to their parents' problems. Three 
common problems were: 
1. The inability to provide proper care and supervision for 
their children during their 101lg working hours. 
2. The necessity of making emergency trips to the West Indies 
(their home islands) because child care arrangements for their foreign-
born children who could not join them in the United States had broken 
down and new arrangements had to be made. Or these children had to 
be brought into the United States Virgin Islands as visitors. 
3. The inadequate arrangements often made for their children's 
care during their required annual departures from United States 
territory or when changing employers and obtaining a new bond. 
Berryman, "Welfare Services to Aliens," Ope cit., p. 39. 
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Consequently, the Department of Social Welfare was severely 
handicapped in its attempts to assist these families, for, as noted 
previously, in addition to the preceding problems mentioned above 
the foreign workers were ineligible for public housing and their 
foreign-born children excluded from the public school system. Sup-
portive services such as day care, foster care, and institutional care 
could only be provided to their foreign-born children if they paid 
the full cost of these services. Even American-born children were 
often excluded from these resources as facilities were limited and 
not available to all those in need of the services. l 
We shall now discuss the staffing of the division. 
Staff Members 
Established in 1947 when the child welfare title of the Social 
Security Act was extended to the Virgin Islands, the Child Welfare 
division was handicapped by the restriction of federal funds to 
staff salaries and training. Thus, limited local funds were directed 
to the most critical areas including board payments in foster care, 
operation of the children's institutions. and day-care services. 
As described previously, the lack of an on-island training facility, 
the low salaries paid professional workers, the lack of qualified 
workers, and the recruitment of United States mainland residents 
resulted in frequent staff turnover, and long-standing vacancies. 
lIbid., p. 42. In 1963, the foster-home board rate was $50. 
See           Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 17. According to a 
Department of Social Welfare, August 1969 Insular Letter, the foster-
home board rate was then $85 a month. Parents paid the same fee for 
institutional care. Day-care fees were $25 a month in 1967 and were 
increased to $50 by 1969. 
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Untrained workers. provided services to families and children in need 
of professional services. 
The division's problems were compounded during the period from 
1960 to 1976 by amendments to the Social Security Act and resulting 
changes in federal regulations that mandatorily expanded the responsi-
bilities of the Child Welfare division. For example, the 1967 amendments 
to the Social Security Act                   the transfer of all Aid to                  
with Dependent Children (AFDC) cases from the Public Assistance diviaion 
to the Child Welfare division. The Child Welfare division was renamed 
the division of Child and Family Services to reflect its new responsi-
bility of servicing the entire AFDC case load and implementing the Work 
Incentive Program. l In 1974, the Department of Social Welfare imple-
mented the 1972 Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) 
regulations mandating the separation of social services from cash 
assistance. The adult assistance recipients were transferred from the 
Public Assistance division.         responsibility for providing social 
services to all adults in need was also added. The division's name 
was again changed--to the Division of Social Services--to reflect the 
comprehensive program of services provided to families and individuals 
of all ages. 2 The increased responsibilities aggravated the staffing 
problems that had faced the division since its inception. The staff-
ing problems, as we shall see, had a major impact on the quality of 
service delivery. 
11969 _ Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office. 1969), pp. 11 and 12. 
219..74 . Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 33. 
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Supervisory Staffl 
Prior to the series of reorganizations, the division consisted 
of a central office headed by a director and a district office in St, 
Thomas, which also directed services in St. John, and district offices 
in both Christiansted and Fredericksted, St. Croix. Each district 
office had one or more units headed by a supervisor. 
The first reorganization, on July 1, 1970, changed the position 
of assistant director from its 'original central-office status to a 
district position. The assistant director for St. Thomas and St. 
John was responsible for supervising the district office. which con-
sis ted of two units--a centralized intake and licensing unit and a 
continuing services unit--and the Youth Care Center. The St. Croix 
assistant director was responsible for supervising the St. Croix 
district offices which consisted of a central intake unit that 
served Fredericksted and Christians ted and the continuing services 
units in Fredericksted and Christians ted. 
The second reorganization, on July 1, 1972,changed the functions 
of the assistant commissioner of the Department of Social Welfare on 
St. Thomas. This officeholder was delegated responsibility for the 
operation of the division of Child and Family Services including the 
supervision of its program director. The latter responsibility was 
lThis section on staffing was summarized from the available 
Department of Social Welfare Monthly Reports from the assistant 
commissioner for Social Services, the Social Services administrator, 
and/or the director of Social Services for the period July 1970 to 
June 1976. 
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emphasized because of the expanding scope of the division. The 
division director had responsibility for the district offices on both 
islands and the Youth Care Center. The assistant commissioner had 
direct supervisory responsibility for the insular training schools, 
the day-care program, the work incentive program, and specially funded 
projects. 
The third reorganization, in May 1974, created the expansion of 
the division that had occurred since July 1, 1970. There were now 
three assistant directors. The assistant director for the work 
incentive program supervised both the St. Thomas and St. Croix units. 
The assistant director for St. Thomas and St. John was responsible 
for the supervision of three separate units: foster care, intake and 
probation, and protective services. The assistant director for St. 
Croix was the counterpart of the assistant director for St. Thomas 
and St. John. Each unit was staffed by a supervisor, four to seven 
social workers, social services aides, and a secretarial staff. 
Each of the three reorganizations created new administrative 
positions and provided enhanced opportunities for administrative 
and supervisory-level staff members. However, the reorganizations 
also increased the staffing problems at the supervisory level because 
of the educational requirements. Administrative and supervisory-level 
positions required a master's degree in social work and a minimum of 
three years' social work experience at the supervisory level. 
However, the expansion meant that the Department's scholarship 
program, which sent two to three employees to graduate school each 
year, could not turn out enough qualified people to meet the division's 
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ever-expanding needs. Also, by the 1970s funds for the recruitment 
of staff members from the United States mainland were limited, and the 
rising cost of living and the comparatively low salaries made these 
positions unattractive. l Thus, the Department had many supervisory 
level vacancies. Experienced workers assumed the responsibility for 
the supervision of some units. 
For example, after the promotion of the one supervisor in the 
St. Thomas district to assistant director in May 1972, the Department 
as of June 30, 1976 had been unable to recruit or employ a supervisor 
for any of its three supervisory vacancies in the St. Thomas district. 
In St. Croix, the supervisory vacancies were not as prolonged as in 
St. Thomas. It is difficult to pinpoint why. We may surmise, however, 
that because the capital of the Virgin Islands is in St. Thomas and 
the Department's central offices are located there, more new positions 
were established at the administrative level. The promotional 
opportunities were therefore greater in St. Thomas than in St. Croix. 2 
These long-standing vacancies on the supervisory level also 
created role confusion, as the newly promoted director or assistant 
directors continued to fill the role of unit supervisors in addition 
to their new responsibilities. Obviously, these individuals were 
lIn 1974 NASW Salary standards were $10,000 for a BSW worker, 
$12,500 for an MSW worker, and $14,500 for an ACSW worker. Supervisory 
staff in the Virgin Islands were then receiving $7,203, assistant 
directors $10,634, bachelor-degree workers $7,420, and workers with 
a master's degree in. social work $9,019. 
2At times division heads were required to live in St. Thomas as 
the St. Croix location made them inaccessible and not readily available 
in times of emergencies or when policy decisions had to be made or 
responded to immediately. Most staff positions were also located on 
St. Thomas, so that these staff members can respond immediately to the 
various requests made to the commissioner's office by the federal or 
local government. 
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spread too thin and could not fulfill their new jobs effectively. 
Caseworkers 
With the absence of supervisory personnel J the Department 
resorted to using experienced caseworkers as workers-in-charge. The 
St. Thomas district office used workers-in-charge for approximately 
four years, saving the agency money, giving experienced workers 
responsibility, and providing coverage for the units. However, these 
workers felt exploited by the Department, since they received no 
additional salary for the added responsibility. Consequently, they 
often performed their supervisory assignments indifferently. The lack 
of an on-island continuing education program also undermined the 
Department's structure because the workers-in-charge and the workers 
under their supervision were without an opportunity to upgrade their 
professional skills. 
The problems at the supervisor level were reflected at the 
caseworker level. Under the Virgin Islands personnel rules, college 
graduates qualified as a "Social Worker II" and a worker with a master's 
degree in social work qualified as a "Social Worker II!." The establish-
ment of a social work major in the Social Sciences Division at the 
College of the Virgin Islands in 1969 produced additional social workers. 
During the 1970-1975 period, the program produced nineteen students 
and eleven were employed as social workers in various on-island 
                     
" l"Assessment of Social Welfare Programs, 1969-1975 (St. Thomas: 
College of the Virgin Islands, 1976, draft report). 
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The Virgin Islands Departmentsof Health and Education both 
recruited college graduates, further inhibiting the recruitment drives 
of the Department of Social Welfare. The most flagrant curb on the 
Department of Social Welfare's recruiting in this regard was un-
doubtedly the fact that the Department of Education offered shorter 
working days and longer vacations. The unionization of the teachers 
also created salary differences as they were able to secure substantial 
increases. Hence, low salaries, large caseloads, and poor working 
conditions led social workers to unionize also. Following unionization 
in 1974, the social workers were still not particularly effective in 
winning concessions, since the group was small and without much 
political clout. 
Caseworkers did negotiate some immediate relief in November 1974 
when the union contract between their union and the Department was 
signed. The contract limited each worker's caseload size to seventy; 
intake workers were limited to thirty-five cases. This change 
resulted in an administrative decision to close all cases with no 
contacts during the preceding six months. A more accurate count of 
active cases was also obtained. 
Another factor inhibiting recruitment was the long and tedious 
process of appointment to a permanent government position. Applicants 
were certified after presentation of appropriate documents (transcripts 
or diplomas) and successfully taking a social work examination. The 
examination was given only at certain intervals. If the applicant 
passed the exam, his name was added to the eligible list. The Depart-
ment could hire from the list only after approval of a quarterly              
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by the budget office. Vacancies occurring within the quarter could 
not be filled until the beginning of another quarter. 
Due to the precarious financial situation of the Virgin Islands 
government in the 1970s, department staff vacancies were often frozen 
at the end or at the beginning of each fiscal year. Consequently, 
staff members could not be hired and vacancies often were long-standing. 
When staff members were hired, these hard-fought-for additions 
inevitably would be offset by staff resignations. Illness, maternity 
leaves, and the liberal vacation policies of the Virgin Islands 
government l depleted the district office staffs still further,              
ing severe on-going coverage problems. Casework staff vacancies often 
ran as high as eight or twelve in a staff of twenty-eight to thirty-
two, with some units having only one or two caseworkers. 
Actual working conditions were generally poor. The offices, 
for                   were cramped and provided little or no privacy for 
workers or clients. Understandably, clients were often reluctant to 
share intimate and important information in such an open environment. 
Yet another problem was the inadequate number of government 
cars. These cars, used for home visits to                           rarely 
available. Most were in poor driving condition. This further 
restriction added to the staff's frustrations. 
In 1971, the staff category of Social Service Aides was established. 
With qualifications ranging between high school and some college, 
these new staff mpmbers were initially assigned to the family planning 
1Virgin Islands government employees hired before 1969 receive 
five weeks of annual leave and those employed after that date receive 
three weeks of annual leave after three years. 
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clinics at the Department of Health and worked in the AFDC program. 
Later, Social Service Aides were added to the Department of Social 
Welfare's district offices, particularly in the work incentive unit. 
During periods of pronounced staff shortages, the Social Service Aides 
provided casework services to clients. even though they had neither 
the training and. experience nor supervision for this work. The 
division of Social Services also relied heavily on the summer employ-
ment of high school and college students--not only as a means of 
interesting students in the profession, but as additional clerical 
and service staff. 
The pervasive staff shortages were not eased by inadequate 
stopgap measures such as the above. Indeed, these shortages 
                the structure of not merely the entire division of Social 
Services but of the Department of Social Welfare as well. Four 
specific problem areas existed: (1) the division's administration; 
(2) agency policies; (3) groups such as foster parents and religious 
institutions that provided services to the department; and (4) other 
community agencies that often expressed severe criticism of the 
Department's social welfare and service delivery. 
The absence of supervisors and their frequent turnover created 
acute case-management problems in terms of knowledge of and adherence 
to agency policies, affecting the agency's credibility and respect. in 
the community. More specifically, the development of caseworker 
discipline and the caseworker's public image were areas of great weak-
ness. The program's administrative staff was also handicapped in its 
professional development as the staff members were never able to fully 
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assume their middle-management responsibilities or polish these skills, 
since usually they carried responsibility for the direct supervision 
of line workers. Consequently, they were unable to support the division 
in planning or organizing needed policy changes. 
Program policies were often not implemented through lack of 
knowledge or inadequate support from other community agencies·, For 
example, caseworkers frequently accepted referrals from individual 
public-school teachers even though this action violated the procedures 
of a cooperative agreement between the Departments of Education and 
Social Welfare. A second commonly found example was that child-support 
payments were required of all parents with children in institutions 
or foster. homes who were able to contribute to their care. Yet in 
most cases, there were no court orders. Even when court orders were 
issued few parents bothered to make payments, because                        
could not, or did not, get around to seeing that they did. 
In another instance. the Department's attempts to solve a 
critical problem at the Queen Louise Home, a children's institution 
operated by the Lutheran Society, and with a group of foster parents 
revealed that additional casework services were needed and requested 
but were not adequately provides. 
In view of the Department's poor record of service delivery, 
therefore, we can appreciate the consequent lack of community sympathy 
and support toward the Department's activities. This was reflected 
not only by individuals but by other government agencies. For example, 
when the Department needed housing for a non-citizen family, the 
request often was ignored since the Virgin Islands Housing Authority 
270 
gave a low priority to non-citizen families. Another problem concerned 
the enrollment of youngsters from the Insular Training School or the 
St. John Group Home into regular public school because of the stigma 
attached to institutionalized children. However, the severest 
criticism of the Department came from the judges of the Municipal Court. 
The judges felt that caseworkers were incompetent because: (1) Court 
reports were not submitted on a timely basis; (2) recommendations were 
often not implemented; and (3) the caseworkers provided the judges 
with unclear guidelines about available options. 
In summary,             the Department projected a weak image to those, 
including foreign workers, whom .it purported to serve, to the community 
at large including other government agencies,           perhaps of greatest 
ultimate importance, to its own staff members and                     In the 
following section, we will discuss in detail the activities of the 
division of Social Services. 
Services 
In addition to staffing, three major handicaps affected the 
performance of the Social Services division; First, all of the pro-
grams in the division saw a dramatic increase in the numbers of 
people served. Second, there were changes in the kinds of people 
and the types of problems that clients brought to the agency. This 
was most vividly demonstrated in the severity and the changing nature 
of the emotional and behavioral problems presented by the youngsters 
entering the Insular Training School in the 1970s. 
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Third, the division {-::-as forced to operate with limited local 
funds. As discussed previously, the scarce local funds were diverted 
to public works and public service projects, thus limiting the amounts 
available for social welfare services. The limited federal funds 
available to the Virgin Islands and the continuing federal financial 
discrimination further aggravated this problem. For example, Title 
XI, section 1108 of the Social Security Act "as amended, set an 
$800,000 limit as of 1972 on the maximum federal participation in 
public assistance and social service programs in the Virgin Islands. 
This limitation meant that further expansion of these programs came 
from local funds; too, other sources of federal funds were unavailable 
due to this ceiling. Specifically, research, demonstration, and 
utilization projects that might otherwise have been funded by 
special grants under Section           were precluded because of a ruling 
by HEW's general counsel that such funds fell within the section 
1,108 limitation on payments. 
The Virgin Islands and the other territories were also excluded 
from participation in the Supplementary Security Income program (SSI), 
which replaced the separate programs for the aged, blind, and disabled. 
Under the new Title XX to the Social Security Act. "Grants to States 
for Services," the Virgin Islands, beginning October 1, 1975, received 
$500,OOO--if the States did not spend all allotted funds. The proba-
bility of funds not being needed by the States, under the economic 
and employment conditions of the late 1970s, was exceedingly slim.l 
lDepartment of Social Welfare, Federal Financial Discrimination 
in the Public Assistance Program of the U.S. Virgin Islands (St. Thomas: 
Government Printing Office, October 31, 1975), pp. 5,7,9, and 11. 
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Despite these problems, many of the division's services could 
have addressed some of the stresses faced by the foreign workers and 
their families. Accordingly, let us now discuss casework services to 
children, families and adults; foster care; institutional care to 
dependent, neglected and delinquent children; adoption services; 
and day-care services. 
Casework 
Through casework services, families were encouraged to take 
better care of             children when poor parent-child relationships, 
neglect, or abuse existed. These services were also geared to 
facilitate the resolution of problems that were·impeding the indi-
vidual's or family's ability to function a4equate1y. 
As seen in Table         during the ten-year period from 1960 to 
1970, the number of children who received casework services more 
than quintupled. As a result of the 1967 Social Security Act              
ments, an immediate upsurge occurred in the number of children served 
from the 1967-1968 figure of 2,181 to the 1968-1969 figure of 3,349 
to the 1969-1970 figure of 4,534. These increases were due primarily 
to the population growth, the increased public awareness of the pro-
gram, and the stresses experienced by families in a transistiona1 
society. 
Although Table 14 indicates some fluctuations in the numbers 
served from 1971 to 1976, the total numbers were much larger than 
TABLE 13 
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during the preceding decade. l Some of this increase was attributable 
to the larger school population in the 1970s and the reunification of 
foreign workers' families. 2 
Another important service offered by the division was the work 
incentive program. Since 1969, the division had been responsible 
for contacting all AFDC families, completing a case study of each, 
providing available services, and evaluating every recipient over age 
sixteen to determine program eligibility. The work incentive program 
assisted families in becoming self-sufficient through training incentives, 
lIt is difficult to determine the numbers of clients served by 
the division of Child and Family Services due to the inconsistencies 
in the statistical reporting on services which are available in the 
Annual Reports during the 1971 to 1976 fiscal years. During 1971-1973, 
three different statistical reporting methods were used. In 1971, 
the children receiving services at the end of the year and the total 
number of children receiving services during the year were reported. 
For 1972 and 1973 only the total number of children receiving 
services at the end of the fiscal year were reported. During 1974-
1976, services provided to adults were also included and again three 
different reporting systems were used. One reported the number of 
adult cases accepted during the year, the second reported the total 
number of cases receiving services at the end of the fiscal year, and 
the third reported the total number of children and adults provided 
casework services. The major differences and inconcistences between 
these reports raised questions about the reliability of the figures. 
Nevertheless, it can be assumed that there were sizeable increases in 
the number of people needing services. (See Table 14 for number of 
clients provided services by the Division of Child and Family Services 
during 1971-1976.) 
2The assumption that a number of foreign-worker families received 
services is based on the author's experience as an employee in the 
Department of Social Welfare in the 1960s and her discussions with 
social workers in the Social Services division in the               They 
generally seem to feel that a majority of the cases served were foreign-
worker families, but ·they had no figures to document this assertion. 
The Department was required to compile statistics to meet federal 
reporting requirements. Consequently, data not required by the federal 
government were generally not secured. As a result, statistics on the 




















NUMBER OF CLIENTS PROVIDED SERVICES 
DURING THE 1971-76 FISCAL YEARS 
Children Total Number 
Receiving of Children Total Cases 
Services Receiving Receiving 
at the Services Services At 
end of fis- During End of fis-





Information secured from the Annual Reports of the Department 
Total Number Adult Cases 
of Children Accepted 
and Adults during 





of Social Welfare for the fiscal 
years 1971 to 1976. Figures were also reviewed by the Director of the Department of Social 
Welfare's Research, Evaluation and Statistics Unit and corrections made where needed. N ...., 
VI 
276 
work opportunities, job placements, and services to help prepare them 
for productive and independent roles in the community. Of the 465 
cases that were evaluated during 1969-1970, one-third were ineligible 
because they were not included in the grant. l Other recipients could 
not participate due to insufficient child-care facilities, medical 
problems, lack of a homemaker service, and inaccessible locations. 2 
The large percentage of payees were due to: (1) the rate of 
illegitimacy in the AFDC caseload; (2) the number of mothers living 
with companions other than the fathers of their children; (3) the number 
of foreign-worker parents with United States-born children; (4) the 
insufficient income of working mothers to meet the total needs of 
their families; and (5) the lack of or minimal child support pro-
vided by the absent parent of these children. 
These findings clearly indicated the need for supportive 
services if families were going to be helped. It should be pointed 
out that this problem was not unique to the Virgin Islands, for only 
a small percentage of the public assistance recipients on the mainland 
were helped by this program. They had the same problems as Virgin 
Islands recipients. 
The economic decline experienced in the United States Virgin 
Islands in the early 1970s led to an increase in unemployment and a 
decrease in the supply of available jobs. It was, therefore, difficult 
11969 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 26-28. 
2Ibid., p. 28, and 1971 Annual Report of the Department of 
the Departient of Social Welfare (St. Thomas: Government Printing 
Office, 1971), p. 27. 
to secure jobs for AFDC recip1cnts with limited job skills and/or 
work experience. 1 The available program statistics show a total 
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of 149 participants in 1974 and an increase to 306 participants in 
1975. 2 No clear reasons for this increase were forthcoming officially, 
but the total still represented less than a quarter of the AFDC case-
load. 
West Indian migrants who were temporary workers were excluded 
from participation in the work incentive program as non-United States 
citizens could not be included in the AFDC grant. West Indian migrants 
who had secured permanent residence or naturalization and met the 
eligibility requirements of the AFDC program were, of course, eligible, 
but statistics on the number of permanent residents or naturalized 
citizens in the program were nonexisent. 3 
As the foregoing discussion indicated, the effectiveness of this 
program was handicapped by staffing problems, the overwhelming increase 
in the numbers of people needing services, and the limited local funds 
that prevented either the much-needed program expansion or an increase 
in staff members employed at competitive salaries. 
Many of the referrals of children, families, and adults 
recommended specialized services. In those cases, a variety of other 
11 976 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 37. 
21974 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 36; and 1975 Annual 
Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. Thomas: Government 
Printing Office, 1975), p. 33. 
3The author met two permanent residents, formerly from the British 
West Indies, who participated in the work incentive program. 
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resources, some of which were unavailable, were required. For example, 
young children who were abused, abandoned, or neglected by their 
parents or guardians often had to be placed in foster homes. Changes 
in parental situations, such as death or illness of the parent, relative, 
or child's caretaker, also resulted in foster care if the families had 
no other resources. 
Let us examine the foster-care program more closely. 
Foster Care 
A consistent problem since the establishment of the foster-care 
program was the inability to recruit sufficient numbers of foster 
homes. This difficulty was attributed to the housing shortage existing 
in the Virgin Islands in the 1950s and 1960s. l The division's attempts 
to secure the needed foster homes included; (1) the lowering of 
standards including waiving requirements that mothers not be employed 
and children be provided individual rooms; (2) periodic increases in 
the foster-home board rate to foster parents to more adequately cover 
the cost of care; and (3) periodic extensive media-outreach programs 
such as foster-care week and radio and television programs. These 
efforts helped to gradually increase the number of foster homes. 
The Foster Parents Club also assisted the Department in recruit-
ing additional foster homes by publicizing the foster-parents program. 
11961 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 10. 
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However, the relatively low board rate, the responsibility of pro-
viding total care for problem children with special needs, the already 
large families, and the large number of working women were major 
impediments to the program's expansion. 
The Foster Parents Club also served as an effective lobbying 
group. For example, in 1974 when the St. Croix Foster Parents Club 
was reactivated, they organized to demand an increase in the foster-
care board rate. Although the Department's administrators recognized 
that the board rate was insufficient to properly meet a child's needs, 
they were unable to meet the foster parents' demands for an increase 
because of budget limitations. As a compromise, the Department offered 
to provide a supplemental food grant of $30 at the time of the initial 
placement of a child in a foster home. l Since this was a one-time 
payment, the cost could be more easily absorbed from existing funds. 
By 1967-1968, the waiting list for foster-home placements had 
grown to about one hundred, and some children were awaiting placement 
in detention or shelter-care facilities. 2 Foster parents for adolescents 
and unmarried teenagers were extremely hard to find. 
Because of the pressures on· the foster-care program in servicing 
the indigenous population, only emergency services were provided to the 
children of foreign workers. The goal in cases where the parents had 
11974 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 34; and 1975 Annual 
Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. Thomas: Government 
Printing Office, 1975), p. 32. 
21968 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas; Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 20. 
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left the Islands was to reunite the child with his parents through 
the assistance of the respective foreign government--even if the child 
was a United States citizen. If the parent did request a foster-home 
placement for his foreign-born child, full payment of the board rate was 
required of the applicant, so this option was generally not usedl because 
few potential applicants could afford it. 
An additional resource available to the foster-care program was 
the three cottages operated by the Board of Social Ministry of the 
Lutheran Church. Although this was an institutional facility it was 
served by the foster-care program and provided care to fifty-eight 
children ranging from infants to twelve years of age. 2 This greatly 
increased the facilities available for young children. 
As seen in Table 1·), the number of children in foster care 
fluctuated through the 1960s, perhaps reflecting the availability and 
capacity of the existing foster homes. 
Another important resource was group homes, established by the 
Department to provide substitute care for children who could not 
remain in their own homes. In 1972 funds were received from the Law 
Enforcement Planning Commission, a local government agency, for the 
3 establishment of a Group Home on St. John. The Department contracted 
lBerryman, "Welfare Services to Aliens, OPe cit., p. 42. See 
1964 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. Thomas: 
Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 17. Foster-care board rates 
in 1963 were $50 per month. This was increased to $85 a month by 1969. 
Information secured from Departmental forms and insular letters. This 
information was not readily available. 
21967 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 35. 
31972 Department of Social Welare Annual Reports (St. Thomas: 
Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 23. 
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with the Cruz Bay Baptist Church in September 1971 to operate a home 
for eight youngster, ranging in ages from ten to fourteen years. 
Eventually, a new home '07as buil t and named "The Ranch" by the youngsters. 
Two couples lived on the premises with the boys and several volunteers 
contributed part-time tutoring and supervision. After a year's 
experience in which fourteen boys were served it was concluded that 
youngsters between the ages of ten and. thirteen received the most 
benefits from the program. 
Several problems arose. For example, a small faction in the 
St. John community opposed the project because of the fear that the 
boys in the home were delinquentswho would disturb the community. 
These attempts to stop the project were                             In another case. 
some youngsters ran away from the home               their initial adjustment 
period. Another group of youngsters were transferred to another 
school because of their involvement in a minor fracas. The attending 
social worker was successful in resolving many problems and by the 
end of the first year the home was functioning well. After three 
years the cost of the program was absorbed by the Department. l 
In 1976, additional Law Enforcement Planning Commission funds 
were allocated to establish other group homes in St. Thomas and St. 
John.2 Despite the availability of these funds and a recruitment 
lThis minor fracas is not described in the report or mentioned 
in the available monthly reports of that period. Information secured 
from an undated Department of Social Welfare report entitled "The 
Group Home for Boys-':"Progress Report" prepared by the project director, 
who was also the assistant commissioner. The content seems to indicate 
that the report was prepared after the first year that the project was 
in operation. 
21976               Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 37. 
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drive to develop more group homes, no homes were in fact established. 
The reasons for the lack of other group homes are not difficult 
to understand. The establishment of a group home required adequate 
housing accommodations, competent staff, and a capital investment. 
A few inquiries were received by the Department, but the low board 
rate of $120 mont1y per child was inadequate to cover reasonable 
operating costs. 
Plans to develop other church-sponsored group homes moved very 
slowly. However, the Department's group-home program administrator 
believed that expansion would not occur until the Department imp1e-
mented a program of agency-operated or religiously affiliated and 
operated group homes. 1 
The closing of the St. Thomas Youth Care Center in April 1976 
escalated the demand for adolescent facilities. To meet this need, 
foster-family group homes were established providing accommodations 
for a minimum of four adolescents. These homes actually were foster 
homes but were called foster-familY group homes in order to qualify 
for the higher board rate and establish an incentive for families 
to take adolescent youngsters into their homes. Two foster-family 
group homes were established on St. Croix and one, for five gir1s,on 
St. Thomas. 
The operation of these facilities provoked serious problems, 
for the foster parents were unable to cope with the acting-out 
lDepartment of Social Welfare, September 1976 Monthly Report, 
dated October 19, 1976, from A1ecia G. Benjamin, director of Social 
Services,to Commissioner Gwendolyn C. Blake. 
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behavior of the adolescents in their care. Additionally. some of the 
youngsters in placement had problems that warranted intensive indi-
vidual care. 
Despite the problems encountered in operating these                
family group homes, they did provide a much-needed alternative for 
the approximately twenty youngsters who were cared for. 
In summary, we have seen that the foster-care program was 
prevented from effectively carrying out its mandate for several 
reasons. First, limited local funding meant that the foster-care 
board rate was extremely low in comparison with the cost of living, 
thus it did not provide sufficient financial incentives to attract 
additional homes. Second, the increased waiting list of children who 
needed substitute care could not be accommodated. Third, the staffing 
shortages severely restricted the provision of high-quality services 
to the natural parents, the foster children, and the foster parents. 
Additionally, there were many youngsters who were not ready 
for care because of emotional and behavior problems. In these cases, 
institutional care was needed. We shall discuss this aspect of child 
welfare in the following section. 
Institutional Care 
The Division's institutional-care program consisted of detention 
facilities and the Insular Training School for Boys and Girls. The 
detention facilities were designed to termpoarily care for children 
who were in conflict with the juvenile justice system, whose parents 
or foster parents were unable to control them, or who, because of 
emotional and behavior problems, could not adjust to or be maintained 
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in their own homes. The Insular Training School provided a structural 
institutional experience for children who could not be helped by 
supportive casework in their own homes or who could not adjust in 
foster homes. 
Detention Facilities 
In the early 1960s, the detention facilities operated by the 
Department were located in the Islands' forts. Community dissatis-
faction with this arrangement led to plans to develop a modern 
detention facility in St. Thomas,l which was called the Youth Care 
Center and opened in 1965.· In 1974, a detention facility was opened 
in St. Croix because of the rise in juvenile crime. 2 
Detention facilities supplied short-term care to children 
pending completion of a family diagnosis report and the development 
of a treatment plan. The treatment plan included returning the child 
to the same home situation, placement with relatives, and foster home 
or institutional placement, with the use of casework or group-work 
modalities. 
The detention facility maintained custody of those children who: 
(1) ran away while awaiting Court action; (2) committed an offense 
dangerous to themselves or to the community; (3) were exposed to 
parental abuse; (4) were runaways; (5) were apprehended late at night 
by the police; and (6) needed secure custody.3 
11961 Annual Report of the Department of S·ocial Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 11. 
21966 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare, OPe cit., 
p. 15; and 1974 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare, 
op. ci t ., p. 39. 
3Department of Social Welfare, Insular Letter Number 30. Subject: 
"Definition of Services and Staff Function", May 15,1974 (mimeographed), 
pp. 16-17. 
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The detention facility in St. Thomas accommodated twenty boys 
and ten girls under eighteen years old. St. Croix youngsters who 
needed detention care 'l7ere sent to St. Thomas prior to the opening 
of the St. Croix facility. 
Placement in the Youth Care Center was available to children 
who were United States citizens or permanent residents. In emergency 
situations, alien children were placed if their parents were not on-
island. The assistance of the British Consul was then secured so 
that plans could be made for the child's return to his parents. 1 By 
1972, a significant increase had occurred in the number of non-citizen 
children needing placement. The Department sought the aid of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, but was advised that depor-
tation was possible only if the parents were foreign workers; in most 
cases the parents were already permanent residents. The Department 
was thus forced to provide detention care. 2 
By the early 1970s, the detention facility, intended as temporary, 
had become an overcrowded permanent residence for many youngsters who 
could not be accommodated at the Insular Training School. These 
children had mental or emotional problems that could not be treated 
at anyon-island facility. 
By 1971, more aggressive and acting-out youngsters were being 
admitted to the Youth Care Center. A subsequent decline in available 
1Berryman, "Welfare Services to Aliens," Ope cit., p. 42. 
2Department of Social Welfare, November 1972 Monthly Report, 
dated December 5, 1972 from Millicent Ann Dandridge, assistant 
commissioner, to Macon M. Berryman, commissioner. 
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full- and part-time staff members compounded the problem. During 
May 1971, some fifty-one youngsters were at the Youth Care Center 
compared with approximately twenty-eight children in February 1970. 1 
The discipline problems at the Youth Care Center led to the 
decision to transfer some of the more aggressive youths to the 
Insular Training School. However, this plan was delayed because of 
their lack of cooperation in completing physical exams and psycho-
logical evaluations. The counselors' ability to control these 
youngsters was further eroded when they destroyed the Center's 
lock-up facility. Additionally, their defiant attitudes included 
personal threats and attacks against the counselors. Knives, 
daggers, machettes, and steel pipes were smuggled into the center and 
used to intimidate the counselors whose primary concern became their 
own personal safety. Thus, in a relatively short span these aggressive 
youths literally took over the center. 
Finally in February 1972, an arrangement was made with the 
Department of Public Safety to house the most aggressive youths in 
the cells at Fort Christian. A maximum of six youngsters, guarded by 
police recruits, were to be put in a lock-up facility. Within four 
months, the                       of Public Safety requested that the Department 
of Social Welfare run the facility. In September 1972, these                      
were returned to the open program at the Youth Care Center. 
lMany of the youngsters served were those picked up by the police 
for curfew violations. Rather than return the youngsters to their 
homes, they were brought to the Youth Care Center for over-night stays. 
Department of Social Welfare February 1970 Monthly Report, dated March 
12, 1970, from Vivian Joseph, acting supervisor, Youth Care Center, to 
Millicent Ann Dandridge, acting director, Child and Family Services. 
According to the monthly reports, the removal of the more 
aggressive youngsters led to a major improvement in the discipline 
and control at the Youth Care Center, but these problems again 
increased with their return. 
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By March 1973, the Youth Care Center was again filled to 
capacity; there were innumerable delays in processing youngsters out 
of the facility. The only available statistics don't really reflect 
the capacity numbers at given times, which from 1971 to 1976 ranged 
from a high of thirty-three to a low of eighteen. The curtailment 
of placements at the Insular Training School in April 1975 resulted 
in overcrowding at the Youth Care Center, for there was no other 
available resource for youngsters in need of rehabilitation and 
treatment. The changes made in the Insular Training School program 
resulted in the placement there of several youngsters between the 
ages of fifteen and seventeen whose families refused to accept them. 
There were no educational, employment, or training opportunities for 
these youngsters in the community and they posed major discipline and 
control problems for the staff. 
In addition to the older aggressive and hostile youngsters, 
a number of children had severe mental illnesses and required far more 
than outpatient treatment. This mixture of youngsters with different 
problems for long periods in a facility designed for temporary care 
contributed to the continuing deterioration of the program, raising 
serious questions about the institution's viability as a healthy and 
safe place for the Islands' troubled youngsters. 
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The permanent closing of the Insular Training School in 
October 1975 resulted in the transfer to the Youth Care Center of 
those youngsters for whom alternative placements could not be found. 
They were severely disturbed and their destructive tendencies in-
creased the disciplinary problems at the center. 
The erosion of discipline and control, the overwhelming nature 
of the problems presented by the youngsters, created severe job 
frustrations for the center's employees, resulting in high staff 
turnover, resignations and disciplinary measures for some staff members. 
It should be noted thata.high school diploma was virtually the sole 
requirement for many staff positions. Furthermore, there was a 
schism between the older, discipline-oriented staff members and the 
younger, more pragmatic staff members, many of whom were raw and in-
experienced. Compounding this dilemma was the fact that the Depart-
ment assigned only one full-time social work supervisor to the Youth 
Care Center. This individual, of course, had little, if any, 
opportunity to fully employ his managerial skills. 
Finally, a total breakdown of the program occurred as a result 
of the magnitude of the foregoing problems·. l In March 1976, the 
governor of the Virgin Islands decided to close the facility. 
The closing of the Youth Care Center led to the incarceration 
of the more incorrigible male youngsters at least sixteen years and 
under age eighteen in the cells previously used to house female 
lThe above was summarized from a review of the Department of 
Social Welfare's monthly reports from the assistant commissioner to 
the commissioner and the director of Social Sevices to the assistant 
commissioner on the Social Services programs from the period July 
19:70 to June 1976. 
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prisoners; the less incorrigible were sent home. This was 
accomplished through the presiding judge of the Municipal Court. l 
It was the judge's position that a temporary arrangement would force 
the Virgin Islands government to propose a realistic youth program. 
A skeleton staff of male counselors was retained to run the 
facility, but the reduced program was limited to the provision of 
custodial care for youngsters who were having serious difficulties 
with the law or for the temporary placement of homeless youngsters 
until alternative plans could be made for them. 2 
Although the St. Croix detention facility did not open until 
1974, plans and preliminary drawings for its                             had been 
included in the Department of Social Welfare's Insular Training 
School "1963 Master Plan Project" prepared by a local architectural 
firm. 3 Despite ongoing efforts to implement this plan, the con-
struction of a detention facility in St. Croix was still in limbo 
as the 1970s began. 4 
Despite community concern and the government's commitment to 
deal with the crime problem, action was handicapped by several factors: 
the Islands' economic downturn, the decline in government revenues in 
11976 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 36. 
2Ibid. 
3Letter dated July 19, 1963 to Macon M. Berryman, commissioner 
of Social Welfare from John R. Garfield, A.I.A., Resident Architect 
of Bellante and Clauss, Architects and Engineers. 
4Letter dated February 2, 1966 from Gwendolyn C. Blake, Child 
Welfare director to the Honorable Cyril Michael, presiding judge of 
the Municipal Court and letter dated February 9, 1968 from Gwendolyn 
C. Blake, Child Welfare director to the Honorable Cyril Michael, 
presiding judge of the Municipal Court. 
relation to the population's needs for various services J and the 
channeling of available funds to expand the public school system to 
meet the large increase in enrollment created by the June 26, 1970 
Virgin Islands District Court decision mandating the admission of 
non-citizen children into the Virgin Islands public schools. In 
June 1972, the long-awaited construction of the Detention facility 
began when ground-breaking ceremonies were held by the governor. l 
Speculation about when the new detention facility would 
open was ended in April 1973 with the governor's decision to turn 
the facility over to the Department of Public Safety to house the 
five murder suspects called the Fountain Valley Five, who were 
accused of killing eight people at a St. Croix golf course. The 
existing penitentiary could not provide sufficient security and it 
was decided to use this facility.2 
Almost one year after the facility had been completed, plans 
were finally made to operate it for its intended use. The delay 
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in opening this facility was indicative of the government's difficulty 
in meeting even those needs identified as its number-one priority. 
lThe Department of Social Welfare June 1972 Monthly Report 
dated July 5, 1972 from the superintendent, Insular Training School, 
to the director, Child and Family Services, implied that the superin-
tendent had not been advised of plans to construct the facility but 
had suspected something was going on as he had noted that a site on 
Anna's Hope was being cleared. The Department's lack of involvement 
in the final decision to construct the facility was confirmed in a 
conversation with the former commissioner of Social Welfare on Tuesday, 
September 5, 1978,           he stated that the governor had made the 
decision to construct the detention facility without consulting the 
commissioner. 
2Department of Social Welfare, Memorandum, dated April 12, 1973 
to unit supervisors from superintendent, Insular Training School,on 
"Use of New Detention Facility." 
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in opening this facility was indicative of the government's difficulty 
in meeting even those needs identified as its number-one priority. 
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The facility opened on January 8, 1974 because the governor 
wanted it opened. It had a skeleton staff consisting of a super-
visor, a houseparent, four social service aides, and three youngsters. 
By January 28, 1974, the number of youngsters had increased to ten. l 
Four new social service aides were hired and interviews with potential 
employees were continued in order to fill other existing vacancies. 
The detention facility had a capacity of twenty-six residents. 
The living area of the physical plant included six security isolation 
rooms and two dormitory areas. 2 However, limited space was available 
for recreation. The capacity of the unit was therefore limited to 
fourteen           so that one dormitory area could be used for recreational, 
dining-room, and other activities. 3 The carefully nurtured plans for 
the facility were ignored as the governor attempted to cope with 
the juvenile-delinquency problem, handicapped by limited funds and 
lack of coordination with the Department of Social Welfare staff. 
Problems concerning almost every aspect of the facility's operation 
began occurring almost immediately. 
lDepartment of Social Welfare, January 1974 Monthly Report, 
dated Jauarny 28, 1974, from Joseph Christian, assistant superintendent 
to Gaveston David, superindendent, Insular Training School; and Depart-
ment of Social Welfare, January 1974 Monthly Report, dated January 31, 
1974 from Gaveston David, superintendent, Insular Training School, to 
Millicent Ann Dandridge, assistant commissioner. 
2January 20, 1975 Report by assistant superintendent, Insular 
Training School, on "Recommendations for Restructuring the Juvenile 
Detention Facility Located at Anna's Hope, Christiansted, St. Croix." 
3According to author's interview with former supervisor of 
detention facility in August 1978. 
The detention facility was designed to serve both short-term 
detention purposes and for intake and diagnosis. 1 As the only 
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available maximum-security facility on-island, it was easily misused. 
For example, youngsters from the regular Insular Training School pro-
gram were placed in the detention facility for varying periods as a 
disciplinary method. The superintendent of the facility expressed 
concern that detention not lose its effectiveness and be overworked 
as a disciplinary too1. 2 In another case, two boys who were 
"sentenced adult prisoners" were placed in the detention facility 
while awaiting transfers to mainland prisons. 3 One of these youngsters 
had severe emotional problems which scared the staff and affected 
their treatment of him.4 
Another major problem was criticism from the Municipal Court 
                who felt that not enough attention was paid to due process 
at the detention facility. Staff members who accompanied children 
during their court appearances were criticized in front of the resi-
dents about the ·youngst2rs' "allegations of staff mistreatment of 
juveniles," illegal incarceration of youngsters, and violation of the 
detainees' civil rights. The youngsters learned quickly that they 
1Department of Social Welfare's "Report on Insular Training 
School to Legislative Standing Committee on Health and Welfare," dated 
June 14, 1973, p. 7. 
2Department of Social Welfare, March 1974 Monthly Report,dated 
April 4, 1974 from Gaveston David, superintendent, Insular Training 
School, to Millicent" Ann Dandridge, assistant commissioner. 
3Department of Social Welfare, February 1974 Monthly Report, 
dated February 28, 1974 from Joseph Christian, assistant superintendent 
to Gwendolyn C. Blake, acting commissioner. 
4Department of Social Welfare, April 1974 Monthly Report dated 
April 29, 1974 from Joseph Christian, assistant superintendent to 
Gaveston David, superintendent, Insular Training School. 
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could expect sympathy from the court, The court's attitude, well 
known among the detainees, further inhibited the staff's authority.l 
From the facility's inception, staff recruitment was a major 
problem. 2 The                         for the position of counselor of social 
service aide was a twelfth-grade education or sometimes even less; 
thus, the new staff members were primarily young and inexperienced. 
In a special report to the Virgin Islands legisla"ture, the Depart-
ment noted that the Insular Training School staff was generally 
interested in helping children, but its members were far from 
equipped to cope with children with deep-seated emotional problems. 
Staff members often became frustrated, confused, and overwhelmed 
when confronted with what they perceived as a "crazy" child. "Also, 
attempts by the few administrative staff members to update 
attitudes, approaches, and techniques were not entirely successful, 
for the older staff members continued to relate to "what it used to 
be like," that is, when children respected their elders and obeyed 
their commands without question. Routine supervision, motivation, 
and the simple use of adult authority were no longer enough. 3 Yet 
these were the only techniques that the new counselors, both young 
and old, brought to the job. 
lDepartment of Social Welfare, February 1974 Monthly Report, 
dated February 28,1974 from Joseph Christian, assistant superintendent, 
Insular Training School, to Gwendolyn C. Blake, acting commissioner. 
2Eighteen staff members were added to the Insular Training School 
staff during January and February 1974. (Information secured from a 
review of the monthly reports for that period.) 
3Department of Social Welfare's "Report on Insular Training School 
to Legislative Standing Committee on Health and Welfare," dated June 
14, 1973, p. 2. 
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In order to more adequately supervise the newly appointed 
social service aides, new male counselors were assigned to the 
regular institutional facility under the supervision of older 
counselors before they were assigned to the detention facility. This 
gave them the opportunity of benefitting from in-service training a.nd 
experience before dealing with the difficult problems at the detention 
facility. Subsequent assignment to the detention facility would depend 
on an evaluation of their job performance. However, half of the male 
social service aides were new. Staff shortages resulted in new 
counselors being assigned immediately to the detention facility.l 
Thus, expediency dictated policy, further complicating staff 
assignments. Counselors were transferred from the institutional 
program to the detention facility and vice versa as need arose, an 
unwield1y and confusing arrangemnt. 2 
During the year, the supervisor of the detention facility, the 
assistant superintendent, and a social service aide attended an 
off-island three-week training course conducted by the United States 
Bureau of Prisons. Additionally, a consulting firm and Corne11 
University provided on-island training for the staff. 3 Unfortunately, 
1Department of Social Welfare·, memorandum from. Gwendolyn C. 
Blake, executive assistant, to Joseph Christian, "Rescheduling Staff," 
dated March 14, 1974. 
2Department of Social Welfare, April 1974 Monthly Report, dated 
May 2, 1974 from                                 Insular Training School, to Millicent 
Ann Dandridge,                     commissioner. 
3Ibid.; Department of Social Welfare, June 1974 Monthly Report, 
dated June 27, 1974, from superintendent, Insular Training School, to 
Millicent Ann Dandridge, assistant commissioner and July 1974 Monthly 
Report, dated July 31, 1974, from Gaveston David, superintendent, 
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these training measures fell far short of the in-depth, comprehensive 
traning program that was needed. The superintendent aptly described 
the ongoing situation. "Disrespect for and open abuse of staff were 
quite common with the direct result being retaliatory action by staff 
in the form of frequent use of corporal punishment."l 
The youngsters' disrespect for and open challenge of adult 
authority contrasted sharply with the staff's expectations of 
respect--creating immediate and                       conflict. The youths' 
rebellion against institutional authority was most manifest in the 
many successful escapes from the "maximum security" detention 
facility. 
Another major problem was the condition of the physical plant. 
Problems began immediately after the opening of the facility in 
January 1974 and continued throughout the fourteen-month operation 
of the facility. 
The slipshod workmanship of the building contractor was at 
fault. However, the long delay in occupying the facility meant 
that the building was already a year old               these problems were 
noted. The government, through its Public Works Department, had 
accepted the building without a thorough inspection. No attempts 
were made to force the contractor to remedy the deficiencies,2 
Insular Training School, to Millicent Ann Dandridge. Social Services 
administrator and December 1974 Monthly                 dated December 20, 
1974 from Gaveston David,                                 Insular Training School, 
to Millicent Ann Dandridge, Social Services administrator. 
1Department of Social Welfare, May 1974 Monthly Report, dated 
June 2, 1974, from Gaveston David, superintendent, Insular Training 
School, to Millicent Ann Dandridge, assistant commissioner. 
2This information was secured from a review of the monthly 
reports of the superintendent of the Insular Training School from the 
period January 1974 to March 1975. 
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The rebellious detainees further damanged the detention facility. 
In fact, they wrecked some parts of it. l By December 1974, a great 
deal of repair work was needed. 2 Needless to say, the necessary funds 
were not available. 
The deteriorating conditions at the detention facility led to 
an examination and reevaluation of the goals and purpose of the 
overall program. Enrollment had continued to decline, as Table 16 
shows, and         frequent staff turnovers created numerous vacancies. 
Finally in March 1975, the detention facility was closed temporarily, 
so that the limited staff could be           to provide coverage for the 
regular institutional program. 3 On April 1, 1975, the detention 
facility was closed permanently when official recognition of the 
physical condition of the building made its reopening untenable. 4 
In summary, within fourteen months, the detention facility, 
developed to provide short-term detention for St. Croix youngsters, 
was closed. The problems encountered in operating this facility 
IAn October 25, 1975 correspondence ftom the Project Director 
to the assistant commissioner of Public Works for St. Croix outlined 
seven areas in which major repairs were needed. The most extensive 
repairs were in the security section. 
2In an April 1972 Monthly Report, the superintendent, in commenting 
on the reaction of a federal official who was distressed at finding 
mattresses rather than bunkbeds in the detention cells, noted that the 
moveable bunkbeds had been used as battering rams and mattresses were 
being used until they could be replaced with rigid bunks which would 
be bolted to the floor. 
3Department of. Social Welfare, March 1975 MOnthly Report, dated 
March 24, 1975, from Gaveston David, superintendent, Insular Training 
School, to Millicent Ann Dandridge, Social Services administrator. 
4April 15, 1975 correspondent to the Honorable Cyril E. King, 
governor of the Virgin Islands, from Gwendolyn C. Blake, commissioner 
of Social Welfare, and April 15, 1975 to Honorable Louis Hoffman, judge 
of the Municipal Court from Gwendolyn C. Blake, commissioner of Social 
Welfare. 
TABLE 16 
ENROLLMENT STATISTICS FOR THE ST. CR01X 
DETENTION FACILITY 
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(A more relevant statistical reporting system would have been a 
detailed count of the number of youngsters admitted and released 
monthly.) 
*Includes two girls. 
++-Fort Christian has two youngsters. 
**Statistics Not Available. 
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indicated clearly· that the changes in the Virgin Islands since the 
1950s required different resources and approaches than those currently 
available. Without a comprehensive approach to the problems being 
experienced by Virgin Islands youths, the various attempts to address 
specific problems were doomed. The inability to provide differentiated 
services meant children and institutions were mismatched and, in some 
cases, facilities were overutilized with children who could not be 
helped or underutilized because they did not meet existing needs. 
1 The Insular Training School 
The Insular Training School for Girls and Boys provided long-
term group care for neglected, dependent, and delinquent children 
who needed more intensive treatment than that available in a family 
setting. Services provided included the provision of (1) good 
physical care to offset the demanging effects of placement; (2) 
agency or community services to meet the normal                         needs 
of the child such as medical, dental, education, and recreation 
activities; (3) constructive and satisfying activities to enable 
the youngsters to work out their problems; (4) individual and group 
guidance to help the child use this experience in a positive way; 
and (5) treatment plans based upon observation and diagnosis of the 
lThere is more detailed information on the Insular Training 
School due to its availability. There were no changes in the adminis-
trative staff of the institution during this period and monthly reports 
were thorough and well written. The annual reports gave more infor-
mation for this program and there was one study on the Insular Training 
School which gave the institution's history and detailed information 
about the problems and the children served. 
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child's behavior. l 
In the early 1960s the institution served a total of sixty-
three boys with an enrollment averaging fifty-one boys. A total 
of seventeen girls were served and the facility was at its full 
capacity of twelve girls during the year.2 By the early 1970s, the 
Insular Training School accommodated three different age groups of 
both sexes: a girls cottage for twenty-six ten-to-sixteen-year-old 
girls, an older boys cottage for twenty-six sixteen-to-eighteen-year-
old boys, and dormitories for fifty-two ten-to-sixteen-year-old boys.3 
The cottages for the older boys and girls had been built in 1965 and 
                                      The ten-to-sixteen-year-old boys were housed 
inadequately in wood and cement dormitories which were over one hundred 
years old and constantly needed repair. 
The school's master plan had included the construction of new 
units for this age group, but the funds were not appropriated. 
Additionally, many of the older buildings such as the administration 
building, dining room, and kitchen were deteriorated. 4 Youngsters 
walked for meals and program activities--rendering close supervision 
virtually impossible. 
lDepartment of Social Welfare, Insular Letter No. 30, "Subject: 
Definition of Services and Staff Function. il Department of Social Welfare, 
May 15,1974 (mimeographed), pp. 22-23. 
21961 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 10. 
3Department of Social Welfare, Insular Letter No. 30, Ope cit. 
4Department of Social Welfare, "Report on Insular Training School 
to Legislative Standing Conunittee on Health and Welfare," June 14, 
1973 (typewritten), pp. 1-2. 
301 
By 1968, the staff had increased to                 enabling the school 
to develop several new programs including a farm program and a 
vocational program. The farm program, under the direction of a farmer 
counselor, expanded the poultry, gardening, and animal husbandry 
projects. The farm program was very successful and became self-
supporting. 
The school's vocational program emphasized construction and 
building maintenance. For                   prior to the receipt of new 
laundry equipment, the youngsters assisted the staff in renovating 
an existing building by doing all the necessary masonry, carpentry, 
plumbing, electricity, and painting. They also assisted the staff 
in the maintenance and renovation of other buildings on the school 
campus. 2 
The Department of Education ran the school's academic program 
which included an ungraded elementary school program. Many of the 
younger boys at the Insular Training School performed below grade 
level because of lack of incentive and opportunity in their prior 
school experience. The ungraded program enabled the teachers to cope 
with the specialized learning needs of the children and to give more 
individual attention than might normally have been the case. 
The Department of Health's Mental Health division administered 
psychological testing and psychiatric evaluation, in most cases prior 
1Robert H. Dalton, Childhood Behavior Problems in Social Focus 
(St. Thomas: Division of Mental Health, Department of Health, 1968), 
p. 7. 
21960-61 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare, 
OPe cit., p. 10. 
to the youngsters' admission to the school. Follow-up services, 
consisting of individual and group therapy, were extended when 
psychologists and psychiatrists were availab1e. l 
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The bureau of Health Education emphasized health care through 
films and discussions moderated by a health educator. The goal in 
this instance was to encourage the students to be responsible for 
their own health care through practicing sound lifelong health habits. 
The Public Health division provided ongoing preventive services 
such as immunizations, routine testing, and regular physical exams. 
Health problems at the school were minimized because of the 
comprehensive preventive care. 
The school's recreation program was also a major factor, for 
it included nearly every sport, had several levels, and was a 
decided morale-booster. The school's baseball team participated in 
the St, Croix Junior Baseball League and won the Island and the 
Inter-Island championships.2 Favorable exposure helped the school's 
students to feel more a part of the community rather than an isolated 
element. 
At the same time, the community support for the Insular Train-
ing School was strong and positive. One community organization, for 
example, sponsored a Boy Scout Troop,3 
lThe Mental Health division also experienced difficulty in 
recruiting and retaining psychiatrists and psychologists. 
21962 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 12. 
31961 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 10; and 1962 Annual 
Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. Thomas: Government 
Printing Office, 1962), p. 11. 
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                    Reaction. By 1968, the school's program, successful 
as it had been, was clearly not equipped to cope with the growing 
number of children with severe delinquency problems. Within the 
school's juvenile population, there was an upsurge in drug addiction, 
runaways involved in purse snatchings, burglaries, and petty thefts 
outside the institution. These incidents generated intense com-
munity concern about the institution's inability to contain the 
youngsters or provide them with treatment and rehabilitation. 
Security guards, fencing, and bright exterior lighting were 
added in an effort to stop runaways and also to decrease the 
incidence of preg.nancy. These stopgap measures could not, however, 
resolve the problems facing the school's staff.1 
In the late 1960s when Dalton's study was conducted, the 
principal reasons for placement were truancy; antisocial acts 
including ungovernableness, fighting, swearing, and running away 
from home; unsuitable homes; and theft. Unlike the boys, 50 percent 
of the girls were admitted due to sexual delinquency. In those 
cases, girls were either grossly abused sexually or were adjudged 
to be in danger of mistreatment if left uncared for. 2 
The election campaign for the first elected governor in 1970 
provided a ready-made forum for widespread and intense community 
expressions concerning the rising juvenile crime rate. The school's 
11969 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 13; and 1970 Annual 
Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. Thomas: Government 
Printing Office, 1970), p. 32. 
20a1ton, Ope cit., pp. 32-33. 
     
inability to control the more aggressive youngsters received con-
siderable attention from·thepublic and the election candidates. 
A valuable document on the subject is an unpublished study of 
the school's residents which was made in February 1973. In a total 
population of 61 (40 boys and 21 girls), 23 were diagnosed as having 
behavioral problems) 18 were delinquents. 8 were neglected, 6 were 
abandoned, 3 were rejected, 2 were orphaned and 1 was abused. l The 
study concluded that the school had experienced extreme                      
in coping with the children's many problems. The needed professional 
help was unavailable at either the school or existing government 
agencies. The report added that escape from the school was simple. 
Some of the munici.pal court judges, frustrated by the Depart-
ment's inability to provide effective rehabilitation for the 
juveniles who appeared repeatedly in their courtrooms, proposed 
off-island institutional placement for these hardcore delinquent 
youngsters. However, the judges' recommendation could not be 
implemented because of the perennial problem--lack of money.2 
lDepartment of Social Welfare, bureau of Research, Evaluation 
and Statistics, Insular Training School Study, February 1, 1973 
(raw data available). 
2Letter dated March 16, 1970 from Judge Louis Hoffman to 
Gwendolyn Blake, assistant commissioner, Department of Social Welfare, 
and Lionel Todman, chief probation officer; letter dated April 8, 
1970                           Philip A. Gerard, commissioner of Education from 
Judge Louis Hoffman; Letter dated March 19 t 1973 to Ive· A. Swan, 
assistant attorney general, from Judge Louis Hoffman; and Letter 
dated April 9, 1973· to Honorable Cyril Michael, presiding judge of 
the Municipal Court from Judge Antoine L. Joseph. 
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It is imperative to note that during this period, the early 
1970s, there seemed to have been an almost total lack of official 
comprehension concerning the magnitude of the juvenile-delinquent 
problem, much less the resources needed to cope with it. As we 
have also noted throughout this study, the Virgin Islands had 
changed in a relatively short time from a small, isolated community 
with close family and neighborhood ties to a large cosmopolitan 
community exposed, but unprepared for, all of the ills of twentieth-
century industrial society. Children were brought up in a society 
that was very changed from that their parents had known and 
experienced. 
In May 1972, the governor ordered the Public Works Department 
to construct detention cells at the school's older boys unit in an 
effort to curb the runaway problem. l The governor's reaction seems 
to have been a response to public pressure, without regard to 
whether this was the proper solution to the problem. 
School Reorganization. In early 1971 the Department of Social 
Welfare developed a reorganization plan for the school. Under this 
plan, the superintendent was responsible solely for the adminis-
trative aspects of the program and his office was moved to a less 
accessible location. The assistant superintendent was responsible 
for implementation including overall supervision of the laundry, 
kitchen, recreation program, and ground maintenance. The cottage 
lDepartment of Social Welfare, May 1972 Monthly Report, dated 
June 1, 1972 from Gaveston David, superintendent, Insular Training 
School, to Millicent Ann Dandridge, director, Child and Family 
Services. 
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supervisors were responsible for their individual unit's program and 
the counselors. l 
There were also several improvements in recreation and education. 
The assignment of a program coordinator in January 1972 resulted 
eventually in community volunteers helping the youngsters to partici-
pate even more in community activities including dinners at local 
hotels, "Big Brother" programs, more in-depth sporting activities, 
and an improved arts and crafts program. The goal was to project 
positive images that would enable the youths to live productively 
when they left the institution. 2 
The academic program for elementary schoolchildren was also 
enhanced with the receipt of Title I funds. Books, training aides, 
recreation equipment, supplies, and funds to purchase materials to 
build a classroom that would be constructed by the vocational 
education classes at the school were provided. The sometime 
availability of teachers of art, of physical education, and of 
music,and the money to pay them, helped to expand the academic 
program. However, the Departmen"t of Education's problems with 
lDepartment of Social Welfare, December 1970, January, February, 
March, April, and May 1971 Monthly Reports, dated March 18, 1971 
from Millicent Ann Dandridge, director, Child and Family Services, 
to Macon M. Berryman, commissioner. Department of Social Welfare, 
Internal Memorandum Re: Conference on Insular Training School, 
dated May 4, 1971 from Millicent Ann Dandridge, director, Child 
and Family Services, to Macon M. Berryman, commissioner. 
21972 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare 
(St. Thomas: Government Printing Office. 1972), p. 26; 1973 Annual 
Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. Thomas: Government 
Printing Office, 1973), p. 22; and 1974 Annual Report of the Depart-
ment of Social Welfare (St. Thomas: Government Printing Office, 
1974), p. 39. 
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staff turnoVer prevented the program from achieving its full potential. 
Thus, in the final analysis, administrative changes, improve-
ments in the recreation and education programs, improvements in 
working conditions, and money for increased staff did not permanently 
improve the quality of the school. The various measures taken over 
a period of years were without exception incomplete, lacking the 
comprehensiveness that would have offered any prospect of success. 
Closing the School. In August 1974, three major incidents 
involving school residents occurred: assault charges were filed 
against three youngsters while on a supervised outing, charges of 
maltreatment and brutalizations of youths were made against some 
staff members, and one youngster assaulted another, resulting in 
surgery for the victim. 
These incidents led to a two-day Senate committee investigation.1 
Consequently, the United States Department of Social Welfare under-
took yet another evaluation of the school. 
On April 15, 1975, the district and municipal court judges 
were advised that the Insular Training School program was henceforth 
restricted to fourteen males and females aged ten to fourteen. Dis-
advantaged youths were to be served in a small family style, self-
contained unit in a group home. . 
By June 1975, the new program had been introduced to staff 
members and final recommendations made for an off-island training 
1Department of Social Welfare, August 1974 Monthly Report, 
dated September 3, 1974, from Gaveston David, superintendent, Insular 
Training School, to Millicent Ann Dandridge, Social Services Adminis-
trator. 
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1 program. The high hopes held by some Department administrators for 
the latest reorganization were short-lived. By August 1975. the DOYs 
cottage was again plagued with problems. 2 
In summary, then, the experience with the Insular Training 
School was an all-too-typical example of the very inadequate social 
services then available to children in the Virgin Islands. ObViously, 
the children of foreign workers, who were consigned to the lowest 
priority by official policy, were easily the most neglected. The 
gross neglect of these children, with rare expectations, was but one 
of the many problems related to foreign workers that profoundly 
affected the structure of Virgin Islands society. 
Staffing, limited funds, and changes in the kinds of children 
needing services led to the unavoidable termination of the insti-
tutional programs for dependent, neglected, and delinquent children. 
Although the facility could accommodate approximately one hundred 
children, poor maintenance and the rapid or continuing deterioration 
of the facilities limited actual capacity.                             enrollment 
also declined because the existing program failed to fulfill the 
children's specialized needs. Limited funds and staff turnover 
contributed to the failure. 
IDepartment of Social Welfare, June 1975 Monthly Report, dated 
July 1, 1975, from Millicent Ann Dandridge, Social Services adminis-
trator to Gwendolyn C. Blake, commissioner. 
2Department of Social Welfare, July 1975 Monthly Report, dated 
August 7, 1975 and August 1975 Monthly Report, dated September 12, 
1975, both from A1ecia G. Benjamin, director of Social Services, 
to Gwendolyn C. Blake, commissioner. 
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We shall now discuss the Department's delivery of adoption 
services and day-care services. 
Adoption Services 
During 1954 and 1955, the Child Welfare division assumed 
responsibility for completing the investigations of adoption petitions 
filed with the district court. 
The two types of adoption petitions received by the district 
court were agency placements and non-agency placements. In agency 
placements, the division approved the petition, oversaw placement, 
and supervised children in adoptive homes. These children may have 
been released for adoption by a parent residing in the Virgin Islands 
or secured through cooperative arrangements with adoption agencies on 
the mainland. 
The non-agency placements represented those cases in which a 
family petitioned the court for adoption. The agency was required to 
complete an investigation that enabled the court to rule on the 
adoption petition. 
Most of the non-agency adoption petitions were those of United 
States citizens, naturalized citizens, or permanent residents who 
adopted the children of relatives or other children from the British, 
French, or Dutch West Indies. l 
The visa status of these children could be more readily adjusted 
to permanent resident if they became the adopted children of United 
'=1955 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
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4 (3 Alien) 
._19 (9 Alien) 
16 Own Parent/Step-
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6 (2 Aliens) 
18*** 
1 (Alien Child) 
1 
**National Center for Social                       form required state agency to 
indicate citizenship status for non-related petitioners only. 
··**Eleven of the 18 were alien children. . 
      report was done so adoption cards were reviewed. There is no 
guarantee that all the adoption cards were submitted for these years. 
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States citizens or premanent residents. In the case were the adoptive 
parents were found to be unfit or inadequate, the division temporarily 
placed the foreign-born child in foster care until arrangements were 
made to return the child to parents or other relatives. l These cases 
were relatively infrequent9 but the Department was required to provide 
care for non-citizen children in emergencies. 
As confirmed by Table 179 the number of adoptees was small and 
were mostly adoptions of related petitioners. In those years when 
adoption petitions increased, an additional burden was placed on an 
already overburdened                               the                 of the petition 
investigations and related services. 
Day Care Services 
The Social Services division administered a day-care program 
designed to assist working parents and those parents who were unable 
to meet the needs of their children because of their own physical or 
emotional incapacities. Day-care centers cared for at least several 
children varying in age from two to five years; children under two 
years were placed in private homes. 
Long recognized as a community need 9 the St: Thomas MuniCipal 
Council established a committee in the mid-1950s to study day-care 
nurseries. The provision of day care was perceived as a vehicle for 
supplying additional employees to the labor force and relying less 
on foreign workers. The committee recommended a day-care facility 
lBerryman, "Welfare Services to Aliens," op. cit., p. 42. 
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be established for preschool youngsters, but the recommendation was 
not implemented due to lack of funds. In 1957 when demand for more 
workers was high, day care was revived as an alternative to foreign 
workers. l The Virgin Islands Employment Service also identified the 
lack of child care facilities as a major problem that prevented women 
from seeking employment. 
The Department's day-care program was initiated in 1960 when the 
Virgin Islands legislature appropriated funds to (1) stimulate the 
development of private day-care facilities; (2) establish day-care 
facilities in any area where a clear need existed; (3) license all day-
care facilities in the Virgin Islands; and (4) subsidize parents who 
were unable to pay the full costs of day care. 2 This mandate was 
implemented through (1) operation of day-care centers; (2) licensing 
of day-care facilities; (3) contracting with private day-care centers; 
and (4) subsidizing families who were unable to pay the total costs 
of day care by setting fees in accordance with income. 
The responsibility for administering these components rested 
with the bureau of Day Care Services. The office of the bureau con-
sisted of a chief, an assistant chief, a licensing worker, educational 
specialists, secretaries, and a social worker in both districts. 
Except for the chief, these positions had a high turnover because of 
h 1 1 · 3 t e ow sa ar1es. 
J St . Thomas Daily Np.ws. Friday. February 4, 1957. 
234 Virgin Islands Code 19; and 3 Virgin Islands Code 377, 
"B(3) and (5)..: 
3A licenSing worker position was included in the fiscal year 
1977 budget. thus fulfilling a long-existing need to have one person 
with the sole responsibility for this component. 
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The Department established cooperative arrangements with five 
day-care centers--two in St. Croix and three in St. Thomas--and 
services were delivered to approximately ninety children per month, 
far below the demand. Thus, working mothers continued to use sub-
standard facilities such as babysitters or group care by older women 
in overcrowded and unsafe facilities. Eventually, these employed 
indigenous mothers began relying on the easily available 
and low-paid foreign-worker domestics. 
Limited funds, lack of facilities, and lack of profitability 
prevented the extensive development of this program. Furthermore, 
the widespread use of foreigners as domestic workers meant that the 
middle class soon needed day-care centers. As a                 the very 
limited day-care services were judged to be successful by policy-
makers. 
In 1967, the United States Department of Labor ordered wage 
increases for foreign workers empldyed as domestics in private homes 
from $60 per month to $100 to $140 per month depending on whether 
living accommodations were supplied. 
This large jump in domestics' salaries meant that many families 
no longer could afford to employ them. Thus, the Department of Social 
Welfare experienced a fresh demand for day-care services. The day-
care nrogram was then serving approximately 175 children in four day-care 
centers and two family day-care homp-s and the additional demand could not 
met. Plans were made to develop new day-care centers in St. Thomas and St. Croix 
By 1970, the Department rented several private residences in 
which to operate day-care centers. This move increased the number to 
11967 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 36 and 37-:--
eleven day-care centers with a capacity of 262 and an enrollment of 
236 as of June 30, 1970. A need existed for family day-care homes 
serving children below the age of two and a half years.l By April 
1974, eight government-operated day-care centers--one in St. John, 
three in St. Thomas, and four in St. Croix--had been established. 2 
The government-operated. day-care centers were staffed by a 
supe·rvisor, social service aides (employees with a high school 
education or less), cooks, food service workers, and custodial 
workers. Additionally, chauffeurs and maintenance mechanics served 
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all government-operated day-care centers. Although anllEarly Childhoodll 
education degree was preferred for day-care center supervisors, most 
had bachelor degrees in other fields such as business administration 
and English. Consequently. they usually brought no special knowledge 
or experience to their position. The supervision often was done by 
social service aides. The lack of qualified supervisors generated 
poor morale among personnel in the centers. 
The day-care programs operated along traditional authoritarian 
lines. The end result of the program's deficiencies was custodial 
care--not education. 
Another major problem was the inadequacy of the physical facilities 
in which the government-operated day-care centers were located. Of 
119 70 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare (St. 
Thomas: Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 28 and 31. 
2Department of Social Welfare, Monthly Report, April 1974, dated 
May 9, 1975 from Millicent Ann Dandridge, assistance commissioner, to 
Gwendolyn C. Blake, commissioner. The local legislation specifies that 
government-operated facilities should be established where there is a 
need, but it does not define how need is determined and there is no 
indication from available Department information that need was really 
established prior to the establishment of the government-operated day-
care centers. 
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the eight facilities, only' three were housed in buildings designed for 
early childhood education programs. The other five were located in 
homes and effective programs could not be carried out in cramped and 
inadequate quarters even on those rare occasions when skilled super-
vision was available. No new facilities were established between 
1974 and 1976 (see Table 18). 
An additional deficiency was that the Department of Health 
could not supply ongoing preventive health care because of chronic 
understaffing. 
In July 1972 the first Virgin Islands facility for deaf and 
blind children opened in'St. Thomas. A number of key elements 
combined to initiate the school, including (1) the availability of 
federal funds; (2) the cooperation of the Perkins Institute for the 
Blind, which provided training for two paraprofessionals from the 
Virgin Islands; (3) the assistance of the Regional Deaf-Blind 
Institute, whose representatives made regular consultant visits to 
the Virgin Islands; and (4) the assistance of the local departments 
of Health and Education. 
For example, the Department of Health provided assistance in 
developing a medical interagency form for the handicapped and worked 
with staff members on the children's language development. Beginning 
in February 1974, the Department of Education provided a special 
education teacher. l We should note that the extensive local and 
IThis information was summarized from the available Monthly 
Reports from June 1970 to July 1976 from the assistant commissioner, 
the director of Social Services and the chief of the bureau of Day 
Care Services, to the commissioner or to the division director in 
the case of the bureau chief. 
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United States mainland interagency cooperation was indicative of a 
growing concern in the Virgin Islands, and in the United States, for 
programs that served the severely handicapped child, although only 
eleven children were actually served. 
At this point in our discussion, let us review some of the key 
elements of the day-care program. 
Licensing. According to Virgin Islands law, any person caring 
for three or more non-related children was required to be licensed. -----------
Despite the licensing requirement, most people caring for non-related 
children were not licensed. Although the Department first implemented 
its licensing procedures in the 1960s, it did not have the manpower 
or resources to enforce the rules. In the 1970s, manpower was 
allocated to enforcement, which was greatly aided by the publication 
of a new licensing manual in June 1975. 1 
The effective implementation of the licensing program guaranteed 
protection to the public and insured a minimum standard of care to 
the children covered by the program. (See Table 18, for the increase 
in numbers of licensed facilities in the 1970s.) 
Contracting with Private Day-Care Centers. Since 1959,2 the 
Department has entered into contracts with operators of private day-
care· centers and family day-care homes. The day-care centers or family 
day care homes must agree to provide the Department with a certain 
number of placements for children who cannot be accommodated in the 
government-operated day-care centers. (There are no government-operated 
lIbido 
















DAY CARE PROGRAM STATISTICS 
FISCAL YEARS 1971-76 
Number of Day Care Centers Capacity 
(7 Government Operated) 
(7 Private Day Care Centers Subsidized) 326 
(7 Government Operated) 
(7 Privately Operated and Subsidized) 290 
(7 Government Operated) 
(1 Pilot Program for Deaf Blind) 
(6 Privately Operated Centers Subsidized) 236 
(8 Government Operated) 
(1 Pilot Program for Deaf Blind) 
(5 Private Day Care Centers Subsidized) 249 
(8 Government Operated) 
(2 Pilot Programs for Deaf Blind) 
(6 Private Day Care Centers) 270 
(8 Government Operated) 
(2 Pilot Programs) 
(5 Private         Care Centers) . 272 . 
available. 
Enrollment Number 






260 12 (7 Renewals) 
(4 New) 
276 15 (11 Renewals) 
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facilities for children under two years of age.) The contracts also 
guaranteed that the day-care operator received a stipulated income 
for providing day-care services in the private day-care facilities. 
This program has enabled the Department to fulfill the ever-increasing 
demand for day-care placements. 
Subsidizing Fam,ilies. Under the 1960 day-care legislation, 1 
the" commissioner of Social Welfare was authorized to grant subsidy 
-p"aym"en"t"s-f"o"r-chi1.-d-c"are-in-any-l-egi-t"ima"te-day-e"a"l"e-p·l"0g"I'am-. -!f.hus.,-------
many parents were able to afford day care. 2 In the 1960s, non-citizen 
children were not subsidized and their parents or guardians paid the 
full costs of day care--$25 per month. In available documents, there 
was no reference to the provision of day-care services to non-citizen 
chi1dren. 3 
In a 1973 study of day-care fees, 53.8 percent of day-care 
client families had a gross annual income exceeding $7,000. The 
remaining 46.2 percent had incomes below $7,000 with 23.1 percent 
in the $5,000 to $7,000 range. This confirms that day-care centers 
were used by middle-income families. Although a little more than half 
of these families were couples, single-parent low-income families were 
seemingly in the minority. 
Since the foreign workers were overwhelmingly low-income, 
presumably only a small percentage of these managed to avail themselves 
lIbido 
2Current day-care fees are $60 a month. 
3Berryman, "Welfare Services for Aliens," OPe cit., p. 43. 
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of day care facilities. We should note also that the exclusion of 
data about services to foreign-worker families was pervasive--testify-
ing to their low priority. (Of course, the United States citizen 
children of foreign workers were entitled to admission in the day-
care program.)l 
Like the other services provided by the division of Social 
Services, day care was handicapped by limited funding and staff 
vacancies. Although not all day-care centers were always filled to 
capacity, this fact was probably more indicative of the individual 
center's location than lack of need. The day-care program remained 
primarily a custodial program. 
Summary 
Many of the services provided by the Social Services division 
could have, and in some cases did, address the foreign workers' 
problems. However, the division's effectiveness was handicapped by 
the overwhelming needs created in the Virgin Islands during the 
Islands' transition from a rural to an urbanized area. More specifical-
ly the'overall increase in people needing services, the impact 
of poorly trained, untrained, or inexperienced staff members on the 
quality of service.delivery, the division's consequent inability to 
respond to these new needs, and the limited local funds impacted 
adversely on Virgin Islands residents, both citizen and non-citizen. 
lDepartment of Social Welfare, "Public Day Care Fees in the 
Virgin Islands--A Study of Department of Social Welfare Day Care 
Clients and their Fees," January 28, 1974, pp. 9-10. The federal 
minimum wage was then $1.60 per hour and many foreign workers 
earned less than the minimum wage. 
The social problems that arose during the 1960s were further 
illuminated in the 1970s by the continued residence of the foreign 
workers in the United States Virgin Islands, their increased popu-
lation, and their marked substandard living conditions. 
In refining our discussion, it was noted that in fact the 
local government had never been able to deliver sufficient public 
services to fulfill the needs of its existing United States citizen 
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---popula-t-ion-,-much-l-ess-t-be-nee-ds-o-f-t-he-emergfng-iorei-gn-i-a-bor----- - _. 
population. Second, the government operated originally on the premise 
that the foreign-lobor population was unentitled to services, so no 
initial attempts were made to control the growth of this population 
nor plan for its needs. Third, because of an unexpected and most 
unwelcome (in terms of the Virgin Islands government) reinterpretation 
of federal immigration law, foreign workers, and their families, 
were abruptly made eligible for health, education, and welfare 
services. This development severely strained the already depressed 
Virgin Islands economy. 
We have seen that during the twenty-year span of the foreign-
labor program, little, if any, official recognition was accorded the 
plight of the foreign workers. Yet the foreign-labor population 
became an ever-more visible entity. Unquestionably, considerable 
animosity was aimed at the foreign workers because of their willing-
ness to work for comparatively low wages, their sudden flooding of the 
unskilled labor market, and what was perceived by the indigenous 
population as a lack of civility and refinement. 
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Consequently, the tensions that accompany life in a developing 
society were greatly heightened by the presence of the foreign workers 
and,perhaps even more significant, the conditions under which they 
were forced to exist. Among this group, families were separated; 
single parents raised children without adequate financial, emotional, 
or physical care; children were unsupervised, became uncontrollable, 
were involved in delinquent acts, and became school dropouts. The 
boys were unemployable, even as unskilled laborers, and the girls 
became young mothers, thus regenerating the cycle. 
The economic downturn during the period 1970-1976 was a hard-
ship for most Virgin Islanders and even more so for the foreign 
workers, many of whom were unemployed and could not find work at any 
price. When the foreign workers and their families were deemed 
officially eligible for social benefits and services previously denied 
them, the result was a near-breakdown for the Virgin Islands govern-
ment, which was literally overwhelmed by the demand for services that 
it could not supply. 
The area of greatest unmet need was in those programs involving 
young people. Caseloads increased to the point that at times services 
were delivered on an emergency-only basis. The Department resorted to 
using social service aides who were totally unqualified. When social 
workers were available, they often were left to fend for themselves 
without administrative support or guidance. 
The institutional programs run by the Department were in many 
cases outmoded and ill-equipped to accommodate children with specialized 
emotional and behavioral problems. The Department of Social Welfare 
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was ultimately forced to close the existing institutional facilities 
for children. 
Now that we have covered the Virgin Islands' political history 
in Chapter II, its socioeconomics in -terms of the foreign-labor 
program, in Chapter           the consequences of the foreign-labor pro-
gram, in Chapter IV, and the development of social welfare, special 
programs and public assistance, and the child welfare division, in 
--------Chap"te"rs-V-, -VI-,-a'n-d-VI-I-,-re"sp-e-c-tive"ly-, -i"t-i"s-t'ime-iTlCnap fer-VI!'I 
to discuss the conclusions reached in our study. 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
In this study,we have discussed the policy dilemmas experienced 
by the United States Virgin Islands government in providing social 
services to a rapidly expanding and changing population that consisted 
primarily of native Virgin Islanders, United States mainland citizens, 
and a large foreign-labor work force. 
Traditionally, the Islands' economic development had been viewed 
as the solution to poverty and unemployment. Indeed, the quickened 
pace of economic activity in the late 1950s and the additional 
revenues generated raised the expectation of these problems being 
reso1ved. 1 The Virgin Islands government strove to encourage creation 
of more jobs, improve public services, and raise the standard of living. 
Unfortunately, the Virgin Islands government failed to consider 
fully the ramifications of the Islands' economic evolution from a 
human-service standpoint--that is, the human costs and benefits of 
unplanned economic development. Thus, the failure to perceive the 
magnitude of the problem, to officially acknowledge that the Islands' 
people were involved in a rapid transition to an urban society from a 




rural society, was a flaw that became increasingly visible as indi-
vidual problems multiplied. 
In Chapter I, "Introduction," a number of hypotheses related 
to the central topic of this study were presented. Let us now, in 
the light of the foregoing chapters, review these hypotheses. 
Review of the Hypotheses 
____________                                                   ..                                                                                  .• -The-f.i                                                                                        
federal government responded more to business interests than to the 
social needs of temporary alien workers (foreign workers) and their 
families." 
In our study, we learned that in 1955 a special subcommittee of 
the House Committee on the Judiciary, after holding hearings on the 
need for alien labor inthe United States Virgin Islands, recommended 
a more flexible interpretation of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality 
Act provisions regarding the importation of temporary non-immigrant 
workers into the Virgin Islands. This move was perceived as necessary 
to enhance the Islands' economic development. 
The labor unions fought the admission of non-immigrant labor, 
denied a labor shortage existed, predicted a future oversupply of labor, 
and requested enforceable return procedures if this occurred. A 
majority of the Virgin Islands Legislative Assembly "apparently" 
favored the importation of labor, but the two-thirds majority necessary 
to pass a supporting resolution could not be mustered. The governor 
of the Leeward Islands and the British commissioner in the British 
Virgin Islands of course supported expanded employment for British 
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Virgin Islanders. 
The Virgin Islands business community strongly supported a 
liberal admission policy for foreign workers. The St. Croix and St. 
Thomas Chambers of Commerce had lobbied hard in Washington, D.C. 
against the restrictive interpretation of the 1952 Immigration and 
Nationality Act. Their argument, of course, was that the tourist 
trade required seasonal labor unavailable in the United States 
Virgin Islands. In 1956 a special foreign-labor program was 
initiated. 1 
Clearly, the effective business lobby achieved its goal, for 
negligible attention was accorded to social needs in the course of 
the committee's deliberation. Thus, this first hypotheses was 
supported by the research finds. 
"Temporax:y" foreign workers. The second hypothesis stated that 
"the federal and the local government viewed the alien "(fereign) 
workers as temporary and failed to envisage the emergence of social 
problems." 
In 1968, a study on foreign workers in the Virgin Islands 
stated that the concept of "temporary" foreign workers was totally 
inadequate. The escalating growth of the Virgin Islands' economy 
since the late 1950s, together with the large percentage of foreign 
workers constituting the work force, made the workers' classification 
as "temporary" grossly inappropriate. 2 
lU.S. Congress, House, Non-Immigrant Alien Labor Program on the 
Virgin Islands of the United States, pp. 5-13. 
2Social, Educational Research and Development, Inc., Aliens in 
the United States Virgin Islands: Temporary Workers in a Permanent 
Economy, pp. 3 and 21. By 1968 it was estimated that 45 percent of 
the total labor force of 27,000 workers were non-immigrants. See U.S. 
Congress, House, Non-Immigrant Alien Labor Program on the Virgin 
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For at the same time that they were officially temporary, these 
foreign workers became an integral part of Virgin Islands society--
intermarrying, establishing permanent households and indicating a 
determination to remain in the United States Virgin Islands if allowed 
to do so. They also were a vital link in the Islands' economy, since 
. no other effective way existed of recruiting a supplementary labor 
force. 1 
___________                                                                                                                                                                                
continually ignored social problems generated by this steadily 
growing non-citizen labor force. The inevitable result was that a 
large, increasingly visible segment of the population2 enjoyed few 
social, political, or economic rights--they were second-class citizens 
and treated according1y.3 They could be fired at will and were subject 
to summary deportation. The longer they were ignored, the more their 
problems festered and infected the whole population. 
The 1968 study stated that no evidence existed to suggest that 
any agency or institution in the Virgin Islands was particularly 
interested in the problem of aliens. Insofar as can be determined, 
the 1968 study was the only example of any broad effort to generate 
lLewis, OPe cit., p. 220. 
2It was estimated that aliens represented 
Virgin Islands population and 30 percent of the 
foreign-born who had not attained citizenship. 
House, Non-Immigrant Alien Labor Program on the 
United States, p. 1$. 
12 percent of the 1960 
19-70 population were 
See U.S. Congress, 
Virgin Islands of the 
              Ope cit., p. 226 and Social', Educational, Research and 
Development, Inc., Aliens in the United States Virgin Islands: 
Temporary Workers in a Permanent Economy, p. 2. 
interest in the foreign-worker problem,l Even when the impact of the 
foreign workers could no longer be officially ignored, the Virgin 
Islands'government denied them social services with the excuse that 
they were not United States citizesn. 
This remarkable example of official myopia was defensible in 
terms of conserving scarce resources for the short term, but un-
questionably was indenfensible in relation to the long-term stability 
of the society. What arguably began as a controllable phenomenon--
the influx of foreign workers with their specialized problems--was 
deliberately allowed to grow until it had assumed the proportions of 
a plague. The fact that the United States Virgin Islands government 
had restricted access to federal government resources compounded the 
problem, prolonging both the engineering of a feasible solution and 
its application. 
Thus, the second hypothesis was supported by the research 
findings. 
Federal Government Support. The third hypothesis stated that 
"the federal government paid no attention to whether or not the local 
government could deal with the socioeconomic consequences of migratory 
workers." The Department of the Interior's position toward the Virgin 
Islands saw a major policy shift shortly after the appointment of a 
lSocial, Educational,Research and Development, Inc., Aliens in 
the United States Virgin Islands: Temporary Workers in a Permanent 
Economy, p. 2. Funds for the study had been secured by the College 
of the Virgin Islands which sponsored the study from Title I of the 
Higher Education Act of 1965. A review of available background 
materials at the College of the Virgin Islands on this study also 
seemed to indicate that the College had not received the direct support 
of the Virgin Islands governor, although government agencies partici-
pated in providing the needed information. 
democratic governor in 1961. It was announced at the governor's 
inauguration that the Department would henceforth play an advisory 
role rather than an administrative role in Virgin Islands affairs. l 
This action effectively removed the Department of the Interior from 
responsibility for determining whether the local government could 
deal with the socioeconomic consequences of the large foreign-labor 
force. 
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The                                 federal agencies involved in the                      __________ __ -------------------------------
workers' program were the Justice Department's Immigration and 
Naturalization Service and the Department of Labor. The                  
pursued by both of, these agencies until 1967 can be most politely 
described as ones of benign neglect. For example, in 1960 a survey 
of the Virgin Islands Employment Service's procedures for determining 
availability of indigenous workers prior to issuing temporary workers' 
certifications found deficiencies in the protection afforded to 
domestic workers. However, no action was taken because of              
differences between the Department of Labor and the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service. 
Since the 1955 Congressional Subcommittee recommendations the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service had permitted' temporary workers 
to hold permanent jobs in the Virgin Islands. As tourism became 
less seasonal, it also became more difficult to distinguish between 
seasonal and permanent employment, yet no action whatsoever was taken 
by the Iwnigration Service. 
lEdward A. O'Neill, Ope cit., pp. 69-70. 
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By the end of the 1960s, the foreign workers were an essential 
ingredient in the Virgin Islands economy. The increased dependence 
on foreign workers had forced down wages in jobs where they were 
present in large numbers. The high cost of living and low wages in 
the Virgin Islands precluded recruitment of workers from the United 
States or its territories. 
By 1965 when the acting director of the Office of the Territories 
became one of the foreign worker program's earliest critics, the 
situation had become uncontrollable. l Later corrective actions by 
the Department of Labor and the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
were necessarily of a scale that was clearly beyond the reach of the 
local government. The third hypothesis, then, was supported by the 
research findings in the study. 
Scarce Resources: 
The fourth hypothesis stated that "the local government disre-
garded the needs of the temporary alien workers because they wanted 
to preserve scarce services for the native-born and voting population." 
During the 1960s economic development increased the supply of jobs in 
the public sector. The majority of these jobs were held by indigenous 
workers, fostering satisfaction among Virgin Islanders. 
By 1970, however, the foreign-labor population had grown so 
large that when the local government was compelled by a district court 
decision2 to grant the foreign workers'                         children public 
lU.S. Congress, House, Non-Immigrant Alien Labor Program on 
the Virgin Islands of the United States, pp. 15-17 and 26-27. 
2Hosier v. Evans, 314 F. Supp. 316 (Virgin Islands 1970). 
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schooling and other benefits, the entire society was engulfed by the 
problem of extending the newly won benefits. 
Soon thereafter, programs such as surplus foods or medical care, 
initially available only to low-income Virgin Islanders or Virgin 
Islands residents from the United States mainland, were extended to 
all low-income Virgin Islands residents,including foreign workers and 
their families. Extension of these services dramatically reinforced 
the notion of conserving scarce                          ______________________________________ ___ 
A society in transition must improvise. For example, public 
school schedules were revised to accommodate two shifts per day. 
Students crammed what had been a six-hour day into four hours. The 
emerging Virgin Islands middle class, luxuriating in its newly 
achieved conspicuous consumption and political clout, perceived the 
foreign workers as a threat to their life-style. Thus, the foreign 
workers and their families were not infrequently stigmatized as the 
cause of all of the society's ills. 
In fact, however, the foreign workers were lowly scapegoats, 
consigned to the bottom of a class structure, exercising little or 
no power, receiving few of the benefits to which they became officially 
entitled. l 
We may venture to suggest that their position was the classic 
one of a society's most deprived group.                       the fourth hypothesis 
IAn Arthur D. Little study, Inflation and Economic Growth in the 
United States Virgin Islands, in" April 1974, found that the cost of 
living in the Virgin Islands was approximately 20 percent higher than 
on the mainland, pp. v-vii. 
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of our study was adequately supported by the research findings. 
Local Government 'Influence. The fifth hypothesis states that 
"the local government's failure to develop adequate policies and          
grams to deal with the consequences of the temporary alien-worker 
program is directly related to the inability of the local government 
to influence federal policies." As we have observed, the unplanned 
and unmanaged growth of the late 1950s and the 1960s, together with 
the Islands government's inability to fulfull the needs of its 
citizens,was connected directly to the Islands' struggle for self-
government and economic development. 
Since the Islands' purchase and transfer from Denmark to the 
United States in 1917, the indigenous leaders encountered severe 
difficulties in achieving, first, a clarification of the Islands' 
status and entitlements, and, second, a representative system of 
government. These two aspects created far-reaChing problems as 
there were no accepted guidelines concerning how the United States 
Virgin Islands should be treated                     other United States 
territories, mainland states, or citizens. For example, in travel 
to and from the United States, Virgin Islanders were treated similarly 
to other United States citizens. In voting for the President and the 
Vice President of the United States, they were excluded. In fact, 
this particular citizen right has not been extended to any United 
States territories. In regard to income taxes, the Islanders were 
included but treated differently because United States Virgin Islands 
income taxes went into the local treasury rather than to the federal 
government. 
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This lack of clarity is dramatically illustrated in terms of 
the social welfare programs extended to the United States Virgin 
Islands. For example, the United States Virgin Islands was included 
in the public-assistance programs, but, unlike the fifty states, 
financial participation by the federal government was limited by a 
ceiling and a fifty-fifty match requirement compared with the seventy-
five twenty-five match and the open-ended appropriation provided to 
the fifty states. Another example of the problem of defining 
entitlements was the Virgin Islands' exclusion from the Supplemental 
Security Income (551) program contrasted with the provision of state-
like privileges in the Virgin Islands food stamp program. 
This prejudicial treatment created severe hardships for Virgin 
Islands residents. Specifically, public-assistance grants remained 
extremely low and were unable to meet basic needs. l Second, the 
Islands' aged, blind, and disabled residents were completely excluded 
from the more liberal provisions of the Supplemental Security Income 
program. Third, the necessity for using scarce local dollars for the 
other social welfare programs limited the funds available to improve 
and expand the administrative structure and organization of the food 
stamp program. 
The Islands' long, arduous struggle to win a representative 
system of government had a major impact. At critical moments in the 
Islands' history, the elected officials were unable to make major 
lAfter 1970, the monthly grant in the public-assistance program 
for a single individual was $52 and $166 for a family of four. 
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decisions because many of these decisions were by law made by the 
federal government. The implementation of the foreign-labor program 
in the 1950s was a case in point. 
The Virgin Islands legislature, the only branch of the Virgin 
Islands government elected by Virgin Islands residents, was unable 
to secure a two-thirds majority needed to pass a resolution favoring 
the importation of foreign labor. Nevertheless, the findings and 
recommendations of a United States Congressional subcommittee were 
ultimately responsible for a less restrictive interpretation by the, 
Immigration and Naturalization Service of what constituted temporary 
labor.l 
As discussed in Chapter III, the program was designed without 
the participation of any of the people's elected representatives. 
This problem, however, was very similar to problems experienced in 
certain state counties and public welfare departments in the United 
States in that they did not share in the decision-making process 'at 
the federal level. Given the similarity between the Virgin Islands 
and small counties, one cannot conclude that the local Virgin Islands 
government failure was totally related to its inability to influence 
federal policies. 
Presumably, the local government could have enforced the            
legislation that was designed to protect the resident workers and 
prevent the exploitation caused by the depressed wages resulting from 
lUnited States Congress, House, Non-Immiarant Alien Labor Pro-
gram on the Virgin Islands of the United States, A Special Study of 
the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law 
of the Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Congress, lst Session (1975), 
pp. 11-12. 
an overabundant labor supply. Instead, the local government chose 
not to enforce its own legislation for fear of driving away the 
business entrepreneurs who were deemed essential to the growth of 
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the Virgin Islands economy. The same fear also led the local govern-
ment to devote a disproportionate share of its revenues to capital 
expenditures, instead of to health, welfare, and education services 
that would have alleviated the worst consequences of the foreign-labor 
________________                 .• ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
It should also be pointed out that the government expenditures 
were very much influenced by the ready availability of matching funds 
for capital improvements. It was also possible for local government 
to make health, welfare, and education services available to all those 
in need regardless of citizenship status. Of course, the improvements 
in the standard of living of indigenous Virgin Islanders would not 
have been realized so rapidly. 
In the light of the options available to the local government, 
therefore, it must be concluded that the fifth hypothesis was not 
totally supported by the data in our study. 
Now that the hypotheses of our study have been reviewed, we 
shall turn to an examination of the policy implications. 
Policy Implications 
Government policies in the Virgin Islands failed to fully 
embrace the consequences of economic development and the population 
explosion. Although non-citizens were ignored, the official view 
was that the government extended the benefits of economic progress 
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to everyone. The contribution of the foreign workers to the society 
was interpreted consistently as a negative. As this population 
expanded) its members became proportionately harder to ignore and 
shunt aside. 
Lewis described the essence of the problem as a rapidly in-
creasing population accompanied by very little planned effort to 
accelerate welfare facilities and services.1 Indeed, this pronounced 
lack of planned effort resulted in what Cafferty and Chestang described 
as ineffective or destructive policies, because they ignored the 
reality of the society and thus failed to respond to it. 2 Hopefully, 
the findings in the present study can be used as the foundation for 
three major implications on the development of socioeconomic policy in 
the United States Virgin Islands. 
First, if a migratory work force is to be continued, then obvi-
ously its members should be accorded access to ordinary things such 
as services, health care, free education for themselves and their chil-
dren, family ·reunifications, and legal services. Thus, the Virgin 
Islands' government must develop policies that will enable the migran.t 
workers to become and remain healthy, productive, and contributing mem-
bers of Virgin Islands society. The basic goal should be integration 
into the community. Otherwise, as this study has illustrated, mutual 
lL . . ewl.S, op. Cl. t • , p. 225. 
2pastora San Juan Cafferty and Leon Chestang, editors, The 
Diverse Society: Implications for Social Policy                                  
National Association of Social Workers, 1976), p. XII. 
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hostility and alienation will surface between the indigenous 
population and the foreign workers. 
The experience of the Virgin Islands has some parallels in 
other parts of the world. Germany, France, Latin America and . Switzerland all at one time or another have imported large numbers 
of laborers to fuel their economic development. These areas, like 
the Virgin Islands, have also responded to them negatively but are 
eventually faced with determining their status or providing services 
to facilitate their integration into the community or deporting them. 
The experiences in these countries may also provide some policy guide-
lines or alternatives that might be useful in determining the social 
and economic cost of integrating foreign labor populations. 
If the costs of a foreign labor population are then deemed to 
be unacceptable, then the costs of a slower rate of economic develop-
ment should be anticipated and recognized in the formulation and 
execution of official policy. In the long term, this step precludes 
the fostering of an illusion of prosperity. 
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A case in pOint was the criticism leveled against the Virgin 
Islands government in the national news media and by the federal govern-
ment in the late 1960s about the living conditions of foreign workers. l 
Although the program had been implemented at the insistence of the 
business entrepreneurs, they were not held responsible for the 
deplorable living conditions in which the migrant worker and his family 
were forced to live. 
Furthermore, the entry of a mi.grant work force for low salaried, 
dead-end employment perpetuates a low-wage economy for two reasons. 
First, the foreign workers tend to be docile because of their tenuous 
place in society, thus few demands are made for salary increases or 
improved working conditions. Second, because people who are low wage 
earners are eligible for public assistance, food stamps, and              
housing, low wages are perpetuated since the basic needs are met through 
lFor examples of this criticism see the following sources: Jack 
Starr, "Virgin Islands: Shame in the U.S. Tropics," Look (March 10, 
1970), pp. 17-21; Edward A. O'Neill. "Virgin Isles Alienate Aliens," 
Washington Post (March 14, 1971), p. D-3; J. Anthony Lukas, "The Plaint 
of the Virgin Islands: We have been encroached on, invaded, engulfed;" 
The New York Times Magazine (April 18, 1971), pp. 30-31 and 101-110; 
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 
Hearings on HR 7330 and related bills and matters relating to election 
procedures and economic affairs in the Virgin Islands, before the Sub-
committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, 90th Congress, 1st sess. 
(1967), serial 90-15, pt. 2, pp. 694-700. Ibid., pp. 701-703, for 
letter of August 12, 1965 from John Kirwan, acting director, Office of 
Territories, Department of The Interior To Governor Ralph M. Paiewonsky; 
and U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearing before the Committee on Interior 
and Insular Affairs on the Nomination of Carlos Garcia Camacho, of 
Guam to be Governor of Guam and the Nomination of Melvin H. Evans, 
of the Virgin Islands, to be Governor of the Virgin Islands, 91st 
Congress, 1st sess. (1969), pp. 9-15. 
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The end result of such a deliberative process is the conscious 
weighing of the pros and cons, the costs and benefits of one policy 
decision compared with another. l Too, such comprehensive planning 
would eliminate the chaos created by the unplanned and unmanaged 
growth of the 1950s and 1960s and the early part of the 1970s. This 
issue of citizenship would be muted, the emphasis placed instead on 
the provision of servi.ces to residents. 
Second, the Virgin Islands government, should the foreign-labor 
program be continued, must make adequate plans for the entry of a 
migrant work force. The failure to take this step will cost the 
Virgin Islands government a hidden subsidy to those industries or 
.businesses that hire migrant workers. Another cost will be the 
undermining of the government's authority. 
lThe Economic Development Policy Guidelines developed by the 
governor's Economic Policy Council inlcuded among its ten principal 
problems that of the Islands' unplanned growth. It was largely 
responsive to the immediate needs of the market process and resulted 
in a disproportionate demand on the territory's limited resources. 
The council recommended the institution of a program of growth 
management to achieve a sustainable economic growth. One of the 
objectives to achieve. this goal was to discourage the population 
spurts that resulted from the importation of labor. See Economic 
Policy Council, The Economic Development Policy Guidelines (St.Thomas: 
Government Printing Office, 1978). 
the government subsidy programs, Thus, low wages become the rule 
rather than the exception and the government is forced to supply 
more social services. Therefore government should weigh the costs 
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of subsidizing low-wage private-sector employees. Such a step would 
inevitably benefit the society in terms of improved government manage-
ment. 
Third, the federal government must be flexible to the extent of 
recognizing the importance of regionalism. When the United States 
government decided to partially implement a               welfare system in 
the Virgin Islands, it transported a system that clashed with the 
Virgin Islands culture. Insufficient funds were allocated to recruit-
ment and training of social service professionals. This resulted in 
what Lewis called a grossly unequal relationship between the United 
Sttes and the Virgin Islands. l The paradox was that the United States 
government expected the Department of Social Welfare to provide 
comprehensive services without competent staff, adequate grants, and 
acceptable office space. 
The United States government must develop appropriate policies. 
For example, these might well include allowing the Virgin Islands 
government the freedom and the technical assistance to design a plan 
that would best fulfill the human service needs of its population. 
This plan should account for the specific needs of Virgin Islands 
society, particularly its large migratory work force, the nature of 
available human services personnel, and the constraints created by 
lLewis, OPe cit., p. 104. 
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limited access to ongoing in-service training and education advancement 
opportunities on-island. The plan should be subject to the same 
accountability standards of existing federal programs. The only major 
difference should be that the program fulfills locally defined needs. 
Indeed, the regional needs of each state and territory should be 
incorporated into federal program implementation. 
Government Decision-Making. 
The United States government's failure to develop either a 
theoretical perspective or a clearly defined public policy to deal 
with its United States territories is an illustration of what might 
be termed vintage imperialisnl. For example, the extension of citizen-
ship to Virgin Islands residents, universal suffrage, immigration laws, 
powers of the local executive, legislative, and judicial branches of 
government, and the difficulty in defining the Virgin Islands' 
territorial status were all negotiated on a haphazard, trial-and-error 
basis. Each issue was resolved after a prolonged struggle by Virgin 
Islands residents. Throughout this struggle no discernible pattern 
emerged; Virgin Islanders never knew what right would be extended at 
a particular point in time. 
As noted previously, the sharing of power between the indigenous 
leaders and representatives of the United States executive, legislative, 
and judicial branches of government is seen by Lewis as a grossly 
unequal relationship.l The result is that the Virgin Islands                        
lLewis, OPe cit., p. 104. 
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decision-making process is inhibited by three major constraints, 
The first major constraint is that critical decisions about 
the Islands' future are made by people with a limited understanding 
and knowledge of the Islands. For example, legislation proposed in 
the United States Senate in 1977,1 known as the Carter Amnesty bill, 
recommended that illegal aliens on the United States mainland should 
be accorded amnesty. 
While this is a benevolent gesture toward improving the lives 
of people from                       States areas, it would create severe hard-
ship in the United States Virgin Islands. It would not resolve the 
status of the foreign workers who live in the Virgin Islands, but do 
not qualify due to inadequate residence. Governor Juan Luis, testifying 
before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary on May 17, 
1978, stated emphatically that the impact of the immediate status 
adjustment of some sixteen thousand temporary and illegal alien 
residents would create severe hardship for the local government. 
While supporting the concept of absorption,. he felt that the proposed 
legislation would harm the unique economic, social, and political 
conditions of the United States Virgin Islands.2 
The second major constraint is the fact that decisions made in 
the national interest often had severe unanticipated consequences in 
the United States Virgin Islands. For example. the many changes in 
the Social Security Act's public-assistance provisions made during 
1United States, Congress, Senate, A Bill to Amend the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act, and for Other                     S. 2252. 95th Congress, 
1st Session (1977). 
2Statement of Governor Juan Luis of the Virgin Islands on S. 2252, 
95th Congress--A Bill "To Amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
and for Other Purposes" (Introduced by Mr. Eastland for himself, Mr. 
Kennedy, Mr. Bentsen, and Mr.                           United States Senate 
the 1960s placed severe strains on the Department of Social Welfare 
since it had neither the funds, staff, nor resources to respond to 
the new initiatives that in fact were designed to address mainland 
problems. 
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As we saw, a major problem that affected the delivery of services 
was the lack of professionally trained staff at the supervisory and 
administrative levels. The requirement that program directors have 
a master's degree in social work plus appropriate experience resulted 
in off-island recruitment. Eventually, some supervisory and adminis-
trative staff were trained through the Department's scholarship pro-
gram. Despite some progress, however, staffing of professional 
positions was a continued problem and vacancies at administrative and 
supervisory positions were long-standing. Additionally, it was often 
difficult to recruit bachelor-degree workers. Even supportive positions, 
such as clerks, remained unfilled for long periods due to budget 
problems, red tape, and the limited supply of workers. 
The absence of supervisory and administrative staff meant that 
effective                   were not developed and workers were not properly 
trained. Thus, the impact of personnel vacancies damaged service 
delivery. For example, public assistance recipients were entitled to 
grants irregardless of the staffing situation, but regular recertifi-
cations, changes in client circumstances, and services needed by 
clients often could not be provided. 
The 1960, 1962, 1965, 1966, and 1967 Social Security Act 
amendments required a series of reorganizations and increased the Depart-
ment's compliance problems. The 1960 amendment created a Medical 
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Assistance to the Aged program which included public-assistance 
recipients and other low-income aged persons. The addition of a new 
program, the implementation of new regulations, and staff supervision 
and training had to be carried out without significant personnel 
expansion. The 1962 amendment required the Virgin Islands Department 
of Social Welfare to accommodate public-assistance recipients. However, 
the 75 percent federal funding match for meeting this requirement, 
provided to the United States mainland agencies, was not extended to 
the Virgin Islands. Nevertheless, the Virgin Islands government was 
expected to comply. 
The problem, then, lay in the United States government mandating 
certain services but not extending funds equal to mainland agencies 
formulas. 
The third major constraint is the fact that Virgin Islands 
leaders are handicapped in their attempts to address issues of local 
concern since Congressional legislation and constitutional provisions 
take precedence. Public Law 91-225, for example,                         a policy 
of reunification of spouses and minor children of foreign workers. 
The effect of this legislation was the promotion of family reunifi-
cations on a massive scale in the Virgin Islands. It was estimated 
that some twenty thousand to thirty thousand aliens entered the Virgin 
Islands as a result of this legislation. l Prior to this decision, low-
income foreign workers who brought their foreign-born children into the 
lUnited States Congress, House, Non-Immigrant Alien Labor Pro-
gram on the Virgin Islands of the United States, p. 31. 
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United States Virgin Islands had to enroll them in private school and 
pay tuition fees. The combination of PubIc Law 91-225 and the Hosier 
versus Evans decision facilitated the entry of foreign-born children 
into the public schools. 
The late Governor Cyril E. King described the situation thusly: 
The result of this ruling has been a disastrous overburdening 
of the schools, leading to a state of incipient collapse of 
the educational system. The unforeseen effects of the change 
(in federal immigration law) are now emerging in all areas of 
public service. This sudden, unplanned increase in the 
population, almost all of whom are poverty stricken, has 
thrown the service providing sector of local government into 
a desperate, chaotic situation. l 
In the special study by the subcommittee of the Judiciary 
Committee in 1975, it was noted that "it is questionable whether the 
Judiciary Committee would have recommended reunification of foreign 
workers' families if it had been fully informed by the Department of 
Justice as to the probably impact of the H-4 provisions on the Virgin 
Islands.,,2 The lack of effective input by Virgin Islands leaders was 
related directly to this particular problem. 
Conclusion 
The study seemingly supports Gil's view that the 
characteristic features of the existing social policy system reflect 
attitudes and practices of exploitation toward the natural environment 
and toward human beings, inequalities in circumstances of living of 
members and groups in society, and a high incidence of alienation in 
lStatement of Governor Cyril E. King, in Washington, D.C. on 
July 14, 1975. 
2United States Congress, House, Non-Immigrant Alien Labor Pro-
gram on the Virgin Islands of the United States, p. 32. 
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human experience and.relations. These attitudes and practices were 
quite evident in the Virgin Islands. Their continuation will further endan-
ger the quality of life in the Virgin Islands. Major changes are 
thus mandatory.l 
Gill 2 argues that a society's dominant value premises will only 
be changed if revisions in the perceptions and consciousness of large' 
segments of the population occur with respect to the true interests 
and the reality in which these population segments live. Implementation 
of the above policy recommendations by both the federal and local 
governments will require reassessment, understandings and clarification • 
.-.. The relationship of the Virgin Islands government vis-a-vis the 
United States government must be refined. Too, the cultural, socio-
economic, and developmental differences and constraints of an island 
community with limited resources must be allotted careful, and 
respectful, attention. 
Both the dilemma and the solution for the United States Virgin 
Islands might well be summed up by the following: 
If you give a man a fish 
You feed him for a day 
If you teach him how to fish 
You feed him for a lifetime. 
IDavid G. Gil, ·Unrave1ling Social Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Schenkman Publishing Company, 1973), pp. 148-142. 
2I bid., p. 152. 
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